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IV. RECASTING THE DEBATE: SOME CAUTIONS AND A MODEST
PRESCRIPTION
A. Limitations of the Antidiscrimination Sentiment
B. Recasting the Debate
At every point in the history of large corporations there has been
some moment of impact on the community when either the com-
munity felt the corporation was not fulfilling its obligations or al-
ternatively, the corporation realized it was up against a situation
it could not handle. In every case, the result has been either a
friendly and orderly, or an unfriendly and disorderly, hassle .... f
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance regulation in this country, as with the law generally,
is more the accretion of specific responses to immediately perceived
problems than the product of ordered efforts to achieve funda-
mental objectives. Governmental concern with the insurance de-
vice has grown slowly, without the guidance of integrated theory,
and with few decisive junctures to punctuate the otherwise incre-
mental patterns of development.' Occasionally, however, events do
occur which offer the prospect that a rationally derived agenda of
goals might be coupled with at least a fleeting consensus to produce
a significant departure from the course suggested by the regulatory
system's existing objectives and existing clientele groups. To some,
the civil disturbances which racked Newark and Detroit in the
summer of 1967 appeared to present such an opportunity. Many
of the riot victims were uninsured or underinsured, and the specter
of additional riots of unknowable frequency and dimension threat-
ened to precipitate a mass exodus of property insurers from central
city areas. With the possibility that crisis might impose what
mature reflection would suggest, a special presidential panel was
convened. 2 Its recommendations for "Meeting the Insurance Crisis
t Cleveland, The Blurred Line Between "Public" & "Private," in ETHICS
& BIGNESS: SCIENTIFIC, ACADEMIC, RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND MILITARY
XIII, xxvi (quoting Adolf Berle) (H. Cleveland & H. Lasswell eds.
1962).
1. See generally J. HANSON, R. DINEEN, & M. JOHNSON, MONITORING COM-
PETITION: A MEANS OF REGULATING THE PRoPERTY AND LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE BusINss (1974); S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1960); E. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED
STATES (1927); STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Now IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION (1969); Kim-
ball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471 (1961).
2. The National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas
[hereinafter referred to as the Panel] was formed as an adjunct to
the parent National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to con-
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of our Cities"3 -- essentially, provision of federal reinsurance of the
riot hazard to those insurers who participate in approved state ef-
forts to guarantee adequate property insurance markets in urban
centers-soon found substantial embodiment in the Urban Property
Insurance Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968. 4 In the opinion
of at least one influential observer, the new law was "the most sig-
nificant insurance legislation adopted in this century."5
Any attempt to evaluate the accuracy of this assessment must
await a perspective that only additional time can provide. From
this vantage, less than a decade into the history of the programs
spawned by the federal legislation, the implications of these de-
velopments remain elusive. True, the legislation dramatically intro-
duced a potentially important federal institutional presence into
what has been primarily a state-based regulatory system.6 For a
sider the insurance problems of urban core businessmen and residents.
The Panel was chaired by Governor Hughes of New Jersey, and
counted among its members former Governor Scranton of Pennsyl-
vania, the Mayor of Washington, D.C., the presidents of a major stock
insurance company and a major mutual insurance company, the presi-
dent of a life insurer with substantial investments in the inner cities,
and an Assistant Attorney General of the United States.
3. THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-
AFFECTED AREAS, MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CrrIEs (1968)
[hereinafter cited as the PANEL REPORT]. The basic findings and rec-
ommendations of the Panel are also included in REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONARY ADVISORY COMAiSSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS app. G. (1968).
The formal hearings conducted by the Panel are reported as THE PRESI-
IDENT'S NATIONAL ADviSoRY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT AFFECTED
AREAS, HEARINGS (1967) [hereinafter cited as the PANEL HEARINGS].
4. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82
Stat. 476 (codified primarily as 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749 bbb-1 to 1749 bbb-21
(1970)) [hereinafter referred to as the Federal Act].
5. Denenberg, The Federal Reinsurance Program, BEST'S INS. NEWS
(P & L), Oct. 1968, at 28.
6. Since United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944), declared that the business of insurance involved transactions
in commerce which could be the subject of federal regulation, and the
McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1970), expressed the congres-
sional decision that continued regulation and taxation by the states
was in the public interest, insurance regulation has been embodied in
a basically state system whose jurisdiction is dependent upon the con-
tinued sufferance of the Congress. The McCarran Act made the Sher-
man Act applicable to cases of boycott, coercion or intimidation, but
provided that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act "shall be applicable to the business of insur-
ance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
In fact, of course, the federal government's activities have impinged
on the state-based regulatory arrangement in a number of ways. The
boundaries of the McCarran Act exemption are continuously being re-
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variety of reasons, however, most of that potential for a relocation
of regulatory authority continues inchoate. True, also, the pro-
grams have written nearly five million property insurance policies
that otherwise might not have been placed,7 and in some states the
programs have become the largest writers of property insurance.
In other states, however, the programs have died, and it is far from
clear that they offer a lasting solution to property insurance availa-
bility problems or that they signal any generalized departure from
existing regulatory traditions in the name of "availability." Still,
if these developments have not unequivocally drawn regulatory au-
thority toward Washington nor wrenched inherited conceptions of
regulatory function on to a new course, it is increasingly apparent
that they have helped to jar the regulatory system into a period
of self-conscious reassessment of some of the fundamental assump-
tions of insurance regulation.
Importantly, this period of introspection has proved more the
product of the Panel's recommendations than of the process by
which they were prepared. Although the usual justification for in-
vestigatory commissions emphasizes their potential for taking the
synoptic view,8 goals for societal action rarely come neatly labeled
defined. See generally Sfikas, The Quality of State Regulation Neces-
sary to Invoke the Insurance Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, 1973
INS. L.J. 305. Beyond that, nonregulatory federal involvement in a
broad range of insurance programs has long been an important indi-
rect influence on the directions of the industry and its regulation. For
an able summary of the situation prior to the developments discussed
in this article, see Larson, The Government's Role in Insurance Mar-
keting, National Underwriter (F & C), Sept. 8, 1967, at 1, col. 1, re-
printed in Hearings on S. 1484 Before the Subcomm. on Small Business
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1967). The best summary of the interests, values, and judgments
implicit in varying allocations of regulatory control to federal and
state agencies is Kimball, The Case for State Regulation of Insurance,
in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 411 (S. Kimball & H.
Denenberg eds. 1969). For a recent status report, see Johnson, Insur-
ance Regulation at the Crossroads, 1977 INS. L.J. 7.
7. BEST'S REviEw (P & L), Dec. 1976, at 5. Annual insurance in force
placed through the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements [hereinafter
referred to as FAIR] programs in recent years has exceeded
$16,000,000,000.
8. Compare Bell, Government by Commission, PUB. INTEREST, No. 3,
Spring 1966, at 3 (extolling the special potential of governmental com-
missions) with Wilson, A Reader's Guide to the Crime Commission
Report, PUB. INTEREST, No. 9, Fall 1967, at 65 (outlining the particular
constraints which prevent most commissions from offering a "solution"
to the "problems" posed). A more comprehensive treatment is pro-
vided by A. PLAT'r, THE PouiTcs OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917-1970
(1971). For an extensive bibliography, see Sulzner, The Policy
Process and the Uses of National Governmental Study Commissions,
24 W. POL. Q. 438 n.3 (1971).
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or ranked, and few commissions possess the will or the means to stay
long in the business of attempting to reconcile competing interests
and objectives. So it was with the Panel. Its role, fully as much as
fact finding and policy recommendation, quickly became a frankly
political one: to explore and extend the limits of federal action
through its consultations with interested groups, and to generate
public interest and support for its ultimate recommendations. It
viewed its primary function to be to develop an acceptable legisla-
tive package. The near unanimity of approval which hailed the
Panel Report and the ease with which the implementing legislation
attained congressional ratification attested the Panel's success, but
they also signaled the limitations of the Report. The need to pro-
duce proposals which could accommodate the programs being de-
veloped independently by several states and which could be ex-
pected to evoke a broad range of support among widely disparate
groups inevitably restricted the Panel's attention to the short run
and forced it to limn its suggestions with broad strokes. Quickly it
became apparent that many read only what they wanted to read in
the Report, and that the federal legislation left serious problems of
concept as well as detail to be resolved by HUD, state regulatory
authorities, and the insurance industry.9
This article is an examination of that process, the residual
market mechanisms it has produced, and their more significant im-
pacts on the property insurance regulatory system. In many ways
this is a case study, and as such it supplies a mixture of the descrip-
tive and the thematic. Throughout, however, its focus is less upon
the traditional concerns of case studies of public regulation-de-
veloping and testing generalizations about political and administra-
tive behaviors, and determining substantive issues of who gets
what-and more upon tracing the evolution of the dominant ideas
and habits of thought that have helped to fashion that development.
This emphasis not only reflects the conventional assumption that
9. This is not to suggest that members of the Panel were unaware that
implementation of their recommendations would require additional
significant decisions. See, e.g., the comment by Panel member Wozen-
craft: "[T]he Panel's report and [the House bill which eventually was
enacted] set forth only the basic operating structure of the FAIR plans.
We expect that each State insurance authority will build upon these
plans and adopt whatever additional provisions are needed to meet
local requirements." Hearings on H.R. 15625 before the Subcomm. on
Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and. Currency, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1076 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 House Hearings]. See
also id. at 168 (Representative Moorhead, the chief congressional ex-
pert, urging that the proposed legislation was too explicit and that
more discretion should be left to the states to tailor the programs to
local needs).
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politically significant belief patterns "shape the boundaries within
which policy decisions are reached,"'1 but also applies the reciprocal
insight that the content and intensity of attitudes and perceptions
are themselves influenced by policy decisions and the vocabularies
and processes through which they are made." For these reasons
this article does not approach the residual property insurance
mechanisms solely as the products of particular episodes of public
policy development, to be tested as attempted "solutions" to a de-
fined property insurance "availability problem." Instead they are
viewed as temporary accommodations of a complex mix of conflict-
ing interests, values, and perceptions, able to both reflect and af-
fect the way "availability problems" are apprehended and treated
by the public, the insurance industry, and public officials.
Central to this perspective is the notion that property insurance
availability problems in one important dimension are political prob-
lems, and therefore in large part are a function of the language
used to define them. The point extends beyond the assumption that
the labels individuals and groups attach to their concerns may be
a useful index to the interests, attitudes, and perceptions upon
which such dissatisfactions are grounded; the discontents provoked
by nonprice supply rationing of property insurance draw their
public meanings from the language by which they are identified.
Thus, as Murray Edelman persuasively argues,
language is an integral facet of the political scene. It is not simply
an instrument for describing events, but is a part of events, strongly
shaping their meaning and the political roles officials and mass
publics see themselves as playing. In this sense, language, events,
and self-conceptions mutually define each other.12
For this reason, the labels, myths, metaphors, and symbols that facil-
itate rhetorical reconciliation of conflicting interests and percep-
tions should not be accepted uncritically as accurate guides to public
needs or to likely moves in public policy. Neither should they be
ignored, for often they prove to be "an instrument for shaping polit-
ical support and opposition and the premises upon which decisions
are made."'"
10. Edelman, Language, Myths and Rhetoric, Soc'y, July/Aug. 1975, at
14.
11. M. EDELmAN, POLrICS AS SyMOLic AcOTio 68 (1971). See also Ben-
nett, Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics, 8 PHILos. & REW-
o ic 23 (1975); M. SKIDMORE, MEDICARE AND THE AMERicAN RHEToRIc
oF REcONciLrAiIo ch. 2 (1970). Cf. Posner, Theories of Economic Reg-
ulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. 335, 355 (1974) (discussing possible applica-
tions of the economic theory of fraud to attempts to explain the per-
sistence of misleading rhetorical constructs in discussions of regulatory
policy).
12. Edelman, supra note 10.
13. M. EDELMAN, supra note 11, at 68. See also K. BOULDING, THE IMAGE:.
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Thus, one theme that recurs throughout this article concerns the
attractions, malleability, and limitations of an antidiscrimination
prescription for property insurance problems. The public definition
given availability problems by the Panel--"failure to distinguish
between good and bad risks in an area regarded as blighted"14-
initially elicited broad acquiescence because the discrimination diag-
nosis appeared to tap a central strain in popular perceptions of
availability problems, seemed to suggest no marked departures from
the usual logic of regulatory concerns, and yet was not inconsistent
with efforts by major elements of the insurance industry to invest
traditions of industry "voluntarism" and "responsibility" with
sufficient content to permit avoidance of publicly defined and
imposed limitations on the underwriting discretion of individual in-
surers. For a time, as we shall see, the contextualization supplied
by the Panel's rhetoric of discrimination helped to obscure poten-
tially competing perceptions of the problem and critical points of
conflict among those pressed into the programs. Later, as it became
increasingly clear that the federal legislation had sealed a bargain
made possible by the ambiguity of its terms, and paid for in a cur-
rency that was rapidly slipping into disfavor, the discrimination
label continued to offer a seductive organizing conception for the
interpretation of new pressures and new events, despite the be-
lated efforts of much of the insurance industry to construct and
promote an alternative version of the property insurance avail-
ability problem. At present, considerable energies are being ex-
pended in efforts to establish or to block acceptance of a new incar-
nation of the antidiscrimination formula as. guiding rhetoric for
grappling with availability concerns.' 5 This article chronicles the
origins and political potency of the antidiscrimination conception,
and the specific regulatory approach it is said to compel, but con-
cludes that it is of only limited value as an index to the complex-
ities of availability problems in property insurance markets.
Other closely related themes discussed in this article concern the
contributions of regulatory institutions and techniques to how
availability problems were perceived and to what the residual
market programs would be expected to accomplish. Thus, the early
identification of "unavailability" as a "regulatory" problem carried
KNOWLEDGE IN Li AND SOCIETY (1965); M. EDELMAN, THE SYmBOLic
USES or POLITICS (1964).
14. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 88.
15. Compare FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF Hous-
ING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FULL INSURANCE AvAIABILITY (1974)
[hereinafter cited as FULL INSURANCE AVALABILITY] with STANFORD
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE (1976).
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a range of channeling attitudes. The regulatory mode, after all, is
better suited to the assumption of some functions than others,16 and
established regulatory institutions tend to view new demands from
the perspective of existing regulatory goals and techniques. 17 More-
over, direct, interdictory regulatory interventions typically are one
thing, attempts to induce or coerce improved performances often
quite another.' s In this setting, for a rich mix of reasons, there was
a strong inclination to regard unavailability as the product of in-
surer failings. On the other hand, the existing arsenal of regulatory
weapons did not easily accommodate this new and ambiguous
"abuse." As a consequence, regulators turned to exhortations and
admonitions. This approach meshed well with industry voluntar-
ism designed to avoid any publicly defined limitations on under-
writing prerogatives. It gave the appearance of governmental con-
16. See, e.g., Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB.
AD. REv. 298, 299 (1972) (suggesting that regulatory techniques carry
a "distinct set of moral and political process consequences associated
with this kind of governmental commitment"); Lowi, American Busi-
ness, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL.
677 (1964) (suggesting a seminal taxonomy of political relationships
in which the determinative feature is the nature of the policy at
stake); L. Froman, The Categorization of Policy Contents, in POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 41 (A. Ranney ed. 1968); R. Salisbury,
The Analysis of Public Policy, in id. at 151 (adding "self regulatory"
to Lowi's basic divisions of policy contents into "regulatory," "distrib-
utive," and "redistributive" categories). An excellent recent synthesis
is provided by Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies:
Toward a More Adequate-and Less Pessimistic-Theory of "Clientele
Capture," 6 POL. Sci. 301 (1975).
17. See Hearings to Study Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 224 (1951), reprinted in L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 241-
42 (3d ed. 1960) (Judge Learned Hand criticizing the tendency of
regulatory institutions to "fall into grooves, just as the judges are so
apt to do"; he concludes, "And when they get into grooves, then God
save you to get them out of the grooves."). See also D. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCEss 467-68 (1951).
18. I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 18 (1970); PERFORMANCE
UNDER REGULATION (H. Trebing ed. 1971).
Inherently, regulation is lacking in precise standards, ei-
ther automatic or scientifically contrived. This defect is far
from fatal. The one inherent weakness, however, which may
prove fatal, is that regulation is essentially a restrictive rather
than a positive promotional instrument. It can restrain, as
does competition, but it cannot promote as does competition.
Only the threat of public ownership will suffice to improve
performance. It can offer inducements for performance but
it has no direct power to enforce it or insure it.
Lewis, Emphasis and Misemphasis in Regulatory Policy, in UTILITY
REGULATION 212, 245 (W. Shepherd & T. Gies eds. 1966).
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cern without the need to specify a coherent vision of availability
problems or to test the accuracy of doubts concerning the ability of
regulatory initiatives to improve industry performance. Even-
tually, as we shall see, this attitude became a part of the Panel Re-
port and the federal legislation. By making the shared respon-
sibilities and parceled authority of "creative federalism" the guid-
ing administrative approach for the programs, the Panel sought to
avoid the disturbance of existing patterns of state and federal reg-
ulation, and even the appearance of coercive regulation itself. The
price was high.1 9 The diffusion of authority over the course of the
programs made the residual market mechanisms impervious to ef-
fective public control. Moreover, it produced a lack of standards
concerning two of their central dimensions-coverage and price, and
a siphoning of industry and regulatory resources into rationalizing
differential impacts of the programs on their participants. As a re-
sult, issues that might have been viewed as primarily actuarial and
administrative instead have been framed increasingly as problems
of unjustified insurer discrimination, with consequent pressures for
remedial action in keeping with that perspective, and with the
added effect that other aspects of availability problems largely have
been screened out of public consideration and debate.
Examination of this process and of the residual market mecha-
nisms it has produced is especially appropriate at this time. "Avail-
ability problems" in a variety of insurance markets are asserting
claims for regulatory attention. The temptation to respond to such
demands with the attitudes and arrangements developed in the
property insurance context-as though the administrative struc-
19. Theodore Lowi's description of "interest group liberalism" captures
much of the motivation and many of the costs of this approach:
Government is obviously the most efficacious way of
achieving good purposes in our age. But alas, it is efficacious
because it is involuntary. To live with their ambivalence,
modern policymakers have fallen into believing that public
policy involves merely the identification of the problems to-
ward which government ought to be aimed. It pretends,
through "pluralism," "countervailing power," "creative fed-
eralism," "partnership," and "participatory democracy" that
the unsentimental business of coercion need not be involved
and that the unsentimental decisions about how to employ
coercion need not really be made at all. Stated in the ex-
treme, the policies of interest-group liberalism are end-
oriented but ultimately self-defeating. Few standards of im-
plementation, if any, accompany delegations of power to ad-
ministrators. The requirement of standards has been replaced
by the requirement of participation. The requirement of law
has been replaced by the requirement of contingency. As a
result the ends of interest-group liberalism are mere senti-
ments, therefore not really ends at all.
T. Lowi, THE END oF LiBERALISM 85 (1969).
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tures evolved there were neutral techniques that somehow could
be divorced from the special mix of history that produced them-
is not easily resisted.
The programs themselves warrant attention. The early 1970's
were generally favorable financial years for most property insurers,
with consequent reductions in the pressures on residual property
insurance programs. In mid-decade, though, a combination of ad-
verse underwriting results in standard property insurance markets
and reserve positions shrunk by stock market reverses made ques-
tions that had lain dormant for several years appear more pivotal.
The Federal Insurance Administration has declared the approach
embodied in existing residual property programs to be fundamen-
tally unsound and, despite the resistance of substantial elements
of the insurance industry, has been urging the adoption of its "Full
Insurance Availability" proposals as the basis for their replace-
ment.20 At the same time, opposition to renewal of the federal
legislation has surfaced in several quarters 2 1 and another federal
agency has prescribed a restructuring of the regulation of the prop-
erty-casualty insurance industry that appears to include attitudes
toward residual market programs dramatically at odds with those
espoused by the Federal Insurance Administration. 22 Clearly, then,
the debate is not yet ended; the struggle to influence how availa-
bility problems will be perceived and treated continues.23 An elab-
20. FULL INSURANCE AvAiLABILrry, supra note 15.
21. See, e.g., Insurance Advocate, Feb. 7, 1977, at 5, col. 1 (report of dis-
agreements between National Association of Independent Insurers and
American Insurance Association in testimony before Senate Banking
Committee).
22. UNITE STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORcE ON
ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES (1977), Teprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) 11 -8 (Jan. 18, 1977). The task force recommends estab-
lishing a system of federal chartering for insurers. Insurers could then
opt to continue under state charter within the McCarran Act exemp-
tion, or seek a federal charter and lose the exemption. However, a
state role would remain. Federally chartered insurers would be sub-
ject to state requirements that insurers participate in residual market
plans; states could "regulate the rates charged by federally-chartered
companies provided they were administered on a self-sustaining basis.
In lieu of cross-subsidization . . . the state could furnish a direct 'ex-
ternal' subsidy to individuals who could not afford insurance protec-
tion." Id. I-9. As we shall see, the funding proposal of the Justice
Department task force is quite different than the approach advocated
in FULL INSURANCE AVAILABILITY, supra note 15.
23. Professor Schattschneider's comment is apt in this setting:
Political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in
which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the
issues. As a matter of fact, the definition of the alternatives
is the supreme instrument of power. . . . He who determines
what politics is about runs the country, because the definition
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oration of the origins of the programs and the ideas and interests
that have contributed to the way they have developed may help
to increase understanding of both the problems and the programs
and may supply a framework that will clarify some aspects of the
current debate.
II. AVAILABILITY PROBLEMS: A PRELIMINARY
EXCURSUS
As with any social problem of broad impacts, the property in-
surance "availability problem" is a synthetic one-an organizing
label which abstracts its core from a number of discontents pro-
voked by restricted supplies of property insurance.24 The disparities
between perceptions of what is and expectations of what ought to
be are defined and redefined in property insurance, as elsewhere,
by the individuals and institutions who feel their impacts and by
those who study them.2 5 Thus, to those concerned with stimulating
of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice
of conflicts allocates power. It follows that all conflict is con-
fusing.
E. ScHATTscHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 68 (1960).
24. The perceptions following the 1967 riots are exhaustively collected in
PANEL HEARINGS, supra note 3. See also PANEL REPORT, supra note
3; Pfeffer, The Social Responsibility of Insurance: A Case Study at
Watts, 34 J. RISK & INS. 525 (1967).
25. The Panel Report eschewed any attempt to provide a precise official
definition of availability problems in favor of constructing a syndrome
of its more apparent characteristics. On the intellectual and institu-
tional constraints supporting this approach, see Marris, The Concept
of Social Problems: Vox Populi and Sociological Analysis, 21 Soc.
PaOBS. 305 (1974). Professor James Q. Wilson has made some of the
same points in characteristically colorful fashion: "If enough people
don't like something, it becomes a problem; if the intellectuals agree
with them, it becomes a crisis, any crisis must be solved; if it must
be solved, then it can be solved-and creating a new organization is
the way to do it." Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, 6 PUB. INTEREST
3, 6 (1967). Compare Miller, The Political Economy of Social Prob-
lems: From The Sixties to The Seventies, 24 Soc. PROBS. 630 (1976)
with R. VIERTON & R. NISBET, CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS (3d ed.
1971).
Adoption of this concept of property insurance availability prob-
lems means that this article will make no attempt to treat availability
concerns as a dysfunction from some paradigm optimal state of affairs.
For representative efforts of this latter sort, focusing chiefly on the
welfare economics of medical care insurance, see Arrow, Uncertainty
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. EcoN. REv. 945,
961 (1963) (in which Arrow offers the general assertion: "The wel-
fare case for insurance policies of all sorts is overwhelming. It follows
that the government should undertake insurance in those cases where
this market, for whatever reason, has failed to emerge."); Lees & Rice,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care: Comment,
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redevelopment of decaying urban centers, the property insurance
availability problem has been to short circuit the degenerative
spiral that results when construction and rehabilitation starts are
dependent on credit, credit is dependent on property insurance, and
property insurance is "unavailable." To property insurers, avail-
ability problems have been an embarrassment of poor public re-
lations, hostile insureds and producers, and vague fears of poten-
tial governmental displacement. To producers, availability prob-
lems have meant terminated or restricted relations with insurers,
reduced autonomy and increased expenses, and a crisis of customer
confidence. To insureds and prospective insureds, availability prob-
lems have been felt as cancellations, refusals to renew, low coverage
limits, and outright refusals to insure, all imposing their own toll
in reduced business opportunities and constricted economic and per-
sonal security. For all, though the nuances of diverse impacts might
produce quite different perceptions, availability problems in prop-
erty insurance markets have involved in some manner nonprice
supply rationing of property insurance coverage.
How are such persistent "shortages" to be explained?2 Expla-
nations are necessary, because a large service industry that insists
55 Am. EcoN. Rav. 140 (1965); M. PAULY, MEDICAL CARE AT PUBLIC EX-
PENSE chs. 1-3 (1971) (emphasizing the limitations which the presence
of moral hazard may impose on Arrow's welfare proposition). From
a similar tradition and perspective are Spence & Zeckhauser, Insur-
ance, Information, and Individual Action, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. 380 (1971); Zeckhauser, Risk Spreading and Distribution: A
Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate
Incentives, 2 J. EcoN. THEORY 10 (1970); Mossin, Aspects of Rational
Insurance Purchasing, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 553 (1968); Smith, Optimal In-
surance Coverage, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 68 (1968).
26. General models of the insurance risk selection process have made few
appearances in economic literature. Two significant recent efforts,
both concerned primarily with automobile insurance markets, are
Smallwood, Competition, Regulation, and Product Quality in the Auto-
mobile Insurance Industry, in PROMOTING COMPEyTON IN REGULATED
MARKETS 241 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); and Joskow, Cartels, Competition
and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL
J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 375 (1973). Both reflect the growing recognition
that simple determinative economic models do not demonstrate the
power that search theories display as potential explanations of under-
employed resources and similar market phenomena. While the large
recent economic literature seeking to incorporate notions of imperfect
and assymetric information is mostly at the level of formal theory,
so that there is no assurance that it has much to say about actual mar-
kets, many of its insights match those prevalent in the insurance in-
dustry for years, and thus seem to provide a useful perspective for
viewing the risk selection process. See, e.g., Rothschild & Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcON. 629 (1976); Hersh-
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on selecting to whom it will sell at the consumer level is not a fa-
miliar phenomenon. Several important contributors are implicated.
In part, the failure of property insurance markets to achieve a
market-clearing equilibrium can be seen as a function of inade-
quacies of regulatory and rating practices inherited from an era
of cartelization and as yet only partially accommodated to the new
realities of competitive insurance markets. In part, the failure may
be attributed to intrinsic limitations of the insurance technique
when practiced by competing insurers in an unruly world of hetero-
geneous property risks of uncertain independence and questionable
spread. In part, also, the failures may be understood as the normal
consequence of the uncertainty, transaction costs, and incomplete
information that characterize real markets unprotected by the
simplifying assumptions necessary for the elegant mechanics of eco-
nomic theory.
A. Price Controls
The orthodox wisdom in the insurance industry-at least that
displayed for public consumption-for many years has been quick
to ascribe primary responsibliity for availability problems to the
constricting influence of the "prior approval" variety of rate regu-
lation. "Every risk is insurable at a price," runs the old insurance
saw, and that refrain has enjoyed a continued currency that re-
flects its foundation in the simple, determinative, economics of
market clearing quantities and prices, and the seductive simplicity
of the conclusions it can be made to suggest. As serious guide to
the property insurance availability problem, the aphorism is
severely incomplete, but its emphasis is not misplaced. 27 Undoubt-
leifer, Where Are We in the Economics of Information?, 63 AM. ECON.
REv. 31 (1973); Rothschild, Models of Market Organization with Im-
perfect Information: A Survey, 9 J. POL. EcoN. 1283 (1973), and au-
thorities cited therein. More traditional is STANFORD RESEARCH INSTi-
TTriE, supra note 15.
27. For an early explanation from the industry perspective see Isaacs, The
Challenge of Risks of Inferior Quality, 14 CPCU ANNALS 239 (1960),
and Cline, Inadequate Rates-The Main Obstacle to Public Relations,
19 CPCU ANNALS 113 (1966). On price control induced shortages
generally, see A. ALcHmAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 92-94
(2d ed. 1967). For an application to fire insurance availability prob-
lems in urban core areas, see Syron, Administered Prices and the Mar-
ket Reaction: The Case of Urban Core Property Insurance, 28 J.
FINANCE 147, 155 (1973) ("The insurance availability problems of core
areas seem to be the result of a normal market reaction to an artifi-
cially low price ceiling"). See also Launie, The Supply Function of
Urban Property Insurance, 36 J. RIsK & INS. 269 (1969); Allen, The
Supply Function of Urban Property Insurance: Comment, 37 J. RISK
& INS. 459 (1970).
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edly, the prior approval laws and the practices they validated have
been important contributors to property insurance availability
problems.
Enacted in most states in the wake of United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association28 in order to immunize concerted
ratemaking from the federal antitrust laws, the prior approval
rating statutes codified the then-dominant prescriptions of the
cartel. They required property insurance to be treated as a monop-
oly, competition to be limited to service competition, and property
insurance rates to be uniform and predicated strictly on costs. Even
after the hegemony of the cartel had been broken by deviating and
independent stock companies and dividend-paying mutuals, the
regulatory lag built into the prior approval system proved compul-
sion enough to ensure that most insurers would retain their tra-
ditional preoccupation with underwriting account quality rather
than price. In an industry with relatively low fixed costs, where
both inherited conceptions of function and procedural barriers made
tailoring price to fit risk an unlikely alternative, insurers were free
to vary the selectivity of their underwriting programs whenever
they thought the essentially backward-looking prior approval ar-
rangement to be insufficiently responsive to changing loss patterns
and the effects of inflation. 29 In this manner, delays in rate in-
creases could contribute to inadequate rates, which could lead in
turn to disinvestment in the insurance enterprise and a restricted
supply of property insurance. 30 The recent movement to substitute
variations of "open competition" rating laws for the existing pattern
of prior approval statutes has gained much of its impetus from
heightened appreciation of these realities.
Nevertheless, however powerful the inclination to attribute
shortages to price controls, property insurance availability problems
cannot be dismissed solely as manifestations of the excess demand
that predictably results when an artificial price ceiling keeps the
market in a state of disequilibrium. A commercial insurer's
willingness to assume risks ultimately rests on its confidence in its
ability both to predict the degree of hazard it is being asked to
assume and to establish a desirable relationship between that risk
28. 322 U.S. 353 (1944).
29. See generally J. HANSON, R. DINEEN, & M. JOHNSON, supra note 1,
at 73-75.
30. Id.; STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INSURANCE FOR INVESTIGATION, STUDY AND RESEARCH OF VARYING
FIRE INSURANCE RATES 76-77 (Legis. Doc. No. 8, 1967); STATE OF NEW
YORK INSURANCE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSUR-
ANCE HOLDING COMPANIES (1968); Sichel, Fire Insurance: Imperfectly
Regulated Collusion, 33 J. RISK & INS. 95 (1966).
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and the premium to be charged. An orthodoxy that trains attention
on the influence of the rate regulatory mechanism on the second
of these concerns is an oversimplification 1 that can obscure that
other important frictions and rigidities in the pricing and under-
writing foundations of the insurance enterprise are likely to per-
sist regardless of the character of the rate regulatory program em-
ployed.
B. Selectivity and the Pragmatic Science
The pricing and underwriting traditions of commercial property
insurers are neither as precise nor as arcane as both defenders and
critics of them might suggest. Most property insurance pricing in-
volves a rather familiar process of flexible mark up over anticipated
average loss costs, with regulatory constraints, demand considera-
tions, and the price posture of competing insurers exerting at least
a potential influence on the price selected. The complexities of the
process result chiefly from the difficulties of determining with a
reasonable degree of confidence the anticipated loss costs of the
risks to be assumed. Application of the insurance technique does
not allow an insurer to reduce its uncertainty concerning the loss
potential of a particular risk, but by proper application of the
theory of sampling, an insurer may expect to achieve acceptable
predictive power concerning the aggregate losses likely to be expe-
rienced by a large number of reasonably homogeneous risks. In
theory, an insurer can examine classified data concerning the loss
experience of similar risks in the past, amend those data by the
application of projection factors, and develop a statement of pro-
babilities of loss that can be used to calculate the dollar amount
of premiums necessary to cover expected losses of the sample of
risks selected. By controlling the randomness and size character-
istics of the sample, the insurer can hope to vary the probability
that average loss cost will deviate within the acceptable limits from
the average loss cost of the universe of risks from which the sample
was chosen.3
2
31. Unfortunately, some analyses seem not to get beyond the delusive tru-
ism that, other things being equal, the higher the permitted rate for
the "average" risk within a rating class, the fewer identifiable sub-
classes will be refused by the rational insurer. But, of course, accord-
ing to accepted rating principles, many risks would be paying too
much for insurance and insurers would be earning greater returns than
would be justified by pricing homogeneous subclasses of risks accord-
ing to their own expected losses.
32. Descriptions of this process are legion. Especially useful are G. HART-
MAN, RATEMAKING FOR HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE (1967); I. PFrFFER,
INsURANcE A EcoNoMIc THEORY (1956); and Houston, Risk, Insur-
ance, and Sampling, 31 J. RIsK & INS. 511 (1964).
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The illusion of statistical rigor dissolves when one considers "the
problem of application-are the inferences derived from the model
valid for the universe under study?"3 3 For almost all insurance
this "fit" is very imperfect; the heterogeneity, relatively high values
and conflagation potential of property insurance risks, and the
uncertainties associated with establishing the causes of property
losses, make the requirements of sampling theory exceptionally dif-
ficult to satisfy in the property insurance context. By establishing
and enforcing underwriting rules of insurability, the insurer at-
tempts to increase the likelihood that the portfolio of risks to be
written will adequately approximate the assumptions implicit in the
sampling formula. Nevertheless, judgment and intuition play a
central role in insurer underwriting and rating decisions, and prop-
erty insurance especially remains far more a "pragmatic than an
exact science.1
3 4
1. The Limits of Classification
Insurance exists partly because it is impossible to price accu-
rately the degree of hazard posed by most individual risks; it is
equally impossible, of course, to devise insurance categorizations
that produce the truly homogeneous classes that sampling theory
presupposes. Messy reality can be wrestled into homogeneous cate-
gories only by a process of abstraction that defines certain risk attri-
butes as relevant and others as irrelevant. Regardless of their
numbers and the skill with which they are chosen, the selection
of class-defining risk indicia produces a classification scheme that
is inevitably imperfect and value-laden. As Alfred Kahn has
wisely noted of classifications in another context: "All raise prob-
lems of enforcement; all involve complex distributional effects; all
will be economically imperfect, and all will inevitably raise noneco-
nomic questions about what is fair, politically acceptable, and so
on.",
3 5
In property insurance, the classification problem has been
handled in a distinctive fashion. Property insurance hazards tra-
ditionally have been thought to present the property insurer with
33. I. PFErm, supra note 32, at 60. See also id. at 181-85.
34. C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 11 (4th ed. 1965). See gen-
erally Parker, Ratemaking in Fire Insurance, in PROPERTY & LIABILITY
INSURANCE HANDBOOK ch. 13 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965); R. RIE-
GEL & J. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCn'LES & PRACTICES ch. 28 (5th ed.
1966); L PFEFF_, supra note 32, at 183-85 (emphasizing the paramount
position of "judgment" and the limited validity of the sampling proc-
ess as the basis for insurers' estimates of risk).
35. I A. KAHN, supra note 18, at 188,
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a loss probability continuum that usually cannot be subdivided into
discrete classes that will be both acceptably homogeneous and large
enough to allow credible classified loss experience to be developed.
In property insurance, the expected amount of loss will vary ac-
cording to so many factors-occupancy, constructional features, fire
protection facilities, size of risk, etc.-that it is nearly always im-
possible to develop a classification scheme that will subdivide our
data into practical homogeneous groups. The finer we classify our
data the nearer we approach homogeneity, but the smaller the
amount of data in each group: What we gain in homogeneity we
lose in credibility of our loss experience.:
3 6
For some property risks, chiefly dwellings and small apart-
ments, 37 the conflict between the competing demands of homoge-
neity and credibility has been resolved in favor of extremely broad
rating classifications. Because the cost of inspections necessary for
more specific rating looms large in relation to the premiums likely
to be generated, no effort is made to differentiate between these
"class-rated" risks beyond broad fundamental groupings based on
the nature of the occupancy, the type of construction, and the rating
given local fire protection facilities. No inspection is made, and the
age and the physical condition of the property do not affect the
rate. Thus,
under class rating, a new one-family frame house in a modern sec-
tion of Queens is subject to the same fire insurance rate as a fifty-
year old one-family frame house in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section
of Brooklyn; similarly, a new brick luxury apartment building
which is eligible for class rating in the Riverdale section of the
Bronx is subject to the same class rate as an old law brick tene-
ment in Harlem.3 8
For most other property risks, the range of loss probability usu-
ally has been considered too great to permit direct application of
such broad averaging in determining the rate. The answer, how-
ever, has not been to refine the classifications and enlarge their
number by using additional class-defining risk attributes. Instead,
36. Longley-Cook, Notes on Some Actuarial Problems of Property Insur-
ance, XLVI CAS. ACTUARIAL Soc'Y PROc. 66, 67 (1959), reprinted
in FiRE INSURANCE RATEMAKING AND KINDRED PROBLEMS 88 (Cas. Ac-
tuarial Soc'y 1960).
37. R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, supra note 34, at 566, indicates that class rates
usually have been applied to "dwellings, churches, small apartments,
farms, clubs, schools, and sometimes small mercantile and special
risks," and estimates that such risks constitute approximately 80%
of insurable risks in urban areas, producing less than 25% of total
premium volume.
38. NEw YORK STATE DEP'T Or INSURANCE, FIRE INSURANCE IN CONGESTED
AREAS 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FIRE INSURANCE IN CONGESTED
AREAS IL
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the basic broad classifications are retained, but periodic rate survey
inspections are conducted to permit modification of the average rate
by a series of uniform charges for specific deficiencies and uniform
credits for superior conditions or the presence of protective devices.
These schedules of credits and charges are elaborate statements of
quantitative ratios that are supposed to express the relative loss
probabilities of the various risk characteristics to which charges and
credits have been assigned. The relationships remain fixed even
though they never have been validated statistically; they are
founded solely on engineering analysis of the hazards presented.
Classified experience is used only to adjust the base rate.3 9
The rough approximations of this rating arrangement would
pose no problem if all property insurance were supplied by a mo-
nopoly fund immune from entry by competitors and insulated from
any criticisms premised on concerns for equity and fairness in the
rating structure. Under these protective assumptions the need for
classification itself would be eliminated. The fund would be
free to ignore all differences in perceived cost potentials and to set
a single price for all risks calculated to produce whatever total rev-
enues were deemed necessary.
When the assumptions are relaxed, the vulnerability of the prop-
erty insurance rating approach becomes evident. Common sense
observations drawn from everyday experience often indicate that
the class rating approach is guilty of an over-inclusiveness that
lumps together many risks that appear to present markedly dif-
fering cost potentials. Although schedule rating may avoid this crit-
icism, its schedules of charges, based on engineering judgments
little changed since 1893 and 1901, in many respects are inconsistent
with conventional modern insights and intuitions about contrib-
utors to property losses.
40
39. McIntosh, The Rationale of the Fire Schedule-Part I, Theory, 13
CPCU ANNALS 1 (1960); Longley-Cook, supra note 36, at 67; R. RIE-
GEL & J. MILLER, supra note 34, at 571-80. Schedule rating admits nu-
merous variations. The Universal Mercantile System, developed in
1892, in some form is employed in roughly half the states-the
Dean Analytic System is used in the remainder. For a simple sum-
mary of the principal characteristics of each, see id. at 572-78.
40. Thus, the criticisms go beyond the "empirical distortion to be found
in all actual schedules." McIntosh, The Rationale of the Fire Schedule
-Part II, Application, 13 CPCU ANNALS 117 (1960). For example,
Brockmeier criticizes the Dean Schedule for emphasizing structural
and exposure elements of fire hazard, and limiting its concerns with
occupancy characteristics primarily to factors involving combustabiity
and damageability, with little effort to recognize conditions likely to
be the causes of fires. Brockmeier, Residual Markets and Fire Insur-
ance Rating, 25 CPCU ANNALS 41, 47-48 (1972). See also T. ALLEN
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In the past, such complaints about the inequity of the property
insurance rating formulae usually have been rebuffed by arguments
drawing on concerns for credibility,41 administrative feasibility,42
and the costs of developing alternative arrangements. 43 However,
& R. DUVALL, PROPERTY INSURANCE RATING: A PLEA FOR CHANGE
(1973); R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, supra note 34, at 591-93; Duke, Property
Insurance Rating, and The Logic of Chance, 19 CPCU ANNALS 361
(1966).
Importantly, the creators of the schedules held no illusions about
their precision; thus A.F. Dean admitted that "[a]ll of those charges,
though they embody the combined experience and judgment of practi-
cal underwriters, are arbitrary." A. DEAN, THE RATIONALE OF FIRE
RATES 55 (1900). They nonetheless constituted a marked improve-
ment, he argued, for the substitution of a schedule for the unfettered
judgment of the producer meant that, at least, "[e]ach of these
charges is as fair for one as for another." Id.
41. "It may well be that fire loss expectancy for other than trivial losses
may be of such a low order that a fire rating system based solely on
loss statistics may not prove feasible within the normal tolerances for
credibility standards." Hurley, Review of Paper on The Probability
of A = MIN by Henry K. Duke, 15 CPCU ANNALS 187 (1962). In a
similar, vein, Kenneth McIntosh speaks of "the actuarial core of any
fire rating problem: The fire rate structure must be (or, at least, for
generations, by custom and usage, has been) refined far beyond the
requirements of the fire statistical plan .... [F]urther refinement
of the statistical plan is no answer of itself because, very simply, of
credibility considerations." McIntosh, A Mathematical Approach to
Fire Protection Classification Rates, 52 CAS. ACTrUARiAL Soc'Y PRoc. 52
(1965). See also Hurley, A Credibility Framework for Gauging Fire
Classification Experience, in FIRE INSURANCE RATEMAING AND KIN-
DRED PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 122. Nevertheless, others have urged
the possible applicability of multiple correlation analysis as at least
a partial means of reducing this problem to manageable proportions.
See, e.g., McGuiness, Review of "The Rationale of the Fire Schedule,"
14 CPCU ANNALS 83 (1971).
42. "Presented with the impracticability of developing useful expected
amount of loss figures, for property insurance, we cannot develop pure
premiums, and a completely different method of rate making has to
be employed." Longley-Cook, supra note 36, at 89.
43. "There are countless obstacles to a schedule rating plan [for dwelling
risks], including the need for many additional classifications, and the
lack of a realistic solution to the problem of underinsurance, especially
on contents exposure. However, the basic objection is to the pro-
hibitive expense involved, and any other criticisms become unimpor-
tant." Cotter, An Evaluation of Present and Alternative Dwelling Rat-
ing Methods, 10 CPCU ANNALS 98, 101 (1958). See also R. RIEGEL & J.
MIhLLER, supra note 34, at 585-87 (discussing a "pure premium" method
for deriving rates based on collection of classified data by location,
occupancy, coverage amount, contract term, building grade, occupancy
grade, internal exposure, external exposure, etc., and cost barriers to
its realization). In recent years, the advent of electronic data process-
ing has reduced some of the difficulties, and the Insurance Services
Office apparently has made some limited initial steps toward increased
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the compulsions of competition are not so easily slipped. The prop-
erty insurance underwriter knows well the dangers of indulging
an assumption that the anticipated average loss costs for any classi-
fication of property insurance risks will be indicative of the antici-
pated loss costs for particular risks within that group where the in-
surer cannot expect to write the entire group of risks. Yet the
individual insurer usually cannot expect to develop rating ap-
proaches more refined than those provided by the rating bureaus;
the constraints of cost, credibility and administrative feasibility are
real enough. Instead, in a competitive property insurance market,
an insurer will feel compelled to attempt through its underwriting
procedures to extend the classification of risks beyond that con-
templated by rating procedures so long as it believes that the ad-
ministrative costs of selective underwriting will be less than the
marginal revenues that will result from increased underwriting
selectivity. If it believes that loss potentials likely are a function
of factors other than those used to characterize the rating class, as
it almost always will, it must consider the practicability of recog-
nizing those additional features in its underwriting procedures,
even if it believes that the rate would be adequate for all risks
within the classification if the insurer could write all or a true
sample of such risks.4 4 The reason is apparent. By successfully
employing a selective underwriting program that increases the
quality of the risks that an insurer writes in a classification, the
insurer can lower its loss costs, reduce the rates it is able to charge,
and achieve first choice of the risks available. If an insurer does
not couple selective underwriting with price reductions it will
eventually discover that the cream is being skimmed from the clas-
sification by other insurers with more aggressive underwriting pol-
icies and that it is writing an adverse selection of risks with higher
than average loss potential.
45
collection of classified property loss experience. See Insurance Ad-
vocate, July 26, 1975, at 4, col. 2 (report of Insurance Services Of-
fice's pilot project to develop a countrywide commercial fire rating
schedule, and companion project to develop a simpler fire class rate
manual for small mercantile and service occupancy risks).
44. Moreover, loss potentials are not the only concern; the insurer also
must be concerned about the adequacy of the expense portion of the
premium. For that reason, low valued risks are unlikely to be attrac-
tive to insurers. Traditional rating and pricing techniques make the
premium a simple multiple of the rate, so that transaction costs associ-
ated with writing a low valued risk will be a much larger proportion
of the total premium than would be the case for high valued risks.
See generally Buffinton, The Low Valued Risk-A Study of the Pre-
mium Required for Habitational Risks of Various Policy Amounts, 49
CAs. ACTUARAL SOC'Y PROC. 119 (1962).
45. See generally Bailey, Any Room Left for Skimming the Cream? 47
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2. Capacity: The Need for Spread
Thus, some selective underwriting practices are a natural con-
comitant of competition among insurers faced with a spectrum of
heterogeneous risks. Other underwriting restrictions reflect the in-
surer's attempt to satisfy its need for spread. No matter how effec-
tively an insurer's underwriting procedures may permit it to differ-
entiate among property insurance risks on the basis of their inher-
ent loss potentials, the insurer still must be wary of the problem of
random variations in that experience. This, rather than limited
capital and surplus to back up risks assumed, is the practical capac-
ity problem for most property insurers.40 The laws of large num-
bers offer the individual insurer an advantage in coping with uncer-
tain incidence and magnitude of losses only if the individual insurer
can achieve sufficient spread in its own portfolio to justify the fun-
damental assumption of insurance theory-that the rates of the
standard deviation to the mean will be reduced as the number of
CAs. ACTUARIAL Soc'y PRoc. 30 (1960); Dykhouse, Underwriting Regen-
eration: Restructuring Our Property Insurance Markets, 14 N.Y.L.F.
795, 800-02 (1968). Cf. Witt, Pricing and Underwriting Risk in Auto-
mobile Insurance: A Probabilistic View, 40 J. RISK & INS. 509 (1973);
Witt, Pricing Problems in Automobile Insurance: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 40 J. RISK & INS. 75 (1973); Joskow, supra note 26; Smallwood,
supra note 26.
46. Traditional perspectives toward capacity questions have assumed that
the capital and surplus posture of the insurer will be the primary de-
terminant of its capacity. In part this may reflect the primacy of so-
lidity concerns, which often employ rules of thumb for gauging "safe"
ratios between surplus and premium volume. See, e.g., R. KENNEY,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FIRE AND CASUALTY STRENGTH (4th ed. 1967) (argu-
ing the "Kenney Theory" that unearned premiums should be kept
roughly equal to policy holders' surplus for property insurers); STATE
OF NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSUR-
ANCE HOLDING COMPANIES 27-29 (1968) (worrying about capacity ef-
fects of non-insurance uses of insurers' "surplus surplus"). In part,
also, it may reflect arguments predicated on industry-wide capital and
surplus structures. See, e.g., Otto, Capacity, 28 J. RISK & INS. 70
(1961); Dykhouse, supra note 45, at 802-05.
Both perspectives provide useful insights into availability concerns,
but from the vantage of the individual insurer it seems that "capacity
is more usefully viewed as a problem in corporate operating stability
than as a problem in capitalization." Stone, A Theory of Capacity and
the Insurance of Catastrophe Risks (Part 1), 41 J. RISK & INS. 231,
232 (1973). See also Stone, A Theory of Capacity and the Insurance
of Catastrophe Risks (Part II), 41 J. RISK & INS. 339 (1973). Tech-
nically, an insurer's need for spread is not the same as its need to
avoid catastrophe exposures; a catastrophe exposure results when risks
assumed are not sufficiently independent. Practically, of course, both
represent a breach of an insurer's stability constraints, a fact reflected
in the common industry practice of lumping the two together for
statistical purposes.
466 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 3 (1977)
homogeneous independent risks making up the portfolio increases.
Reinsurance can help to satisfy this concern, but its effects also are
felt in underwriting strategies. As a consequence, based on its con-
cern for achieving adequate spread, an insurer's underwriting rules
may cause it to refuse to commit its resources to insuring some
risks, even if as a class such risks appear to be profitable and even
if the particular risk is a better than average member of the class.
47
3. Moral Hazard
"Moral hazard" is the label applied by insurers to the possibility
that the insured's reaction to the presence of insurance will increase
the loss potential of the risk. In theory, moral hazard is a problem
for an insurer because it represents a deviation from the assump-
tions of rate classification schemes;4 the problem of moral hazard
should be a problem of risk heterogeneity, potentially subject to
treatment by incorporating appropriate rate factors in the classifi-
cation systems. Practically, however, that is not done nor is it
likely to be done. Although at least some moral hazard can be
viewed as the product of rational economic behavior subject to
standard economic analysis and treatment,49 the insurance industry
has not been willing to try to rate it but instead has steadfastly
regarded moral hazard as an ethical and moral failure which should
not be insured and which, in any event, is unquantifiable. 50 Conse-
quently, underwriting rules will dictate rejection of a risk if moral
hazard is suspected.
47. For an application of the argument to the availability problems ex-
perienced by some restaurants, bars, seasonal dwellings, and other
classifications which "would have produced a good profit for an in-
surer if an adequate number of the large risks were insured, making
the law of large numbers operative," see Barrett, Profitable High
Hazard Risks, National Underwriter (P & C), June 29, 1973, at 31, col.
1. Not uncommonly, bowling alleys, supermarkets, discount depart-
ment stores and other buildings with large, undivided areas produce
the same reactions. See generally R. HOLTOM, UNDERWRITING 378-80
(1973).
48. I. PPFrF, supra note 32, at 62.
49. Most recent work on "moral hazard" has focused on how it may affect
the traditional welfare case for public provision of health insurance.
See generally Arrow, supra note 25; M. PAULY, supra note 25. See also
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
EcoN. 1, 7 (1969): "A price can be and is attached to the sale of all
insurance that includes the moral hazard cost imposed by the insured
on insurance companies. And this price is individualized to the extent
that other costs, mainly cost of contracting, allow"; Joseph, The Meas-
urement of Moral Hazard, 39 J. Risx & INs. 257 (1972).
50. Adams, Underwriting in Fire Insurance, in J. LONG & D. GREGG, supra
note 34, at 190, 194; I. PFEFFm, supra note 32, at 119.
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Thus, an insurer's attitude toward a particular risk will be
colored by many concerns, only some of which are a function of
particular features of the risk. The insurer understands, though
the insured and the rejected applicant may not, that "[t]here is
no one proper rate, per se, for an individual insured or expo-
sure,"51 and that, for the same reasons, the "insurability" of a risk
cannot be determined solely by its intrinsic characteristics.
4. Implementing Selectivity: The "Organizational Filter"
Moreover, the "organizational filter" 52 through which an in-
surer's concerns about the character of its risk portfolio are trans-
lated into specific underwriting decisions also tends to exert a per-
vasive influence on how property insurance availability problems
are framed. Demands for the exercise of underwriting judgment-
at best an uncertain "mixture of experience, acumen, and in-
stinct"53-are felt at numerous junctures throughout the insurer's
distributional apparatus, with consequent opportunities for idiosyn-
cratic and other imperfect judgments to be exercised. In practice,
of course, institutional habits and devices operate to trammel some
of the discretion of individual underwriters and producers. Thus,
the cartel-imposed uniformity of property insurance rates and pol-
icy provisions long permitted little room for tailoring rates and
forms to the particular contours of particular risks, and habits of
thought born of the cartel did not die with it; property insurance
underwriters tend to perceive their options to be limited to accept-
ing or rejecting risks,5 4 with the burden of developing capacity
passing by default to the independent agents and brokers who long
have dominated this phase of the insurance industry. Furthermore,
both producers and those with direct underwriting responsiblity
may find their compensation or their continued association with the
insurer tied to the experience of the risks they contribute to the
insurer's portfolio. 55 Designedly, these contingent commission
51. G. HARTmAN, supra note 32, at 25.
52. The term is used in Gordon, Short-Period Price Determination, 38 Am.
ECON. REV. 265, 288 (1948). As employed here, it is meant to suggest
both "managerial" and "behavioral" influences on organizational deci-
sion making within an insurance bureaucracy. See generally Machlup,
Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM.
ECON. RaV. 1 (1967).
53. Kulp, The Rate Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance-
Goals, Technics and Limits, 15 LAW & CoNTamP. P:oBs. 493, 500
(1950).
54. Thus, Brockmeier speaks of "an historical perspective placing empha-
sis on account quality rather than price," Brockmeier, supra note 40,
at 45. The attitude is often explicit in R. HOLTOM, supra note 47.
55. Barrett, supra note 47, provides a striking commentary on the way
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agreements and similar institutional arrangements5 6 ingrain conser-
vative risk selection attitudes at the critical levels of the under-
writing process and further accentuate the market-limiting effects
of capacity concerns about risks thought to pose the threat of high
expected variation from the classification mean. Perhaps most im-
portantly, however, at all levels insurer concerns soon become codi-
fied, formally or informally, into decision rules that channel discre-
tion and help to produce a measure of consistency and uniformity
in an insurer's underwriting decisions. 57
Although such institutional constraints may help to discipline
the decisions emanating from the various levels of an insurer's ac-
quisition system, they do little to alter the essentially subjective
character of the judgments involved. Inevitably there is in the
rating and underwriting problem a large element of irreducible
uncertainty. Beyond that, however, much in the rating and under-
considerations of spread may be felt within the underwriting process:
An individual underwriter is not apt to be impressed with
the figures [showing profitability for the classification as a
whole] . .. because his performance is judged on the small
book of business he underwrites and he knows this book could
never be large enough for any of these classifications to set
in motion the law of large numbers. Consequently, the indi-
vidual underwriter takes what he considers to be the most
prudent action. He shuns such risks, or takes a small portion
of the total coverage. He is not impressed that on a national
basis only a small percentage of restaurants burn down; he
is concerned that the restaurants that do burn down will be
the ones that he has accepted.
Id. at 31.
56. Goldbeck & Hanlon, Personal Lines Underwriting: An Alternative
Approach, BEST's REVIEW (P & L), Nov. 1976, at 26, suggests that
agency selection & discipline rather than analysis of applications is
more likely to prove fruitful at least for the personal lines. They sug-
gest "profiling the characteristics of business submitted by individual
agents." Of course, contingent commission arrangements, writing lim-
its, and restricted binding authority are traditional industry tech-
niques, as are account terminations. For an indication of the tensions
thus produced, see White, Insurance Producers Account Terminations,
23 CPCU ANNALs 167 (1970); Note, Independent Insurance Agency
Agreements and the Termination of Agency: Antiquated Approach to
the Modern Market, 49 B.U. L. REv. 286 (1969).
57. Compare the discussion of "ineligible tests" in R. HOLTOM, supra note
47, at 127-32, with Zelomek, Business Pricing: The Irrational Uses of
Irrational Rules of Thumb, in PRIcEs: IssuEs IN THEORY, PRACTCE, AND
PuBLic PoLicy 202, 203 (A. Phillips & 0. Williamson eds. 1967) (dis-
cussing with approval "the so-called rule of thumb, which in a busi-
ness sense is defined as judgment based on practical experience rather
than on scientific knowledge or analysis"); Baumol & Quandt, Rules
of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect Decisions, 54 Am. ECON. REV. 23
(1964); Winter, Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant, 85
Q.J. EcoN. 237 (1971).
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writing practices of insurers can be understood chiefly as attempts
to economize on the information costs associated with achieving
more refined judgments.58 The same pressures that have kept the
classifications of the rating systems effectively divorced from justi-
fications founded on classified experience also militate for a similar
trade-off between greater refinement of underwriting criteria and
the costs of securing the information necessary to identify and
implement more precise indicators of risk quality. Often the costs
of better information and the compulsions of competition make the
use of relatively crude rules of thumb the rational course for the
insurer to pursue.
C. Selectivity and Individual Perceptions
Nevertheless, although for the insurer "underwriting ... de-
pends on averages," 59 individual perceptions of causal relations
usually do not.60 The disciplines of the underwriting system force
upon the insurer recognition that a particular risk sometimes may
be an undesirable addition to its risk portfolio for reasons that have
nothing to do with the "inherent" hazard of the risk. Thus, in an
insurer's calculus of acceptability, even properly rated and better
than average risks may be avoided by an underwriter because the
low value of the risk produces too small a total premium, because
the high value of the risk or the absence of similar risks in the
insurer's book of business violates the insurer's concern for spread,
or for reasons as mundane as the insurer's inexperience with risks
of that sort or its lack of producers in the area in which the risk
is located. Moreover, even when the insurer's evaluation of the
inherent hazard of the risk is the reason for an adverse under-
writing determination, the negative decision may be prompted by
the underwriter's belief that the risk lies along the lower margin
of the rating classification rather than by a conclusion that the risk
is a "bad risk" in any absolute sense. In sum, to the insurer, the
attractiveness of a risk is a function both of its inherent hazard
58. Id. See generally Hershleifer, supra note 26; Symposium on the Eco-
nomics of Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 666 (1976).
59. Adams, supra note 50, at 194.
60. For a discussion of the factors tending both experts and laymen to
rely on a few simple heuristic principles when attempting to make
subjective assessments of probabilities, see Tversky & Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124
(1974). Cf. Dauten & Dauten, Consumer Perceptions of the Consumer
Credit Process, 10 J. CONSUmER AFr. 62 (1976) (contrasting the per-
ceptions of consumer loan applicants with those of loan officers). No
similar study of the insurance underwriting process has been discov-
ered.
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and of the particular problems it may pose to the particular insurer;
to the individual who finds himself treated as a residual risk, that
range of concerns may be less than obvious, and the adverse de-
cision may well appear to be the product of animus or mistake on
the part of the underwriter.61
To this divergence of perspectives must be added similarly op-
posed perceptions of the meaning of the insurer's underwriting de-
cision rules. The underwriter is interested in correlations; he is
unlikely to ask more of an underwriting rule than that it demon-
strate a useful predictive power for the group of risks to which
it is applied. In many applications, conceptions of causation are
explicitly not a part of the rating, and even the underwriting, in-
quiry. 2 By contrast, the individual against whom the rule of
thumb cuts often shares the common assumption that to rely on
correlations is to imply causation, and may well question the fair-
ness of employing an indicator because it is beyond the power of
the individual to control, or because it sweeps broadly or is only
a rough surrogate for the true variables involved. In that di-
chotomy resides a tension that is intrinsic to the process we have
been describing and that lies close to the heart of the "availability
problem" in property insurance. That it is inevitable does not les-
sen its significance as a regulatory issue.
In the property insurance context this tension at times has ac-
quired a special volatility from the kinds of indica that under-
writers have tended to select. Although other examples are pos-
sible,63 the complexity and sensitivity of the issues that can be
generated by the use of these subjectively chosen rules of thumb
can be demonstrated by an examination of two prominent kinds
of underwriting rules-those designed to factor out risks affected
by a "moral hazard" and those designed to distinguish among risks
on the basis of their geographic locations.
The concept of moral hazard is well understood and the prescrip-
tion for it-reject the risk-is clear. Unfortunately, the haziness
of the distinctions which must be attempted and the costliness of
developing the information needed for more refined indicators often
result in the use of underwriting rules of unseemly crudity to iden-
61. See generally PANEL HEARINGS, supra note 3, passim.
62. A. DEAN, supra note 40; Brockmeier, supra note 40.
63. For a still-useful collection from the automobile insurance context, see
The Workshop Sessions: Summary Report, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 618 (sum-
mary of issues raised at conference at University of Illinois); Hearings
on the Insurance Industry Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
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tify situations in which it might be thought to be in the interest
of the insured "to sell the property to the insurance company." In-
dications of potential moral hazard are sought in cheaply observed
risk attributes; credit reports, financial records and the observa-
tions of producers and field representatives supply much of the in-
formation.64 Although the core concern of the underwriter is the
human characteristics of the risk, cheap screening indicators are
adopted as surrogates for solid information about the attitudes and
values of the prospective insured. Are his facilities obsolete? Is
his mercantile establishment located in an area of declining or
shifting residential populations? Is he seeking a high insurance-
to-value ratio? Is he experiencing financial difficulties? Are there
abnormalities in his personal life? The invitations to underwriters
to introduce prejudgments and biases and to indulge amateur psy-
chological stereotypes are apparent. Even generalized under-
writing texts include occupational, ethnic, racial, geographic, and
cultural characterizations certain to give offense if publicly stated.65
Related tensions are generated by the use of broad-gauge under-
writing decision rules based on the geographic location of the risk.
During the 1960's, "red-lining," "blackout maps," and "postal zone
underwriting" became familiar entries in the property under-
writer's lexicon. Perhaps their prevalence can be explained as
another instance of economizing on information costs in the face
of a widespread lack of confidence in the answers provided by pre-
vailing rating systems. Often neighborhoods are born, mature, and
decline together, but of the three factors which influence fire in-
surance rates for class-rated properties, only the protection grading
in any way reflects the location of a risk, and it does not permit
rating distinctions for differences in location within most urban
areas. Rather than incur the costs of inspecting habitational risks
to determine their individual risk characteristics, underwriters em-
ploy the convenient surrogate of location. In the case of mercantile
structures, red-lining also might be merely a rational use of rules
of thumb, even though schedule rating allows some reflections of
building conditions and exposures-presumably important elements
of the underwriters' concern-because of limited confidence in the
64. R. HOLTOM, supra note 47, at 214-16.
65. See A. CAMPBELL, INSURANCE AND CRIME 121-76 (1902) (providing a
lurid list of instances in which the presence of insurance provoked
criminality); J. MAGEE, AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MORAL HAzARD
13-15 (1933) (indulging a series of racial and ethnic stereotypes); C.
RUPPRECHT, THE MODERN FniE UNDERwRrrER 23 (1940) (reporting that
"[c]ertain types and groups of people and certain races have charac-
teristics detrimental or dangerous to insurance companies and their in-
terests"); P. REED, FIRE INSURANCE UNDERWRITING 295 (1940) (reflect-
ing similar views). But see R. HOLTOM, supra note 47, chs. 15-16.
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schedules and the ways they are applied and awareness of the lag
time and likelihood of significant changes between reinspections.
Nevertheless, rational as the use of such decision rules might be,
they often displayed a distressing tendency to be drawn to corres-
pond with racial residential patterns and could easily be perceived
to be an attempt to avoid what one academician delicately phrased
"the public moral hazard." 66
The indicators employed in the search for moral hazard and the
geographic distinctions used in property insurance rating and
underwriting decisions invite popular dissatisfaction, and it has
been forthcoming. Less apparent, perhaps, is that similar com-
plaints would seem applicable in some degree to the use of all such
indicators. As we have seen, the price that people pay for property
insurance, and whether they get insurance at all, can turn on con-
siderations unrelated to the inherent hazard of the particular risk,
and can be determined by the application of decision rules that may
be the product of a biased "taste for discrimination," sloppy
thinking, or the subjugation of concern for precision to a concern
for avoiding the costs necessary to secure better information. 67 The
decision rules used to identify moral hazard and those involving
geographic distinctions differ from these others, if at all, chiefly
in the numbers of risks they affect and in their apparent transpar-
ency to critics who would find a racial or other improper motive
behind their use.
66. Long, The Future and Insurance, 34 J. RISK & INS. 515, 517 (1967).
67. For access to the burgeoning literature concerning the economics of
discrimination, see generally Stiglitz, Approaches to the Economics of
Discrimination, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 287 (1973) (categorizing economic
explanations as those that emphasize "discriminatory preferences" and
those that emphasize market imperfections-chiefly informational),
and citations collected therein. The first approach is most fully stated
in G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); the
second has received its most graceful presentations in Akerlof, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970); Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Ra-
cism and Sexism, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 659 (1972); and Arrow, Models
of Job Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE (A.
Pascal ed. 1972). For an indication of the passions that can be stirred
when attempts are made to transfer the explanations suggested by
economic modeling to a discussion of real world phenomena, compare
Williams, Why the Poor Pay More: An Alternative Explanation, 54
Soc. Scr. Q. 377 (1973) (emphasizing use of cheaply observed attri-
butes as decision bases as rational attempt to economize on informa-
tion costs) with Sturdivant, Rationality and Racism in the Ghetto
Marketplace, 54 Soc. Sci. Q. 380, 383 (1973) (attacking journal for pub-
lishing an attempt "to rationalize racial stereotypes as a basis for hu-
man behavior").
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Thus, risk selectivity, even when predicated on indicators of
broad generality, should not be defined too casually as an abber-
ration to be quickly prohibited when it runs afoul of rising public
demands for additional coverage and particularized decisions based
on the inherent hazards of particular risks. Doubtless, some such
demands for restrictions are legitimate, and should be honored, but
they must confront the reality that the process, if not necessarily
its details, is inevitably a central feature of the insurance technique
as practiced by private insurers competing for heterogeneous risks.
The practical questions that this tension poses for public policy
are whether and in what manner the underwriting process or its
results or both should be constrained by governmental initiatives.
Broadly stated, the possible answers are three: (1) government can
simply accept the outcomes produced by the normal underwriting
process; (2) it can choose not to intervene in the underwriting pro-
cess, but attempt to. assure coverage for some or all of the risks
rejected by the standard market; or (3) it can attempt to constrain
underwriting discretion in an effort to purify the process or to as-
sure underwriting outcomes.
Where once drift and inertia produced general acquiescence in
the first of these alternatives, increasingly during the last decade
the property insurance industry and its regulators have been forced
to acknowledge the possibility and implications of some combination
of the other potential choices. How they have responded in the
property insurance context is the subject of the remainder of this
article.
III. THE PROGRAMS: ANTECEDANTS, IMPLEMENTA-
TION, AND ADMINISTRATION
68
A. Underwriting Discretion and the Instinct Toward Voluntarism
For most of the history of property insurance regulation, these
questions seldom have been posed squarely to regulatory officials.
68. Unless otherwise indicated, statements in section III of the text con-
cerning the state programs at various stages of development are based
primarily on a collection of the implementing documents for the sev-
eral programs compiled by the author. Some statements concerning
the early programs may be based on a report of a survey conducted
by the Central Office of the NAIC in early 1969 reprinted in II 1969
NAT'L. A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 516-35; an unpublished tabulation
compiled by the Insurance Company of North America in 1969; FED-
ERAL INSURANcE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT or HOUSING AND URBAN
DEvELOPMENT, REPORTS ON FAIR PLAN OPERATIONS 1971 (January, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as REPORTS ON FAIR PL.AN OPERATIONS 1971]; a
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From an early date most states subjected property insurance rates
to statutory requirements that they not be "excessive, inadequate
or unfairly discriminatory." However, despite the obvious connec-
tions between rate classifications, rate levels, and underwriting de-
cisions, insurance regulators have never used these standards as the
basis for inquiries into underwriting practices of individual in-
surers.69
In part, of course, this failure seems simply to have reflected
a wise discretion: insurance regulators, like their counterparts in
public utility regulation,T0 have displayed a habitual and under-
standable reluctance to become embroiled in the intricacies of
industry rate structures in attempts to impose a regulatory vision
of appropriate correspondence between rates and anticipated costs,
even where the complications of different underwriting approaches
have not been thought to be a part of the problem. Historically,
regulatory concern for the solidity effects of "inadequate" rates and
for the political consequences of permitting insurer revenues to out-
strip costs and expenses by too great a margin usually could be
vindicated without looking much beyond aggregate results.7 ' Selec-
tion of classification bases and related questions of rate design re-
mained almost entirely the province of the industry, usually oper-
ating through its rating bureaus. Where issues of rate equity did
push their way into the regulatory consciousness, they most often
were framed by insurers or producers as complaints about "destruc-
tive" price cutting or rebating by their competitors; as a result, the
dominant emphasis given the prohibition against unfair discrimi-
nation has been felt in efforts to promote the formal equity of con-
formance to the rate structure. More fundamental questions about
the legitimacy of the rate design itself have gone mostly unasked
or have been brushed aside as the inevitable special pleading chal-
series of reports on individual FAIR Plans by the Federal Insurance
Administration's Office of Review and Compliance, released in 1973;
a "Compendium of Individual State Property Insurance Plans" pre-
pared by the Property Insurance Plans Service Office in 1975; and the
periodic "Fair Plans-Reports of Operations" prepared by the Insur-
ance Services Office from data supplied by the individual FAIR Plans,
reproduced in the annual Proceedings of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. All are on file in the University of Ne-
braska College of Law. Of course, the conclusions drawn from these
materials are the responsibility of the author.
69. See generally J. HANSON, R. DINEEN, & M. JOHNSON, supra note 1,
and authorities collected therein.
70. See, e.g., II A. KAHN, supra note 18, at 54; J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 287-93 (1961).
71. Perhaps the best statement of the traditional view that insurance rat-
ing objectives "may be achieved at various levels" and "over time"
is provided by G. HARTMAN, supra note 32, at 33-34.
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lenges to the treatment of particular groups of risks that must be
expected in any insurance arrangement where broad averaging is
required. They certainly have never been thought to lead regu-
latory officials to expect an insurer to write all applicants for in-
surance at the rate prescribed for the classification into which they
fall.72
72. For a traditional treatment of the statutory requirement that rates not
be "unfairly discriminatory," see C. WILLiAMs, PRICE DiscrmATIoN
IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (1959); Williams, Unfair Rate
Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in S. Kimball &
H. Denenberg, supra note 6, at 209.
Professor Kimball's seminal article, "The Purpose of Insurance
Regulation," Kimball, supra note 1, an exhaustive catalog of the "pub-
lic policy objectives" that have shaped insurance regulation, employs
a somewhat broader perspective, and thus locates among the aims of
the regulatory system a notion that rating and underwriting standards
should be equitably "related to the characteristics of the individual
applicant." Id. at 497. From this objective he derives two important
generalizations. First, a priori classifications present special dangers,
since the defining characteristics chosen may have only a par-
tial correspondence with the true causal factors. For exam-
ple, Negroes have often been "rated up" in life insurance,
based on the undeniable fact that mortality experience for all
Negroes is less favorable than experience for all whites. It
requires little sophistication to appreciate the danger in using
these categories, for such factors as a less favorable public
health environment may well bias the statistics. While reli-
ance on the race classification will protect the company, the
classification is too crude, for it sweeps within the disfavored
class many who should receive more favorable treatment. A
desire to eliminate this particular inequity as in conflict with
fundamental moral notions about equal treatment of races has
led to statutes forbidding the use of race as a classification. A
more refined statistical apparatus which isolated and used the
true causal factors would probably exclude it too.
Id. at 496 (emphasis in original). Second,
[o]ther practices may lead to discrimination against groups of
policyholders. For example, whole groups may be excluded
from coverage. If the company exercises a sound underwrit-
ing judgment one cannot regard this conduct as discrimina-
tory, but the company's standard of exclusion may not always
be justifiable. Exclusion of applicants from consideration on
the ground of race or color is one such standard that is of
questionable validity. Moreover, when the companies think
that rates are inadequate, as in automobile liability insurance
in the 1950's, the resulting strict application of the company's
selection criteria will drive large numbers of "clean risks" into
the assigned risk plan, where they are surcharged. There are
elements of unfair discrimination in this exclusionary practice,
and in 1960 there was developing concern with the problem.
Id. at 496-97.
In fact, although such concerns are felt throughout the property
insurance regulatory system, only sporadically have they been em-
bodied in statutory or regulatory standards applicable to underwriting
judgments by commercial property insurers. Thus, the unfair trade
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fn fact, although long deemed sufficiently affected with a public
interest to warrant detailed regulation extending far beyond the
practice statutes enacted in each state as part of the coordinated NAIC
response to the compulsions of the McCarran Act had almost no ap-
plicability to the underwriting decisions of property insurers. See
generally Model Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance,
1947 NAT'L A. INS. COMMnSSIONEaS PRoc. 383; see also I 1959 NAT'L
A. INS. COMMIssONERS PROC. 145. In 1972, a proposed revision of the
Model Unfair Trade Practices Act would have "restricted the right of
insurers to reject persons as risks solely because of race, color, creed,
marital status, sex, national origin, residence, age, lawful occupation,
failure to place collateral insurance, or previous refusal by another
insurer." The NAIC "decided not to incorporate such provisions
because":
(1) Some of these matters are presently covered in civil
rights laws;
(2) Some of these points are covered by special statutes relat-
ing to auto insurance; and
(3) The broad philosophical implications would appear to
make the treatment of this subject more appropriate in a
separate bill. The Subcommittee does recommend, how-
ever, that the Automobile Insurance Problems Subcom-
mittee appoint a task force to prepare model legislation.
I 1972 NAT'L A. INS. COMISSIONERS PROC. 490, 491.
A recent compilation of state unfair trade practice provisions may
be found in Bailey, Hutchison, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge
to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 779, 782 n.17 (1976).
Most state enactments contained a prohibition against unfair discrimi-
nation in rates, benefits and "other terms and conditions" of life insur-
ance contracts, and often contained a similar prohibition for accident
and health insurance. Only rarely was the prohibition framed broadly
enough to reach insurer practices with respect to property insurance
risks. See, e.g., Aniz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West 1956). In any
event, the prohibitions were generally thought to mirror the unfair
discrimination prohibitions of the property and casualty rating laws,
and thus to be inapplicable to underwriting decisions.
Until quite recently, the only legislative deviations from this pat-
tern were scattered statutes attempting to restrict the use of race as
a criterion in life insurance underwriting. Despite the demonstrable
higher mortality of blacks in general, sensitivity to the dangers of em-
ploying such a blunt and morally charged indicator as race as the basis
of underwriting decisions produced a few statutory provisions requir-
ing that rejection of black applicants for life insurance be accompanied
by a physician's affidavit that the applicant had been refused on
grounds that would have produced refusal of a white applicant. See,
e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-150 to 38-151 (West 1969); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 122 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
72A.12 (West 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 178:30-12 (West 1974); Onio
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3911.16 to 3911.18 (Page 1975). The sprinkling of
such statutes did not prevent the development of a specialized segment
of the life insurance industry specializing in high-cost life insurance
coverage for blacks unable to obtain insurance in the standard market.
See generally M. STUART, AN ECONoMIc DETouR (1940). Furthermore,
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question of rates, the commercial insurer has never been held sub-
ject to any general duty to serve all who request insurance. Its
rates and its policy forms are regulated, its investments and finan-
cial condition are limited by stringent rules, and its marketing sys-
where statutory restrictions or racial distinctions were not made spe-
cifically applicable to underwriting practices, as in the provision now
codified as MicH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2082 (1967), they were not
easily extended. See [1951-52] Op. MICH. ATT'y GEN. No. 1402, at 239
(interpreting statutory prohibition against "any distinction or discrim-
ination between white persons and colored persons ... as to the pre-
miums or rates charged for policies on the lives of such persons, or
in any other manner whatsoever" as not applicable to instructions to
producers not to solicit applications from blacks). In the last decade,
by both legislative and regulatory action, numerous states have
adopted prohibitions against underwriting denials of life insurance or
disability insurance or both on the basis of sex or marital status or
sexual preference; the mixed pattern is usefully tabulated in Bailey,
Hutchison, & Narber, supra at 795-801. A sprinkling of state statutes
dealing with other narrow problem areas also has appeared. See,
e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 120A (West Supp. 1974) (life
insurers prohibited from refusing to insure mentally retarded "for the
sole reason of mental retardation"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-195.5 (Supp.
1975) (life insurers prohibited from denying coverage or charging
higher rates for individuals with sickle cell or hemoglobin C traits).
Only occasionally have similar restrictions on property-casualty in-
surers been adopted. In 1940, New York enacted a general prohibition
against discriminatory practices based on race, creed, color and na-
tional origin, including underwriting practices, by any insurer or pro-
ducer. N.Y. Laws ch. 796, §§ 1-2 (1940), as amended, N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 40(10) (McKinney 1966). New Jersey more recently adopted a
similar measure. N.J. Laws ch. 139, § 1 (1965) (codified as N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:298-4(7) (c) to 4(7) (e) (West 1970)). Several states have
recently adopted measures making refusal to insure an unfair trade
practice if based on age (except for life, accident and health insur-
ance), residence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry, lawful
occupation or marital status. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-
55 (Supp. 1976); N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(8) (e) (Supp. 1976).
These few specific restrictions have not significantly altered the
underwriting prerogatives of property insurers. Of course, other, more
general legal prohibitions of judgments based on certain criteria might
be applicable to the underwriting decision. Thus, state public accomo-
dations laws forbidding discriminations on the basis of race, religion
or national origin might reach property insurance underwriting judg-
ments. See, e.g., WASHINGTON INs. DEP'T RULING (November 17,
1958). Moreover, in an appropriate circumstance the state action hur-
dle might be overcome to permit testing of underwriting judgments
against constitutional equal protection standards. Thus, in Stern v.
Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
a challenge to life insurance classifications by sex, the court found suf-
ficient state action to allow plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss;
however, the state insurance department was also a defendant in that
action, and the decision preceded Jackson v, Metropolitan Edison Co.,
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tern is the object of licensing requirements and continuing surveil-
lance, but the individual insurer is not considered a public utility,
and availability traditionally has not been made an official
member of the spectrum of primary regulatory values.7 3 Indeed,
419 U.S. 345 (1974), so that its applicability to underwriting decisions
not reviewed by state regulatory officials seems highly questionable.
Cf. Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (action un-
der 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 attacking alleged gender discrimination
by insurer and California Commissioner in benefits provided by dis-
ability policies dismissed on grounds that nexus between Commis-
sioner and insurer was inadequate to satisfy the "under color of state
law" requirement). Even in the absence of state action, federal civil
rights statutes may impose some restrictions on insurer underwriting
conduct. See, e.g., Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982
held applicable to refusal of fraternal insurance company to enter into
life insurance contracts with blacks). Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976); UAW v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 522
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
Of course, restrictions on discrimination by employers will indi-
rectly impose standards on the insurance coverages provided to em-
ployees as part of a fringe benefit package. For an excellent short
summary of the impact of the requirements of the Equal Pay Act of
1963; the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967; and a variety of executive orders, administrative
rules, and state statutory restrictions on discrimination in employment,
see Bailey, Hutchison, & Narber, supra at 805 n.82. See also Gerber,
The Economic and Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classification,
10 FoRum 1205 (1975).
73. Professor Kimball also identifies among the external demands felt by
the insurance industry, "[p ressures for extension of insurance cover-
age," but draws his examples from a limited number of public and
quasi-public insurance programs, and describes the impacts of such
pressures on insurance regulation in language largely subjunctive.
Kimball, supra note 1, at 512-14. After noting the spread of financial
responsibility laws, he concludes:
This produces the assigned risk plan, and compulsion on the
company to insure. At this point insurance begins to look like
a public utility. The consequences of this change are im-
mense. If it is urgently required that insurance be available
to all comers, it is more difficult to implement with the same
degree of effectiveness the basic objective of solidity of the
enterprise, or even the less crucial but important objective of
equity among policyholders. Libertarian objectives are chal-
lenged. All must be qualified by the overriding needs of soci-
ety. If solidity is endangered, public subsidies or public guar-
antees are not far behind. If subsidies are required, consid-
erations of equity give way to convenience to the tax gatherer.
The public policy with which we are dealing leads to serious
conflicts of important values.
Id. at 513-14.
The general approach for public utilities has been quite different:
"A regulated company is required to serve all who ask for, and are
willing to pay for, service within the area where it holds itself out
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until recently, in the few instances when formal regulatory atten-
tion has been directed to questions of which risks an insurer is to
write, it almost always has been to restrict the risks which insurers
would be permitted to accept.
74
This traditional deference to the idea of untrammeled under-
writing discretion has been able to draw its justification from a
rich vein of conventional business attitudes and immediate business
concerns. To insurer and regulator alike, the "underwriting prerog-
ative" has been viewed as an important protection for the solidity
of the insurer and a logical corollary of the absence in insurance
regulation of the guaranteed rate of return so prominently featured
in public utility regulation. The right to be selective in the assump-
tion and retention of risks has meant the freedom to tailor mar-
keting strategies to a variety of business and social conditions, to
choose and enforce one corporate identity rather than another, to
correct mistakes, even to withdraw completely from an inhospi-
table economic or regulatory situation.75 More than that, however,
to insurers who perceive themselves as forced to assume an in-
creasingly defensive posture toward the substitution of govern-
mental interference for managerial discretion on a variety of fronts,
the underwriting prerogative has served as an important political
symbol, at once an affirmation that the insurer still may command
its own destiny and an effective rallying point for resistance to fur-
ther governmental intrusions.
to serve." C. PHILLIPs, THE ECONOVrICS OF REGULATION 418 (1965). Of
course, the duty is not absolute. See generally id. at 418 n.52; F.
WELCH, CASES & TEXT ON PUBLIC UTILrrY REGULATION chs. 3 & 4 (rev.
ed. 1968).
In 1965, just before the onset of the developments considered here,
Professor Kimball noted the growing similarities to public utilities:
"[I]f companies could not choose their policyholders at will, then in-
surance would be virtually a public utility. That day may not be far
away." Kimball, Regulation at the Crossroads, 18 CPCU ANNALS 155,
164 (1965).
For an attempt to grapple with similar questions, this from a van-
tage subsequent to many of the developments discussed in this article,
see J. HANSON, R. DINEEN, & M. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 95-96.
74. S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 142-49 (1960). Kimball
classifies the underwriting restrictions in terms of limitations intended
to assure that companies achieve an adequate spread of risks in order
to avoid catastrophes, and limitations designed to maintain high qual-
ity in the risks selected.
75. Numerous examples of withdrawals and threatened withdrawals are
possible. For an historical sampling, see S. KImBALL, INSURANCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY 171, 243, 273, 276, 284 (1960). Doubtless the possibility
of retraction or withdrawal is perceived by the industry as one of the
advantages of a state-based regulatory system.
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Thus, it should not surprise that hardly any direct incursions
have been made upon it. Instead, where demands for insurance
protection to which the market has not seemed prepared to
respond have found recognition in the political arena, the usual ap-
proach has been to create a new mechanism, not to impose a general
regulatory requirement that commercial insurers provide the pro-
tection.
1. Intermediate Mechanisms and the Traditions of Voluntarism
The distinction may be too facile. The prevailing deference to
untrammeled insurer underwriting discretion for most of this cen-
tury has been linked in an uneasy synergism with traditions of in-
surance industry voluntarism grounded chiefly in industry fears of
governmental displacement.76 As a result, the variety of coverage-
providing institutions that have helped to permit continued avoid-
ance of direct regulatory inroads on the underwriting prerogative
seldom have been unequivocally public, and sometimes by the
manner in which they have structured and justified participation
by commercial insurers have tended to import their own subtle sub-
versions of insurer underwriting discretion. The point is important
enough to warrant some detail.
Economic security programs in this country currently are de-
livered by a complex mix of commerical insurance companies,
governmental insurance programs, and such intermediate mechan-
isms as uninsured pension funds, hospital and medical service
plans, and residual market mechanisms. The allocation of functions
among these devices has followed no articulated theory; efforts to
classify the programs have trailed in the wake of changing social
perceptions of the nature of risks and changing fashions in institu-
tional arrangements. The structural similarities of public and pri-
vate bureaucracies and the expansion of governmental activities
have further operated to obscure the line of demarcation. Work-
men's compensation insurance, the first of the "social" insurances in
this country, is written primarily by commercial insurers despite the
presence of monopolistic governmental funds in some states and
competing governmental funds in others. The most recent of the
social insurances, medicare, employs private organizations to per-
form the bulk of the day-to-day operations of the program. The
76. For an incisive and articulate discussion of the "cluster of political,
social, and economic principles" upon which the American variant of
the ideology of voluntarism has drawn and its influence on the devel-
opment of professional and public attitudes concerning social insur-
ance theory and policy, see R. LuBoVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SocIAL SEcu-
RiTy 1900-1935 ch. 1 (1968). See also 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, THE
DIMENSIONS OF LIBERTY ch. 5 (1961).
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result is a mixed system in which it has become increasingly risky
to identify the thrust of a program by the institutional character
of its administrator. As Harlan Cleveland has soundly noted: "The
line between what is public and what is private can no longer be
drawn between government and nongovernment organizations. The
line between what is public and what is private must be drawn
within each organization, between its publicness and its private-
ness."
77
With the important distinctions between public and private thus
blurred, the explanations and slogans that accompany the partici-
pation of insurers in a particular program can profoundly influence
what they are asked to do and how programs are allowed to devel-
op. So it has been with the residual market mechanism. Tradi-
tionally, much of the thinking and rhetoric of insurers and regu-
lators concerning availability problems has been framed in terms
of pressures on the commercial insurance industry to assume risks
that are "incident to the business." Yet, as we have seen, these spo-
radic pressures have not been translated into special legal obli-
gations to "take the good with the bad" in the manner of the public
utility industries. Instead, the prevailing theme has echoed the
warning of Adolf Berle, addressed to all corporate entities: "[T] he
corporation, having won its place in the economic system must fill
it. ' s78 Professor Kimball especially has given currency to the idea
that availability problems represent "pressure from society at large
to compel the insurance institution to do the job for which it
exists."7 9 He concludes:
One important corollary to the key role played by insurance is
this: in order for insurance to do its job, in order to provide both
security and a feeling of security for substantially all members of
the social organism, insurance must be comprehensive in its cover-
age. I.e., substantially all persons in the community must somehow
be brought within the protective scheme that constitutes insurance.
This is not merely desirable; it is imperative. In primitive society
the fiction of adoption was born to make sure that everyone would
get inside one of the kin groups which would provide him mutual
aid. If commercial insurance does not provide a modern equivalent
to the fiction of adoption, it does not do its job, and something else
will replace it.80
77. Cleveland, The Blurred Line Between "Public" & "Private," in ETrncs
& BIGNESS: ScIENTIc, AcADEIC, RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND MILITARY
XIII, xxvi (H. Cleveland & H. Lasswell eds. 1962).
78. A. BEnLr, PowER WITHoUT PROPRTY 102 (1959). See also W. HURST,
Tim LECiT.AcY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1969).
79. Kimball, supra note 1, at 512.
80. Kimball, Insurance and the Evolution of Public Policy, 15 CPCU AN-
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This sense of an inchoate public consensus giving enlarged con-
tent to a functional definition of the role of the commercial insurer
and enforcing that definition by the threat of displacement by
governmental or intermediate programs has been especially strong
in the property-liability industry. The development of the early
residual market mechanisms for automobile and workmen's com-
pensation risks are habitually and accurately described as prompted
by the industry's fear that state funds would provide the coverage
if commercial insurance did not.8 ' Basic to the motivation is con-
NALS 128, 131 (1962).
It is quite possible for a whole institution to commit suicide
if it does not accommodate itself to the winds of change, and
in the present context, that means if it does not adjust itself
to perform the full task now assigned to it by the social or-
ganism. If private insurance is to survive as a private institu-
tion, it must recognize the central importance of the function
it performs in society, must take pride in it, and must perform
it ungrudgingly and fully. If it does not, it certainly will be
replaced by institutions, largely governmental, that are more
responsive to the needs and demands that exist below the sur-
face of society, and it will have failed.
Id. at 143.
Of course, Professor Kimball did not originate the message. See,
e.g., Yount, Insurance Problems of Tomorrow-Challenges to Survival,
14 CPCU ANNALS 225 (1960); Cline, Maintaining Property Insurance
Markets, 18 CPCU ANNALS 29 (1965).
81. That is, when the decision is not baldly attributed to the public-spirit-
edness of the commercial insurers. Compare St. Clair, Occupational
Disability-Privately Insured, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 91, 93 (E. Cheit & M. Gordon eds. 1963) ("[t]he insurance in-
dustry owes employees and the public the duty of maintaining an in-
surance market which will provide every employee seeking workmens
compensation coverage an opportunity to obtain it.") with C. KULP,
CASUALTY INSURANCE 151, 155 (3d ed. 1956) (emphasizing the threat
of state funds and the willingness of insurers to carry workmens com-
pensation as an accommodation because of the great number of oppor-
tunities it affords for selling other coverages). For an excellent run-
ning account of the ebb and flow of pressures and the difficulties in
distinguishing between "public" and "private" responsibilities, see Na-
tional Underwriter (F & C), Jan. 14, 1937, at 29, col. 1, and Jan. 21,
1937, at 31, col. 1 (Illinois insurers resisting a proposed voluntary occu-
pational disease assigned risk plan in the face of threats of a state
fund, because of inclusion of accumulated hazards without an exami-
nation, on the grounds that protection against such hazards "is a public
responsibility and not one of the casualty companies, and . . . it is
nothing more or less than an attempt to provide social security at the
expense of the carriers").
The struggle over automobile financial responsibility laws and as-
signed risk plans is well known. For a representative account, see
C. KULP, supra at 185. For an arresting colloquy on the difficulty of
labeling why insurers participate in automobile liability insurance as-
signed risk plans, see the exchange between Senator Tydings and John
Nangle of the National Association of Independent Insurers in Hear-
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cern that once established a governmental program would not limit
its operation to residual risks unwanted by commercial insurers;
8 2
an insurance operation, after all, requires comparatively little in
the way of capital investment, and insurance is "a line of work in
which government also has a certain talent and expertise ...
Government indeed comes in where private business drops out, but
once in government may go further. No one, and certainly no sover-
eign, should be expected to conceive his mission as nothing more
than picking up after someone else.18 3 The fact that residual mar-
ket mechanisms were not until recently developed to meet avail-
ability problems with other coverages does not truncate the validity
of this characterization. The specter of displacement, as with any
threat, is effective only to the extent that it is credible, and in the
first two-thirds of this century only in workmen's compensation in-
surance and automobile liability insurance among those normally
written by commercial insurers was insurance coverage made man-
datory, or practically so, by legislation.
Of course, this is not the only possible explanation of the process.
From another perspective, 4 less dominated by conceptions of insur-
ance as an instrument of social policy, the role played by the insur-
ance industry in the residual market mechanisms might appear
quite different. In this view, a government confronted with strong
public demands that it assume functions not performed by other in-
stitutions within society, yet not greatly expand its own bureauc-
racy, has seen as both necessary and desirable that it farm out to in-
surers a large portion of what is essentially a public concern. At
some point, government accepts responsibility for providing mech-
anisms for spreading risks where other mechanisms do not develop,
ings before the Subcomm. on Business and Commerce of the Senate
Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 233-341
(1968).
For an excellent general treatment of the automobile assigned risk
plans, see D. B 4mum & G. STONE, A STUDY OF ASSIGNED RISK
PLANS (1970), and DIVIsIoN OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, BUREAU OF ECONO-
MICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INSURANCE AccEssIBILITY FOR THE
HARD-TO-PLAcR DRIVER (1970), both part of the Department of Trans-
portation's Automobile Insurance and Compensation Study.
82. Stewart, A New Responsiveness in Insurance and Its Regulation,
BEST'S REVIEW (P & L), Mar. 1970, at 32.
83. Id.
84. For a useful statement of this perspective, and a discussion of its im-
plications, see M. WEIDENBAUM, THE MODERN PUBLIC SECTOR: NEW
WAYS OF DOING THE GOVERNMENT'S BusInss (1969), and citations col-
lected therein. See also A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE
CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1965); E. GINSBERG,
D. HiESTAND, & B. REUBENS, THE PLURALISTIC ECONOMY (1965); CLEVE-
LAND, supra note 77.
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even if it chooses for reasons of ideology or efficiency to place ad-
ministration of the mechanisms in the hands of private organizations.
In medicare, a program with frankly public objectives, insurers ap-
parently found highly attractive their role as "fiscal intermediaries"
with administrative responsibilities but no risk-bearing function.8 5
In fact, this latter characterizaton has rarely exerted much influ-
ence on the development of residual market mechanisms. Traditions
of voluntarism established in the formative years of the assigned
risk plans served well enough for nearly three decades, and when
attention shifted in the mid-1960's to availability problems of prop-
erty insurance markets other important conditions combined to
make the industry's "voluntary" assumption of responsibility for
managing the availability crisis in property insurance seem a de-
sirable and almost inevitable alternative to political interventions
and governmental insurance programs.
2. Riots, Responsibility and the Role of Industry
The current era of concern with property insurance availability
problems can be dated from the development of the homeowners
policy in the mid-1950's. The introduction of package policies which
provided coverage against fire and allied perils, burglary, theft and
personal liability in exchange for a single indivisible premium
began to siphon off the better residential risks; those risks that
could not qualify for a homeowners policy and the package discount
which made it attractive gradually formed a residual class for
which available insurance was limited to the separately written
coverages. This transfer of the better risks to homeowners' policies
left the traditional lines with a built-in selection of low-value dwell-
ings, 0 urban core properties, and other less desirable risks. The re-
sults, hardly surprising in an enterprise in which risk selectivity is
a crucial element of price competition, included a general tightening
85. See, e.g., H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, MEDICARE AND THE HOSPITALS 32-
34, 268 (1967); R. STEvENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMER-
ICA 48-51 (1974). The actual allocation of functions between the im-
pressive federal administrative structure developed to supervise the
programs and the fiscal intermediaries apparently was a matter of no
little conflict. See generally Hess, Medicare and Private Insurance-
The Challenge of a New Equilibrium, 1966 INS. L.J. 653. A major
difference between Medicare and other governmental programs which
have employed private insurance carriers with no assumption of risk
on the part of the carriers, such as the World War II War Damage
Corporation, is that in the case of Medicare the coverage already was
being offered by commercial insurers.
86. Dunham, The Challenge of the Low Value Dwelling, 18 CPCU AN-
NALS 209 (1965). See also Chatfield, Dwelling Fire and Extended
Coverage Rates, 10 CPCU ANNALS 118 (1958).
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of company underwriting guidelines as the transfer of less hazardous
risks to the preferred package policies revealed the wide range of
risks which might be encompassed within a single rating classifica-
tion.8 7 With the cream skimmed first by the package policies, and
again by underwriters grown wary of risks whose position in the
lower reaches of the spectrum of desirability once had been obscured
by the general class results, problems of property insurance avail-
ability began to command regulatory attention. By 1966, a sub-
committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) was forced to acknowledge that over half the states were
experiencing restricted markets for dwelling fire and extended cov-
erage insurance in urban areas, rural areas, or both.8 8 Particularly
the subjects of concern were low value dwellings and those located
in the blighted areas of major cities.
Initial regulatory responses were facilitative. Some states ap-
proved substandard rating plans which allowed insurers to apply
surcharges for specific hazardous conditions discovered on a class-
rated property.8 9 The plans did allow a greater measure of rate
flexibility for properties subject to class rates, but a physical inspec-
tion of the property to identify specific hazardous conditions was
required before surcharges could be employed, and the prospect of
an increased premium proved insufficient to induce many companies
or agents to incur the costs of inspection and individual underwrit-
87. See generally G. HARTMAN, supra note 32, at 97-111.
88. II 1966 NAT'L A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 522. The report of the
NAIC subcommittee studying the problems presaged later develop-
ments; mandatory assigned risk procedures applicable to property risks
seemed a credible threat, and the subcommittee offered a program of
"cooperation" and "responsibility":
(1) The Responsibility of Owners-for maintaining prop-
erties in insurable condition.
(2) The Responsibility of Agents-for being willing to put
in extra time and effort necessary to comply with companies'
underwriting requirements in the way of on-site or sidewalk
inspections.
(3) The Responsibility of Companies-for relaxing under-
writing requirements so that any well-owned property main-
tained in insurable physical condition will find a market re-
gardless of location or value.
(4) The Responsibility of Governmental Authorities-for
enforcing building codes, demolition of condemned properties,
etc.
(5) The Responsibility of Bureaus-for developing rating
plans and schedules which will let the insurers write this
business on a no worse than break-even basis without making
other classes subsidize it.
(6) The Responsibility of Insurance Commissioners-for
using their influence to implement 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Id. at 520-21.
89. See generally PANEL REPoRT, supra note 3, at 56-79.
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ing in order to made use of the plans. Any inspection was likely
to result in quotation of a premium higher than that produced by
the application of manual rates, and there was no guarantee that the
prospective insured actually would purchase the insurance if it were
offered. He might find his way to another company whose different
underwriting standards would permit it to take a chance on the risk
at class rates without an inspection, or he might simply forego in-
surance coverage at the premium quoted. Prospective insureds, for
their part, often proved reluctant to seek an inspection and invite
attachment of a surcharged rate when there was no assurance that
the coverage would be written. Excess rate (ER) plans, which per-
mitted insurers to write property insurance on substandard risks at
a rate in excess of filed rate levels if the applicant gave his written
consent, were approved in about half the states. These plans per-
mitted even greater rate flexibility than the substandard rating
plans because they were applicable to commercial and mercantile
properties as well as class-rated property, and because the use of
increased rates was not restricted by a fixed schedule of conditions
or charges.9 0 Nonetheless, these plans, too, received only limited
use, mostly by a few small companies specializing in substandard
business. When they were employed they often provoked outrage
for rates not infrequently ranged as high as 600 per cent of manual
rates and usually averaged between 300 per cent and 400 per cent of
standard rates.9 1
The failure of increased rate flexibility to alleviate market prob-
lems for dwellings prompted regulators to turn from the facilitative
to the suasive.9 2  The underwriting prerogatives of property in-
surers remained untrammeled by officially imposed constraints, but
in numerous speeches, "bulletins," and "directives," often including
amorphous warnings of possible governmental intervention, insurers
90. Id. Such plans were permissible under statutory provisions recogniz-
ing that rates in excess of those provided by a filing otherwise applica-
ble might be required to provide coverage on risks having conditions
or hazards not contemplated by filed tariffs. See, e.g., MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.2614 (1967). Evidence of failure to obtain coverage
from licensed companies at filed rates usually was a prerequisite to
"consent" rates. The plans were promoted as solutions that would
permit recognition of block congestion, inadequate protection, and riot,
flood and earthquake hazards.
91. National Underwriter (F & C), May 24, 1968, at 52, col. 1; FIRE INSUR-
ANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS I, supra note 38, at 15-18.
92. The conclusions stated in the following three paragraphs of the text
are based on inferences drawn from a survey of weekly editions of
the National Underwriter (F & C) for the years 1960-1969, and Weekly
Underwriter, Insurance Department Service, for the years 1963-1969.
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were urged to act responsibly in the exercise of their underwriting
judgmento 3 For the most part, these were not blanket exhorta-
tions; tight markets generally were attributed to the practice of
predicating underwriting decisions concerning class-rated property
on such indices as the value of the dwelling, its geographical lo-
cation, or the agency through which it was initially written, rather
than upon consideration of the merits of individual risks, and it was
upon this practice that efforts to evoke social responsibility
focused.9 4
However, the underwriting prerogative appears in several guises.
The decision not to insure a risk might come as an initial refusal
to offer coverage to an applicant for insurance, as a refusal to renew
coverage at the conclusion of the policy term, or as a cancellation
of a policy in mid-term. All three facets were involved in the pull-
back of insurers from urban dwelling risks, but not all elicited the
same deference from regulatory officials. During this period, the
prerogative of an insurer to refuse to write a risk after comparing
the characteristics of that risk with its own underwriting standards
93. Moral suasion in this situation offered most of the attractions and was
subject to most of the limitations that typically attend this style of
governmental coercion. See generally Lewis, The Economics of Ad-
monition, 49 Am. ECON. Rzv. 384 (1959) (listing aversion to direct
coercion, doubts about the capacity of governmental institutions, and
the desire to appear to be responsive while delaying difficult decisions
as the primary motivations for what he labels "creeping admonition-
ism"); T. Lowi, supra note 19, at 85 (emphasizing the prevalence of
the pretension that "the unsentimental business of coercion need not
be involved"). Romans, Moral Suasion as an Instrument of Public
Policy, 56 Am. EcoN. REV. 1220, 1221-23 (1966), identifies two neces-
sary conditions for effective efforts at moral suasion: strong public
support for the policy sought, and a small and easily identified popu-
lation to be persuaded. He also catalogues the chief objections to the
use of moral suasion by government:
Moral suasion is inequitable in that it rewards non-com-
pliance; it constitutes extralegal coercion by government
without judicial review; it is in violation of the "rule of law";
where promises, explicit or implicit are involved, it entails the
danger of an overly familiar relationship between regulator
and regulatee; its ad hoc character adds an additional and un-
necessary element of uncertainty to business decisions; and it
may frequently be used in lieu of (Le., as an excuse for not
implementing) more effective legislation.
Id. at 1221. But see M. EDELmANN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLTICS
134-38 (1964) (attempting to explain the attractions and functions of
the hortatory style).
94. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), Feb. 26, 1965, at 1, col. 1
(New Jersey Commissioner reporting an "increasing number of com-
plaints which intimate an apparently capricious underwriting pro-
cedure by some insurers," and urging the use of "reasonable rules"
rather than "willy-nilly whims").
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seems never to have been seriously challenged; on the other hand,
numerous regulators responded to complaints with requests that in-
surers refrain from mass cancellations not based on the merits of
each risk.9 5
The cases stated seemed to represent opposite ends of a con-
tinuum of possible underwriting decisions. The continuum ran
along two axes. Cancellations of insurance protection were con-
sidered less defensible than refusals to renew a policy, and both
engendered more opposition than did an initial refusal to insure.
Underwriting decisions in any form were less subject to public and,
thus, regulatory criticism if made after consideration of the features
of each risk than if founded upon presumptions, rules of thumb, and
broad averages. In the exhortations which emanated from insur-
ance departments in the early 1960's, both dimensions were clearly
visible. During this period, automobile insurers were experiencing
sharp "voluntary" and legislative restrictions on their right to can-
cel or refuse to renew a policy of automobile liability coverage.9 6
95. The following "Notice to All Companies Concerned," from the Colo-
rado Commissioner, Dec. 10, 1965, is not atypical in either tone or con-
tent:
Along with other state insurance departments, this Depart-
ment is greatly concerned about the many cancellations prior
to declared expiration date of policies by some insurers. We
are not concerned with the occasional justifiable individual
cancellation of a risk which has experienced an unfavorable
change in conditions. Our major concern is the "mass can-
cellations" of risks.
These so-called "mass cancellations" result from various
causes, but we are mainly aware of situations involving the
cancellation of an agency with the resulting cancellation of
his book of insurance; the withdrawal of a company from a
geographical area of the state or a type of policy; and similar
mass cancellations.
Cancellation rights should be used by companies with dis-
cretion. If a company accepts a risk, and such risk does not
develop definitely adverse loss experience in and of itself, the
insured should not be penalized due to factors over which he
has no control, and which did not enter into the underwriting
of his particular risk.
If changes occur which make it desirable for a company
to. discontinue the underwriting of certain lines, or in certain
areas, or through certain agencies, etc., it is the company's re-
sponsibility to see that the replacement of coverage is done
without penalty to the insured.
96. A useful summary may be found in Zellers, Regulation of Cancella-
tions and Nonrenewals, 26 CPCU ANwAs 45 (1973). The rationale
for limited incursions into the underwriting prerogative to restrict can-
cellations and nonrenewals received its fullest statement in STATE OF
NEW YORK INs. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST NOW IN PROPERTY & LIA-
BILITY INsURANcE REGULATION (1969):
It is entirely appropriate for the legislature to make a
value judgment among the various grounds for cancellation.
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For property insurers, however, the primary emphasis of regulatory
pressures was upon persuading insurers to base their adverse un-
derwriting decisions, no matter what the form, on consideration of
the merits of the individual risk. For the class-rated urban
dwellings, this usually meant an inspection.
It was in the context of these pressures that the urban areas plans
evolved. 7 In Boston in 1960, in Pennsylvania in 1965, in Detroit
It is also entirely appropriate for that value judgment to be
limited to cancellation, and not to extend to other manage-
ment activities involving underwriting judgment. The mid-
term cancellation of an existing insurance policy involves
more than the mere absence of insurance protection. It in-
volves interruption of protection that the policyholder was
told he had and-since much of the value of insurance protec-
tion derives from the policyholder's ability to plan on the ba-
sis of it and to draw from it peace of mind-unjustifiable can-
cellations undercut some of the most essential benefits of the
entire insurance process. Finally, since (i) the essence of in-
surance is transferrence of risk from the policyholder to the
insurer, (ii) cancellation of a policy by the other party usually
works more of a hardship on the policyholder than on the in-
surance company, and (iii) the parties are so unequal in bar-
gaining power, it is appropriate for the law to restrict the in-
surer's privilege of cancelling without commensurately re-
stricting the policyholder's privilege of cancelling.
Id. at 49.
The possibility of a trend toward judicial restriction of the right
of cancellation to "reasonable" motives has been raised by the author
of Note, Insurance-The Exercise of a Cancellation Clause as a Breach
of Contract, 37 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 154 (1969). In L'Orange v.
Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968), the court held that
a petition alleging that an insurance policy had been cancelled for the
purpose of discouraging a dentist from testifying in liability suits
against other dentists stated a good cause of action. The result marks
a break from earlier decisions, which permit cancellation regardless of
motive. See, e.g., Camp v. Aetna Ins. Co., 170 Ga. 46, 152 S.E. 41
(1930) (upholding the right of Aetna to cancel the fire insurance
policy of a judge who made certain distasteful remarks about insur-
ance companies in his charge to a grand jury).
See also I 1971 NAT'L A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 549 (model stat-
ute regulating cancellations of automobile insurance); NATIONAL As-
SOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, CANCELLATION-SUMMARY OF
STATE LAws AND REGULATIONS RELATING THERETO (Looseleaf, un-
dated). Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 631.36 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976), ex-
plained in the 1969 Prefatory Committee Comment to chapter 631:
"All too often, cancellation has been exercised with no better reason
than timidity in the underwriter who has acted on the basis of guess,
hunch, and inadequate information. As a result, the public has re-
cently demanded and secured protection against certain kinds of can-
cellation."
97. The various urban areas plans, and their limitations, are ably sum-
marized in PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 56-79. See also FIn INsuR-
ANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS I, supra note 38, and N.w YORK INSURANCE
490 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 3 (1977)
and Cleveland in 1966, and in New York and Buffalo and a few
other cities in 1967, widespread publicity given the shortage of
dwelling insurance in urban areas and the apparent imminence of
an attempted legislative solution prompted insurers, usually
working through their major trade associations, to institute "volun-
tary" urban areas plans to deal with the problem. In each instance,
participating insurers acknowledged a "responsibility" to distin-
guish between good and bad risks if the burdens of so doing could
be rationalized. An individual insurer confronted with an appli-
cation for insurance of property in a blighted area was free to
practice the prerogatives of social responsibility only to the extent
that it was exempt from the compulsions of competition, 98 but com-
panies unable to respond individually to calls for uneconomic but
"socially responsible" inspections could together provide the neces-
sary inspections without damaging the competitive positions of any
of the participants. The plans made inspection of class-rated prop-
erties, which had been urged as the responsibility of individual in-
surers and agents, the duty of the fire rating organization already
established to inspect and rate mercantile and commercial property
subject to schedule rating. The costs of inspection were included
in the general operating costs of the rating organization and shared
by sponsoring companies in proportion to their total premiums
written in the state.
The plans involved no restrictions on the right of a company
to cancel a risk or to refuse to renew coverage at the end of a policy
term. They did, however, include "a commitment by insurers to
insure all properties that meet reasonable underwriting stand-
ards,"' '99 and most plans provided for periodic reports to permit the
rating organization and the state insurance department to monitor
the underwriting decisions made by each company on the inspected
risks submitted to it. Most plans did not try to define a "good
risk" or to state what underwriting standards would be deemed
"reasonable"; insurability was left to the underwriting discretion
of the individual companies, subject only to whatever pressures the
rating organization or the regulatory authorities might exert.
Thus, the urban areas plans defined the problem of unavailability
of dwelling insurance in central city areas as one of insurers en-
gaging in presumptions of undesirability without actual knowledge
of the characteristics of the individual risk, spread the incidence
DEPARTMENT, FIRE INSURANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS (A Second Report
to Governor Rockefeller, DEC. 29, 1967) [hereinafter cited as FIRE IN-
SURANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS II].
98. See generally Lewis, supra note 93, at 390.
99. Fmi INsURANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS I, supra note 38, at 24.
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of the cost of making inspections from those insurers receiving ap-
plications to most fire insurance companies within the state, and se-
cured a formally stated but largely undefined commitment by in-
dividual insurers to act responsibly to provide coverage for all "in-
surable" dwelling property. The riots which struck the cities in
1967 and 1968 and which provided the impetus for transforming the
urban areas plans into "Fair Access to Insurance Requirements"
(FAIR) plans caused no significant alteration in either the defini-
tion of the problem or the emphasis on voluntary assumption of re-
sponsibility by insurers as the key to its solution.10 0 In fact, at-
tempted withdrawals of some insurers from central city areas fol-
lowing the riots accentuated the definition of the problem as one of
underwriting on the basis of geographical area. Calls by state of-
ficials for moratoria on area cancellations pending the development
of programs to deal with the urban insurance crisis, in stressing the
special responsibility of insurers as the most mutual of all corporate
citizens, continued to rely on exhortations rather than direct reg-
ulatory controls. Perhaps most important of all in setting the
dominant tone, attempts by leaders of the insurance industry to
secure federal assistance to cope with the riot hazard led them to
confess supposed prior delinquencies' 01 and pledge new social re-
sponsibility to help meet the problems. 02
100. See comment by Governor Hughes concerning the Panel recommenda-
tions: "You see the sense of it is to impute higher responsibility to
the insurance company not to be capricious or bigoted or not forget,
in other words, a measure of social responsibility compatible with
business safety." PANEL HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 304; PANEL
REPORT, supra note 3, passim.
101. Gradually but perceptibly, as attention focused on preventing mass
withdrawals by insurers and insurers made their case for relief from
the riot hazard, underwriting by area was changed from a lack of posi-
tive virtue to the abuse of red-lining. See, e.g., National Underwriter
(F & C), Nov. 17, 1967, at 4, col. 1 (speech by insurance company
executive):
In the past the problems of inadequate rates, of competi-
tion, the shackles of past practice, and perhaps our own inertia
may have led us too often into practices for which there is
no justification. Class underwriting, or "slot underwriting,"
as it is sometimes called, and underwriting judgment based
merely on averages, rather than consideration of the individ-
ual, are the seeds of many of our difficulties.
See also National Underwriter (F & C), July 19, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (red-
lining discontinued "because we were being prejudiced").
102. The only significant analysis of the character of the social responsibil-
ity upon which the urban areas and FAIR programs relied is provided
in McGuire, The Changing Nature of Business Responsibilities, 36 J.
RISxK & INS. 55, 61 (1969). He distinguishes the conduct expected of
property insurers in participating in the state programs ("enlight-
ened") from the 1969 pledge of the life insurance industry to make
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Means of protecting the solvency of insurers in the face of new
and greater riots dominated the rhetoric. Protection against riot
and civil commotion losses had been available from commercial in-
surers as a part of the extended coverage (EC) endorsement to
the standard fire policy for a quarter century preceding the civil
disorders of the 1960's; riot coverage, however, had proved a rela-
tively inconsequential feature of the EC package of coverage and
produced only a negligible portion of the total premium. The most
important aspect of the endorsement was the protection it pro-
vided against the windstorm hazard. In its early years the endorse-
ment was popular only in the Midwest where tornadoes presented
a constant threat. In the 1940's a series of major storms and hurri-
canes produced severe wind damage in other sections of the country,
and thereafter the EC endorsement became almost an integral part
of the fire insurance contract, sold with the basic fire policy as a
matter of course. During this period of the endorsement's matu-
ration, the nation enjoyed the longest respite from major civil dis-
orders in its history.10 3 Consequently, when riots of the magnitude
of Newark and Detroit made their appearance, the insurance indus-
try discovered that the indivisible EC premium contained little pro-
vision for riot losses, and that there was little experience upon
which to predicate adjustments to account for the riot hazard.
The problem from the point of view of the insurance industry
was not so much that it could not absorb its liability under the fire
policy and its EC endorsement; the Newark and Detroit
disturbances did not produce unbearable dollar losses.' 0 4 What the
one billion dollars in investments in urban core areas ("responsible").
Apparently the salient difference is that property insurers were feeling
the effects of government pressures and were confronted, at least in
their eyes, by the spectre of replacement by governmental agencies.
The post-riot motivations of the life insurance industry's invest-
ment program in urban neighborhoods have been exhaustively consid-
ered in K. ORREN, CoRPoRATE POWER AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1974). See
also Mundheim, A Comment on the Social Responsibilities of Life In-
surance Companies as Investors, 61 VA. L. Rsv. 1247 (1976). For a
useful study of the pressures that prompted post-riot corporate pro-
grams in center cities, see J. CoHN, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CORPORA-
noN, 1967-1970 (1971).
103. A. WAsKow, FROM RACE RioT TO SIT-IN 220 (1966). No important riots
broke the domestic peace during the interval between the Harlem, De-
troit, and Los Angeles riots of 1943 and the re-emergence of violence
in Harlem, Rochester, and several New Jersey cities in the summer
of 1964. Furthermore, the riots of the mid-1960's had a "property, not
people" character that distinguished them from earlier outbreaks.
Hubbard, Five Long Hot Summers and How They Grew, PuB. INTER-
EST, No. 12, Summer 1968, at 3, 22.
104. See PANEL HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 185-194 (early Newark and De-
troit insured riot loss statistics); the Panel estimated total insured riot
losses in 1967 at less than $75,000,000. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3,
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riots did produce was a loss of faith in the efficacy of past experi-
ence as a guide to future losses. The law of large numbers is use-
ful only to the extent that the events causing the loss are statis-
tically independent; to insurance company executives and un-
derwriters the civil disorder hazard seemed subject to nu-
merous stimulating influences likely to produce serious problems
of aggregation of exposure for individual insurers. Organized
leadership of rioters would reduce the residual independence of
loss-producing events. Reports of apparent selectivity in burning
and looting,10 5 stories of express recognition by participants in the
disorders of the insurance ramifications of their conduct, 0 6 and the
publicity given governmental decisions to "place life above prop-
erty"'1 7 all worked to exacerbate these fears. When initial con-
spiracy theories began to give way under closer examination of the
incidents, they were replaced by recognition that the sparks of riot
could be disseminated as effectively by communications media as
by the wind. Some perceived the long-term development of a
"public moral hazard" which made continued operation of the com-
mercial insurance enterprise a highly speculative venture.10 8
Others expressed fears that future riots would not be confined to
the center city and might strike areas with higher property values
and a greater incidence of insurance protection. 10 9 Indeed, the
civil disturbances which followed the assassination of Dr. King were
far less concentrated in their impact and affected far wider areas
in each city than had most of the 1967 incidents. Hit-and-run fire
bombings of Chicago and New York department stores heightened
the apprehension that the disorders were spreading from core city
areas to the classes of property which insurers had always con-
at 4. Insured losses in civil disturbances following the assassination
of Dr. King were estimated to approach $67,000,000. National Under-
writer (F & C), May 24, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
105. See, e.g., Fogelson, White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Com-
mission Report on the Los Angeles Riots, 82 PoL. SCL Q. 337, 353 (1967)
("[T]he Los Angeles Rioters were so highly selective in their violence
that, with few exceptions, they looted and burned only white-owned
stores which charged outrageous prices, sold inferior goods, and ap-
plied extortionate credit arrangements").
106. See, e.g., Tnv, June 28, 1968, at 28, col. 2.
107. See, e.g., Wall St. J., April 11, 1968, at 1, col 1.
108. Long, The Future and Insurance, 34 J. RIsK & INs. 515, 517 (1967).
See also J. LONG, ETmIcs, MoRALrrY, AND INsURAxcE 40-45 (1971); Na-
tional Underwriter (F & C), Nov. 24, 1967, at 42, col. 1.
109. E.g., 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1095-96 (statement by presi-
dent of American Insurance Association); National Underwriter (F &
C), March 28, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (emphasizing the changing character
of riot losses); J. Com., Dec. 2, 1968, at 9, col. 1 (speculating on
possibility of sorties into more expensive neighborhoods).
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sidered prime risks. -Confronted with the spectre of such metasta-
sis, insurers began to defend themselves by another round of
tightening underwriting standards, making marginal risks of many
properties which previously had experienced no difficulty in ob-
taining the basic property insurance coverages.
The difficulties were not restricted to class-rated properties; the
riots struck hardest at mercantile and commercial risks." 0 The
Panel, however, located the source of the problem in the companies'
practice of declining the application of an inner city homeowner
or businessman "on the basis of the neighborhood where his prop-
erty is located.""'
The same reasons adequate insurance is unavailable for dwellings
explain why it is unavailable for mercantile and commercial prop-
erty-there is a failure to distinguish between good and bad risks
in an area regarded as "blighted." The problem, always chronic,
has now become acute, as insurance companies have increasingly
become reluctant to provide insurance in areas that might be dam-
aged by riots.112
The problem, in the eyes of the Panel, was only an enlarged version
of that faced by the urban areas plans; the remedy proposed by
the Panel, and adopted almost intact in the federal legislation, was
to try to neutralize, or at least to sharply reduce, the riot hazard
as an underwriting consideration'" by offering federal riot rein-
110. In Detroit, drug stores and liquor stores incurred the greatest dollar
losses, with grocery stores, clothing stores and laundries and dry
cleaners also hard hit.
111. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
112. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 88.
113. Other means of neutralizing the riot hazard as an underwriting consid-
eration were advocated, but none proved viable. Despite some protes-
tations to the contrary, the disturbances of the 1960's were generally
considered to be "riots" within the meaning of the EC endorsement
and not the "insurrections" excluded from coverage. Compare Com-
ment, Insurance Protection against Civil Demonstrations, 7 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REv. 706 (1965) with Comment, The Aftermath of the Riot:
Balancing the Budget, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 649, 692-702 (1968) and Note,
Compensation for Victims of Urban Riots, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 57, 60-
62 (1968). See also GENERAL ADJSTMENT BUREAU, INC., INSURREC-
TIoN-RIoT, Aug. 4, 1967.
Proposals for insurers to provide insurance against riot damage
apart from other property coverages in order to keep insurance against
other property hazards available met with little approval from insur-
ers and none from regulators, chiefly because of the acute problems
of adverse selection and rating that necessarily would be involved in
any separate packaging of riot and civil commotion coverage. See
generally Note, Compensation for Victims of Urban Riots, supra at 65;
National Underwriter (F & C), Nov. 3, 1967, at 8, col. 1 (remarks
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surance to companies actually participating in state programs
modeled after urban areas plans in states which made provision
for funding a five per cent layer of the total reinsurance liability.
Reinsurance alone would not solve the market problems, of course,
but it was thought that by tying eligibility for reinsurance to active
participation in state programs designed to increase property insur-
ance availability, individual insurers might be induced to accept a
sufficient measure of social responsibility to alleviate most of the
urban market problems.
The responsibilities demanded of insurers participating in FAIR
plans were similar in nature to those required by the plans' progeni-
tors in New York, Detroit, Boston, and other cities. Participating
insurers were to agree that
no risk shall be written at surcharged rates or be denied coverage
for essential property insurance unless there has first been an in-
spection of the risk, without cost to the owner, by an inspection
facility and a determination by the insurer, based on information
in the inspection report and other sources, that the risk does not
meet reasonable underwriting standards at the applicable premium
rate. . . .114
As in the urban areas plans, the burden of inspection was spread
through most of the property insurance industry by committing the
duty to the rating organization in that state. Procedures assuring
the applicant the right to request an inspection, allowing a tenant
of J. Sammit, Executive Vice-President, Continental Casualty Com-
pany).
Extension of statutes fixing liability for mob damage on local gov-
ernmental units received wide support among the commentators, but
the realities of limited financial resources of local governments to-
gether with a healthy skepticism about the supposed deterrent effects
of such liability made extension of the device to other jurisdictions
unlikely. The best analyses are Rottman, Riot Damage, Municipal
Liability, and Insurance, 1968 INs. L.J. 597; Comment, Municipal Lia-
bility for Riot Damage, 81 HARv. L. Ray. 638 (1968), and Comment,
The Aftermath of the Riot: Balancing the Budget, supra at 668-692.
Contra, Jaffe & Dubin, Trends in Municipal Liability, 1967 INs. L.J.
282. See also Sengstock, Mob Action: Who Shall Pay the Price, 44
J. URBAN L. 407 (1967) (urging judicial imposition of municipal liabil-
ity to individuals injured by negligent failure of municipal authorities
to suppress riots).
In Newark, insurers were among those successfully seeking reim-
bursement from the city for claims arising from the 1967 riots. Na-
tional Underwriter (F & C), July 4, 1969, at 1, col. 1. On the equities
and practical difficulties of permitting insurers subrogation rights un-
der municipal liability statutes, see Note, Compensation for Victims
of Urban Riots, supra at 74-75; and Comment, The Aftermath of the
Riot: Balancing the Budget, supra at 702-08.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b) (1) (1970).
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an inspection even in the absence of the building owner, and re-
quiring insurers to render a prompt underwriting decision were
mandated by the federal enactment. The decision to accept or not
accept a risk after an inspection again was left to the discretion
of the individual insurer, but copies of both the inspection report
and the action report were required to be forwarded to the state
insurance authority to permit monitoring of each company's deci-
sions, and each rejected applicant was given a right to appeal the
decision of the insurer to insurance regulatory officials." 15 In addi-
tion, each FAIR plan, in order for its participants to be eligible
for federal reinsurance, was required to include a mechanism for
assuring that the burden of considering applications for insurance
from inner city locations, and actually assuming risks deemed insur-
able, did not fall inequitably upon the companies. Under urban
areas plans, some insurers had avoided contact with prospective in-
sureds in urban cores by the simple expedient of not appointing
agents to receive applications from such areas, and by discouraging
existing agents from accepting such applications. The Panel pro-
posed, and the federal statute required, that each FAIR plan include
an "all-industry placement facility" to assist applicants for insur-
ance in placing coverage up to the full insurable value of the risk
and to distribute the risks involved equitably among participating
insurers."16
B. "Creative Federalism" Insurance Style
This vision of the availability problem meshed well with the
underlying administrative approach recommended by the Panel. In
constructing its proposals, the Panel was forced to mediate carefully
between two imposing sets of pressures. On the one hand the
Panel was confronted by a suspicious Washington wary of passing
out federal benefits without substantial practical assurances that
meaningful improvements in urban property insurance markets
would result; on the other hand the Panel was faced by an industry
and an established regulatory regime adamantly hostile to lodging
any regulatory authority over the insurance industry in any federal
agency. The Panel found its solution in the rationale of "creative
federalism."' 1 7 By specifying goals to be accomplished in exchange
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3 (1970).
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-4 (1970).
117. Although the Panel apparently did not employ the term, the research
director for the Panel, Herbert Denenberg, made clear that the pro-
posals consciously were structured to accord with that rationale.
Becker & Denenberg, Implementing the National Reinsurance Pro-
gram: The District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, 21 CPCU
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for the provision of riot reinsurance and by leaving the existing
industry-regulator axis free to administer itself in determining how
to accomplish those responsibilities, the Panel hoped that it could
construct a package that could be made to seem scarcely either "fed-
eral" or "regulatory."
Thus, the rhetoric of the Panel was the rhetoric of "cooperation,"
"partnership," and voluntary assumption of responsibilities par-
celed out by it to the cooperating groups. The federal role would
be limited to providing the reinsurance structure necessary to pro-
tect insurers from catastrophic riot losses. 118 The industry, freed
from that worry, as its part of the bargain would stop underwriting
by area and would resume making underwriting decisions based on
the merits of the individual risk. State government would share
in the riot reinsurance back-up, and state regulators would prevent
shirking of responsibility by individual insurers and assure that the
industry put the necessary patches on the urban areas plans. The
existing scheme of regulation would be preserved. Each partner
in the undertaking would fulfill its responsibilities; each would do
ANNALS 293, 294 (1968). See also Denenberg & Teberg, Meeting the
Insurance Crisis of Our Cities: The Theory and Reality of Legislative
Reform, 22 CPCU ANNALS 121, 131-35 (1969); MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 251, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114
CONG. REC. 3956, 3959 (1968).
For perspectives on the sort of federalism variously labeled "new"
or "creative," see A GREAT SOCIETY (B. Gross ed. 1968). The close con-
nections between notions of corporate social responsibilities and the
idea of "creative federalism" are apparent; Max Ways has explained
the attractions to the business community in this way:
Creative federalism starts from the ... belief that total power
-private and public, individual and organizational-is ex-
panding very rapidly. As the range of conscious choice
widens, it is possible to think of vast increases of federal gov-
ernment power that do not encroach upon or diminish any
other power. Simultaneously, the power of states and local
governments will increase; the power of private organizations,
including businesses, will increase; and the powers of indi-
viduals will increase.
Ways, "Creative Federalism" and the Great Society, FORTUNE, Jan.
1966, at 121.
For a devastating critique of this "ersatz public philosophy," see
T. Lowi supra note 19, at 38. But see, e.g., Fluno, The Floundering
Leviathan: Pluralism in an Age of Ungovernability, 24 W. POL. Q.
560 (1971).
118. Concerns for both costs and speed supplemented the philosophical
bases for avoiding a substantial federal role. See, e.g., Denenberg &
Teberg, supra note 117, at 134; 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at
1077 (Mr. Wozencraft defending Panel's judgment that direct federal
reinsurance was inappropriate because industry-based programs could
be more quickly established and would permit avoidance of substan-
tial federal costs).
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its share; each would carry out its part of the bargain.119 The Panel
program was the beneficiary of almost unstinting praise.
However, the bill' 20 that became the primary vehicle for the fed-
eral legislation that was to ratify the bargain dealt with a number
of grubby matters of detail and dealt with them by committing
substantial authority to the federal agency that was to administer
the program. The Panel Report advocated that federal reinsurance
be provided by an independent federal corporation managed by a
board of directors composed of representatives of industry, the
public, state regulators, and the federal government. The Panel
envisioned that. the corporation would have no regulatory powers
that would disturb the established patterns of state regulation.'2 '
The bill that emerged not only made the corporation into an agency
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but also
conferred on it significant regulatory functions.1 22 The bill gave
the federal agency complete auditing and examination power over
any reinsured company or FAIR program and the power to refuse
reinsurance to an insurer if it was not fully participating in an ac-
ceptable program, to modify the standards of performance re-
quired for eligibility, including the authority to require addition
of burglary and theft coverages to state plan requirements, and to
119. The language of bargain was remarkably explicit throughout the de-
velopment of the programs. See, e.g., Insurance, November 16, 1968,
at 34, col. 1: "[I]n essence, we traded a reinsurance back-up to re-
move catastrophic exposure in return for our commitment to write
property insurance in the ghettos and blighted areas"; Denenberg &
Teberg, supra note 117, at 124: "In its simplest terms then, the federal
government and the states protect insurance companies from catastro-
phic riot losses in return for a fee and in return for their agreeing
to make insurance available in the cities." See also 1968 House Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 1071, 1073.
120. H.R. 15625, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) ("The National Insurance De-
velopment Corporation Act of 1968"), reprinted in 1968 House Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 48-57. The companion Senate Bill was S. 3028,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
121. PANEL REPolR, supra note 3, at 994_1'02.
122. The decision to make the Federal Insurance Administrator an agency
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development apparently was
prompted as much by the desire to fit the funding of any federal rein-
surance liability within established channels of HUD borrowing au-
thority under the National Housing Act as by any particular theory
of administrative direction for the programs. See, e.g., Washington
Ins. Newsletter, Feb. 26, 1968; Washington Ins. Newsletter, May 13,
1968; 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1082-86.
The House bill would have limited borrowing authority to $150
million; the Senate bill imposed no limits. The compromise was bor-
rowing authority to $250 million and such further sums as might be
authorized by joint resolution. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-13(b) (1970), in-
corporating the limits and terms of 12 U.S.C. § 1735d(b) (1970).
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specify the geographical areas the state plans were to serve. In
the words of one of the state regulators who rushed to Washington
to oppose this development, the agency was to be given "[e]x-
tremely broad powers to alter and shape the whole existing pattern
of markets and regulation... without meaningful participation by
the insurance industry or insurance regulators and without any
means for Congress to establish and oversee the specifics of Fed-
eral policy.' 123 The regulators and the industry presented a united
front against the vesting of such powers in the federal agency.
124
Eventually, a compromise was hammered out. The reaction was
a typical one for a program structured according to the governing
rationale of creative federalism: the problem of aversion to the
location of regulatory power in the federal government was
handled, not by reducing the power, but by diffusing it and dis-
persing it. As a consequence, the Panel's "sophisticated allocation
of responsibilities" grew even more splintered under pressure from
state regulators and the major insurance trade associations. Repre-
sentation of the industry and state regulators on the Advisory
Board was increased, and the Federal Insurance Administration
(FIA) in HUD was required to consult with the Advisory Board
before taking certain actions.
1 25
Conversion of the Panel's recommendations into a legislative
package also had another, related, consequence. On one critical
123. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1163 (testimony of Commis-
sioner Parker).
124. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1131-37 (AMIA objections); id.
at 1116-1121 (NAII objections); id. at 1147-1158 (INA objections); id.
at 1160-1191 (NAIC objections). But see id. at 1099 (chairman of
AIA has no complaints concerning federal authority, but supports ef-
forts of concerned insurers and regulators to obtain clarification of fed-
eral powers).
125. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb-1, 1749bbb-6, 1749bbb-8, &
1749bbb-9 (1970). The alterations did not silence all detractors of the
federal involvement. See, e.g., Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, Rep. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 195-96 (1968) (minority
views):
We do not consider these broad extensions of Federal
power into the insurance industry necessary to carry out this
program nor do we consider them desirable.
It is argued that the Federal authority is justified because
of the remote possibility that the riot losses covered by the
program may exceed the exposure of the insurance industry,
the required State contributions, and the reinsurance premium
funds.
[S] uch losses are not likely and can be avoided and ...
the remote possibility of a demand on Treasury funds is not
sufficient to extend Federal regulatory power throughout the
insurance industry.
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question-whether the responsibilities of insurers participating in
the state programs should include a guarantee of coverage-the
Panel had waffled. For most of its report the Panel had seemed
content to live with its diagnosis of the property insurance avail-
ability problem as one of area underwriting, and to accept the as-
surances of the industry that neutralizing the civil disorder expo-
sure and rationalizing the burdens of inspection would result in
particularized underwriting decisions that somehow would take the
sting out of the availability problem. However, as expressed by
the Panel, this anti-discrimination prescription was not unambigu-
ous. With a disingenuousness that could not completely mask the
significant antinomies it was obscuring, the Panel juxtaposed its
conclusion that the availability problem resulted from "a failure
to distinguish between good and bad risks" 126 with the hope that
"all well-maintained property in the hands of responsible owners
should be insurable without regard to environmental hazards."'
1 27
Constructing a statutory scheme embodying the Panel's adminis-
trative approach meant converting such broadly stated goals into
formal conditions for eligibility for the riot reinsurance. If the
Panel's concept of "environmental hazards" were read to encompass
only the riot exposure and the amorphous concerns behind unpartic-
ularized location-based inferences about the desirability of individ-
ual risks, the Panel Report could be seen as embodying a single
prescription emphasizing the responsibility of insurers to make in-
formed underwriting decisions without fear of civil disorders. How-
ever, in the federal legislation the Panel's precatory sentiment was
translated into a requirement that within two years participating
insurers must stop making underwriting and rating decisions based
on environmental hazards,1 28 and "environmental hazard" was de-
fined to include "any hazardous condition that might give rise to
a loss under an insurance contract, but which is beyond the control
of the property owner.'
1 29
While not without its own ambiguities, the sweep of this defini-
tion insured that the implementation of the FAIR plans would not
be easily accomplished. The requirement that the underwriting de-
cisions of participating insurers not only be particularized but also
ignore conditions that were "beyond the control of the property
owner" at the least involved a rejection of the simplistic vision of
the urban areas plans (and most of the Panel Report) of a property
insurance world inhabited by unequivocally "good" and "bad" risks,
126. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 88.
127. Id. at 96.
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9 (a) (2) (1970).
129. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-2 (a) (4) (1970).
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with conscientious consideration of the features of each risk all that
public policy should require. Instead, the message of the statute
became that insurers would be expected to write at standard rates
a third category of risks that would be unacceptable in the volun-
tary market because of environmental hazards. The boundaries of
that category, how the responsiblity was to be allocated, and where
the costs were to fall, as with other details of administration, all
were left to be worked out in the process of implementation.
Thus, the programs established under the joint aegis of the Panel
Report and the federal statute were characterized by a parceling
of responsibility defined largely, in the case of insurers, in terms
of a duty to participate, with but few standards to dictate the form
and nature of that participation. Central questions concerning the
role of individual insurers in the programs, the underwriting
standards to be employed, and the pricing of the coverage to be
provided, were simply deferred and delegated to the insurance in-
dustry, the state regulatory officials, and HUD, without any very
clear boundaries on the responsibility. While this technique had
the supposed advantage of locating the power of decision and the
expertise in the same hands, in fact the decisions that were deferred
often were not technical matters but rather broad questions of pur-
-pose and design. The result was threefold: (1) the layering of
responsibility and its concomitant diffusion of authority placed the
power of initiative in the industry and insulated many aspects of
the program from effective control by public agencies; (2) there
was a struggle for access to and control over the boards of gover-
nors of the state plans, often the real locus of authority; and (3)
not surprisingly, the boards of governors felt as their primary con-
cern a functional accountability to their constituent elements.
130
When the lure of riot reinsurance failed to live up to its advance
billing as a strong inducement to full participation in the programs,
it quickly became evident that the other instruments available to
state and federal officials were ineffectually blunt, and that the
emphasis on cooperation, partnership, and responsibility had ob-
scured important differences among those shoehorned together in
the programs. In the process of implementation, these difficulties
would stretch thin the fabric of the rhetoric of cooperation and re-
sponsibility and protrude as real problems to be resolved.
C. Who Governs: Authority, Accountability, and Control
1. The Limited Lure of Riot Reinsurance
The near-unanimity with which the industry welcomed the ad-
130. Cf. T. Lowi, supra note 19 (providing numerous examples of similar
consequences of "interest group liberalism").
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vent of the riot reinsurance program was soon to dissipate. With-
in three months after the federal statute had ratified the bargain,
one of the principal leaders of the industry's pilgrimage to Washing-
ton was denouncing the accord as "almost . . . a 'pound of flesh'
exacted by a 'shylock' government.' 131 Similar and only slightly
more temperate complaints soon followed. 13 2 By early 1970, even
the Federal rnsurance Administrator was opining in public that the
insurers who "screamed for federal riot reinsurance sold their birth-
right for a lousy mess of potage."
13'
The roots of the disenchantment lay in the structure of the fed-
eral reinsurance system. Despite its label and its superficial resem-
blance to commercial excess loss reinsurance, the contract offered
by HUD" 4 to participating insurers differed markedly from trad-
itional reinsurance arrangements. The contract provided that
each insurer would be subject to an annual net retention of riot
losses incurred by it in any one state equal to 2.5 per cent of its
direct earned premiums on reinsured lines in that state and that
the insurer would participate in any losses in excess of its net
retention according to a sliding scale ranging from ten percent to
two per cent as excess losses grew. HUD, as reinsurer, would as-
sume the remainder of the insurer's losses. However, HUD's par-
ticipation was to be funded in the following order: first, out of
accumulated reinsurance premiums generated in the state in which
the insurer experienced the riot losses; then, if additional funds
were required, out of assessments against other participating in-
surers in that state to the extent that their riot payments in the
state for the year had not equalled or exceeded their net retentions;
then, if still more funds were needed, out of the state government's
commitment to back up the other layers with funds in an amount
up to five per cent of the aggregate property insurance premiums
earned in the state during the preceding calendar year on the lines
of insurance reinsured with HUD during the year in which the
131. H. Clay Johnson, speech before 1968 annual meeting of the Inde-
pendent Insurance Agents of California, reported in National Under-
writer (F & C), Oct. 4, 1968, at 30, col. 4.
132. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), Oct. 11, 1968, at 53, col.
2. Kenney, The Great Awakening to the Shortcomings of Federal
Back-Up of Riot Insurance, UNITED STATES INVESTOR, Oct. 7, 1968,
at 63.
133. Insurance Advocate, Jan. 31, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
134. The first formal contract offer was published at 33 Fed. Reg. 11,077
(1968). For subsequent contracts consult 34 Fed. Reg. 642 (1969); 35
Fed. Reg. 6125, 6504 (1970); 36 Fed. Reg. 2475 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg.
8379 (1972); 38 Fed. Reg. 8076 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 13,018 (1974); 40
Fed. Reg. 14,351 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 13,648 (1976). The "Standard
Reinsurance Contract" is found at 24 C.F.R. Part 906 (1976).
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losses occurred; and finally, if still more funds were required, out
of funds borrowed by IIUD from the federal treasury, to be re-
paid with interest when sufficient reinsurance premiums became
available.
As a consequence of this arrangement, the program operated not
as a reinsurer but as twenty-seven separate sinking funds, or-
ganized and administered by the federal government, but involving
no federal resources put at permanent risk. 3 5 While the program
could help to redistribute the impact of riot losses among partici-
pating insurers in a particular state, it would not redistribute
losses across state lines.136 Thus, although the HUD borrowing au-
thority held the promise of a guaranteed method of spreading at
least a portion of the impact of a truly cataclysmic riot over time, al-
most all of the activity under the program involved redistributions
of funds among insurers doing business in the state experiencing
riot losses. Only if the funding of the state layer were to be
broadly based and only if there were a reasonable likelihood that
the state layer would be tapped did the federal program offer in-
surers benefits that could not have been achieved under private
auspices without the intervention of the federal program.137 In-
surer disillusionment in large measure grew out of a burgeoning
fear that neither of these conditions would be met.
138
135. Thus, the oft-quoted statements by the Panel that the riot reinsurance
program was designed to "eliminate the riot risk as an impediment
to the active participation of companies in the urban core insurance
market" and to "neutralize the riot risk as a factor in insurance com-
pany underwriting decisions," PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 100, 102,
should not have been misunderstood to mean that the riot hazard
would no longer be borne by the insurance industry. Rather, the Pan-
el's program operated to tie the fortunes of a state's participating in-
surers together so that whether or not an insurer wrote urban core
properties, it would be bearing a share of the riot hazard of those writ-
ten by any participating insurer. The riot risk was not being totally
eliminated in the sense that an insurer could not avoid riot loss poten-
tials by deciding to write one risk rather than another within the state.
For a general treatment of the implications of this arrangement see
J. LEwis, PROPERTY INSURANCE IN THE URBAN CORE 168-250 (Unpub-
lished Ph. D. dissertation, U. Wisc. 1970). Lewis quite correctly refers
to the federal role as "little more than a fiscal agent." Id. at 234. See
also Launie, A View of the HUD Reinsurance Plan with a Suggested
Alternative, 21 CPCU ANNALS 305 (1968).
136. Because an insurer's net retention and potential assessment liabilities
were tied to its total writings within the state, the reinsurance arrange-
ment was not calculated to recognize differences in particular insurers'
riot exposures. Launie, supra note 135, at 308.
137. This assumes that loans of up to $250,000,000 would be available to
industry organizations. Treasury loans under the program would be
made on commercial terms. 12 U.S.C. § 1735d (1970).
138. Insurer unhappiness also focused on the uniform rates and retentions
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a. Funding the State Layer
The state backup layer requirement, part of the Panel's elabo-
rate allocation of responsibilities, was chiefly an attempt to counter
warnings that the Panel's program would be an invitation to
unchecked arson and looting: "Maintaining law and order is pri-
marily a state and local responsibility. Thus, any state desiring
reinsurance for riot risks located in that state would be required
to accept a state layer of financial backup of some kind in the event
that disorders actually take place in that state."' 39 The Panel sug-
gested that the backup layer might be funded from general reve-
nues or from existing or augmented insurance premium taxes, and
that a state "might also wish to share its responsibility with units
of local government to assure their continued cooperation in the
maintenance of law and order and the prevention and control of
riots.' 1 40  The federal legislation followed the Panel's lead, re-
quiring that statutory provision be made by each participating state
for reimbursement of HUD by "the State, its political subdivisions,
or a governmental corporation or fund established pursuant to state
law."1141
Most states proved reluctant to pledge state or local revenues
to fund the layer. Some states simply decided that the reinsurance
program was not worth the candle and opted out of the program.
Other states, though determined to qualify their insurers for par-
ticipation in the program, resisted funding the state layer out of
applicable in all states; differing degrees of riot potential and varying
distributions of business should be recognized, ran the argument. Na-
tional Underwriter (F & C), Feb. 28, 1969, at 2, col. 1. For a report
of a survey of similar dissatisfactions, see Lewis, A Critical Review
of the Federal Riot Reinsurance System, 38 J. RisK & INs. 29 (1971).
Cf. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 185 (state regulatory official
urging that riot hazard be viewed as a national social problem and
that the same reinsurance premiums and retentions should prevail in
all states without regard to riot experience or potential).
139. PANEL REPoRT, supra note 3, at 13. The recommendation also was de-
signed to help allay fears that states not suffering riot losses somehow
would be subsidizing riots in states unable to avoid such difficulties.
Id. at 102.
140. Id. For an indication of the seriousness with which the "maintenance
of law and order" rationale was received in some quarters, see the
discussion by Senator Russell, 114 CONG. Rxc. 15122-25 (1968) (urging
extension of the state layer requirement to include mandatory equal
participation by municipalities in order to help discourage official de-
cisions to let riot areas burn as a method of "cheap urban renewal").
See also National Underwriter (F & C), April 26, 1968, at 1, col. 4
(representative of rating organization urging use of riot exclusion en-
dorsements in all policies written on governmental property).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9 (a) (1) (1970).
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general revenues or by imposing an additional premium tax. Their
hesitancy went beyond mere fiscal caution; the method chosen to
fund the state layer could have important ancillary consequences.
In theory, riot loadings were designed to produce enough premium
dollars to pay for insurance of the riot peril, including the cost of
any reinsurance the primary insurer in its business judgment might
decide to purchase from either the federal program or from com-
mercial reinsurers. Broadly based funding of the state layer
would import a potential subsidy to insurers participating in the
federal program and thus would prejudice the competitive positions
of insurers seeking to handle their riot exposures through normal
methods. From the viewpoint of HUD and insurers participating
in the federal program, the result was a useful and justifiable in-
ducement to full participation in the federal program. From the
perspective of state regulators and nonparticipating insurers, the
riot hazard already had been spread once through the loading so
that the only question was
whether the public having already paid for the riot peril through
the premium structure should be called upon, in addition, to pay
for part of some insurer's losses through a funding device involving
additional potential outlays of public money, either directly or
through a premium tax borne only by the insuring public.142
A second consideration also colored the state regulators' perspec-
tives. Broadly based funding of the state layer would permit HUD
to use an artificially reduced reinsurance premium as an induce-
ment to insurers to participate in the federal program and to rely
on the state layer to make up any deficiency in the reinsurance
rate.143 A proposed model bill aired at the December 1968 meeting
of the NAIC would have resolved both objections by funding the
state layer through proportional assessments on insurers who par-
ticipated in the federal program, thus making the cost of the state
layer a part of the cost of the reinsurance and charging any inade-
quacy in the reinsurance rate to the insurers who benefited from
the inadequacy. Industry trade associations voiced strong objec-
tions to this approach, the Acting Federal Insurance Administrator
professed official neutrality though not private indifference, and
the NAIC Committee to Study Civil Disorders, after cataloguing
142. II 1968 NAT'L A. INs. CoMMissloNERs PRoc. 93.
143. In fact, of course, the absense of serious riots has meant that state
layers have not been tested. By 1970, reinsurance premium rates
had been drastically reduced and revised assessment provisions in the
HUD reinsurance contracts imposed a further reduction in protections
against future state layer assessments. Despite annual reductions in
reinsurance premiums, the reinsurance fund reserves eventually would
exceed $100,000,000.
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the considerations, ultimately took no formal stand on the ques-
tion.
144
The official neutrality of HUD ended a few months later with
the promulgation of an HUD rule dealing with the state layer re-
quirement. Included was the following section:
Funds for the State share may be raised in any constitutional
manner consistent with the intent of the Federal Act to place ap-
propriate responsibility upon the State to share in property insur-
ance losses resulting from riots or civil disorders. The Federal Act
provides that the Secretary is to be reimbursed by the State, its
political subdivisions, or a governmental corporation or fund estab-
lished pursuant to State law. Thus, the State share should be fi-
nanced out of general revenues or in some other manner which
broadly distributes the burden of property insurance losses re-
sulting from riots or civil disorders. 145
Although the battles dragged on for many months, so that HUD
eventually was forced to obtain congressional extension of the dead-
line for enactment of the state layer,146 most states eventually fell
into line. Five states funded the layer from general revenues; two
employed a premium tax; one authorized state borrowing; most im-
posed assessments on all property insurers doing business in the
state, to be recouped almost immediately through a premium sur-
charge on all property insurance. Only one state, Michigan, followed
the proposed NAIC plan of assessing only those insurers who actu-
ally purchased federal reinsurance, but several states adopted a
somewhat awkward intermediate position, assessing all insurers
doing business in the state but not authorizing immediate premium
structure recoupment.
b. Reaching the State Layer
Even where the state layer was broadly funded insurers soon dis-
covered that the structure of the federal program, coupled with a
changing pattern of riot losses, was producing results that made
the "federal benefit" purportedly provided by the reinsurance sys-
tem appear increasingly tenuous. The problem was not that in-
dustry leaders had succumbed to the uncritical assumptions of some
early enthusiasts that the program would substantially nullify the
influence of the riot hazard on insurer underwriting decisions; they
understood that the program was designed to assure that most riot
losses, regardless of magnitude, ultimately would be borne by the
industry. Still, insurer attentions had been trained on obtaining pro-
144. II 1968 NAT'L A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 93.
145. 24 C.F.R. § 1907.4 (1976).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9 (1970).
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tection of their surpluses against the prospect of riots of apocalyptic
dimension. When the riot loss configuration in the years following
1967 began to change, with smaller, more scattered, more frequent
outbursts in hundreds of cities replacing the much larger, more
concentrated, less containable devastation of Watts, Newark, and
Detroit, insurers began to view the benefits of their bargain with
growing suspicion. In states with relatively low premium volumes
and highly concentrated riot loss exposures, insurers could foresee
the possibility of tapping the state layer; in states with high pre-
mium volumes and scattered riot exposures, the chances of reaching
the state level appeared remote.
c. Civil Disorder Loadings
A related development further complicated insurer assessments
of the merits of participation in the programs, but ultimately did
little to allay insurer suspicions that the riot reinsurance bargain
had gone bad. In the rush of industry panic following the Detroit
and Newark disasters, the rating bureaus proposed an unusual de-
parture from traditional property insurance ratemaking procedures.
Customary property insurance ratemaking separated losses into
"normal" and "catastrophe" categories, with "catastrophe" losses
defined as losses in excess of $1,000,000 per occurrence. Adjust-
ments to the "normal" portion of the rate were based upon
"normal" losses for the preceding five or six years; adjustments to
the "catastrophe" portion of the rate were predicated on "catastro-
phe" losses of a much longer period, usually from ten to twenty-
five years. The majority of states permitted the use of projection
factors to allow some recognition of apparent trends in loss experi-
ence, but a significant minority required strict justification of modi-
fications solely on the basis of past experience.
The post-riot proposals argued that riot losses should be excised
completely from the normal ratemaking procedures. Instead, in-
surers would receive the premiums necessary to cover riot and civil
commotion losses through the imposition of a separate riot loading
to be applied to a broad base of property insurance coverages
throughout each state. This loading, based on a review of esti-
mated loss experience between 1965 and 1967, was to apply to ex-
isting rates for fire and extended coverage, including special ex-
tended coverage and vandalism and malicious mischief endorse-
ments, and for the multiple-line policies which include those perils.
The only exemption from the loading was for farm property, but
the loading was designed to differentiate on a judgment basis be-
tween properties in cities or counties with populations over 250,000
and all other properties, and between private dwelling properties
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and all other classes of property. 147  If approved in all the states,
the loading was expected to generate additional annual premiums
of $50,000,000 to well over $100,000,000.
The arguments in support of this modification of rating tech-
niques were simple. First, existing extended coverage endorsement
rates were said to provide only negligible recognition of a riot peril
of the nature experienced in the mid-1960's, so that use of normal
ratemaking procedures would severely curtail the bureaus' ability
to develop rates truly reflective of current potentials for property
losses from riots and civil disorders. 1 48  Second, statewide distri-
bution of the impact of the loading was said to be desirable because
of uncertainty about where civil disorders might erupt in the future,
inability of inner-city insureds to bear the full brunt of the addi-
tional premiums required, and an oft-expressed feeling that the
loading should reflect a general responsibility for the social condi-
tions that give rise to civil disorders. 149 NAIC sanction'8 0 spurred
147. Thus, extended coverage endorsement rates for private dwelling prop-
erties and their contents were to be increased by a flat 1%; fire, ex-
tended coverage (including special extended coverage endorsements
and vandalism and malicious mischief), or explosion, riot and civil
commotion when written specifically, and vandalism and malicious
mischief rates on all property categories except dwellings and farm
property were to be increased by 2% in counties with a population
under 250,000 and by 4% in cities and counties with a population of
250,000 or more. National Underwriter (F & C), Mar. 29, 1968, at
1, col. 2. For a general treatment of the loading program, see Whitman
& Williams, Environmental Hazards and Rating Urban Core Proper-
ties, 37 J. RISK & INs. 419, 430-35 (1970).
148. Although riots have been a familiar phenomenon in the United States,
severe insured property damage losses have not been so common.
Prior to the Watts outbreak in 1965, most experience under the riot
and civil commotion clause of the extended coverage endorsement was
the product of labor related violence in the 1930's. The manager of
the Fire Insurance Research and Actuarial Association, Kent H.
Parker, was quoted as saying that prior to the 1960's, extended cover-
age endorsement rates gave no recognition to fire hazards from rioting.
Whitman & Williams, supra note 147, at 430 n.20. Those authors point
out that fire losses initially caused by riot or civil disorder probably
were reflected in some measure in standard fire insurance rates. Id.
The arguments concerning the loadings rarely reached the question of
why "normal' riot losses of less than $1,000,000 should be excluded
from normal ratemaking procedures, a point of some interest inasmuch
as insured dwelling riot losses did not reach $1,000,000 even in Detroit.
149. See, e.g., Letter from Fire Insurance Research and Actuarial Associa-
tion (FIRAA) to rating bureaus (No. 68-2, Jan. 15, 1968); J. LEwis,
supra note 135, at 302-08.
150. I 1967 NAT'L A. INs. CoMIssIoNERs PROC. 327. The Panel recognized
the arguments but neither approved or disapproved in its formal rec-
ommendations. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
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implementation of the loading in more than half the states, though
a few states altered the formula to accord with local regulatory
officials' ideas of the proper way to distribute the incidence of the
loading; in Maryland and in New Jersey, for example, the loading
was made uniform throughout the state.151 Other states proved
balky. Arguments by the bureaus that a state's small number of
metropolitan centers and low loss experience from the riot hazard
were irrelevant because of the national scope of the riot problem
seldom were persuasive. The South Carolina response was not
atypical:
Approval or disapproval of rates filed must be based upon reason-
able inferences fairly arising out of the facts established and may
not rest upon speculation and conjecture. While social eruptions
such as those encountered in Watts, Newark, Detroit, Baltimore and
Washington may possibly occur here, the probability is that they
will not.152
In this atmosphere, both state regulators and the bureaus at-
tempted to tie the riot loading to voluntary assumptions of risks
thought to involve riot hazard. Representatives of the bureaus re-
peatedly warned that riot and civil commotion coverage might be
curtailed in the twenty-three states that had refused to approve
the loading unless those states reversed their stances. 153 On the
other side of the ledger, several states that had approved the
loading rescinded the approval when confronted with restricted
underwriting by insurers in potential riot areas.154 A few states
151. J. Com., Nov. 5, 1968, at 7, col. 8. In Michigan, at the urging of the
Insurance Bureau, the loading was altered so that in counties of
less than 100,000 population, one and two family dwellings were
subjected to no loading and all other coverages were subjected to
a 2% loading; in counties of more than 100,000, the loading was
roughly one dollar per policy for homeowners and dwelling fire, and
6% on all other coverages.
152. Quoted in National Underwriter (F & C), July 28, 1968, at 2, col. 4.
153. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), Oct. 25, 1968, at 1, col. 2
(representatives of FIRAA and Multiline Insurance Rating Board ar-
guing that civil disorder exposure must be viewed as a nation-wide
problem that cannot be limited to specific localities and thus that it
is inequitable for policyholders in states with the loading to subsidize
riot protection for policyholders in states without the loading).
154. The riot surcharge was approved with the understanding that
those companies adding the surcharge to their premiums would
not restrict their writings in areas of potential riots. Our ex-
perience, and it seems the experience of many states, has been
exactly the opposite .... It is unconscionable to believe that
an insurance company can increase its rates approximately
3% to cover riot losses and then nonrenew or refuse to accept
risks in these areas.
Letter from Nebraska Director of Insurance, Benjamin Neff, to all
property insurers licensed in Nebraska (August 1, 1968) (announcing
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dropped the loading after the federal insurance program became
operable, purportedly on the theory that it was rendered unneces-
sary by the availability of the federal reinsurance; 155 that FAIR
programs were not activated in those states (and thus insurers did
not become eligible for federal riot reinsurance) suggests that antic-
ipated low levels of riot activity in their states and the desire not
to "subsidize riots" in other states may have played a larger role
in the decision to terminate the loadings.
Out of this haphazard development came not only a promiscuous
pattern of redistribution of the burden of paying for the riot
hazard' 56 but also a nearly indiscriminate distribution of the pro-
ceeds of the loadings. If the gradations in the loadings adequately
reflected differentials in riot hazard,157 and if the loadings were
in effect nationwide,'5 8 the loadings would be reasonably distrib-
withdrawal of approval of the loading). See also National Under-
writer (F & C), Aug. 16, 1968, at 54, col. 2 (two New York broker as-
sociations urging New York Department of Insurance to rescind load-
ings in that state unless contraction of the voluntary market is re-
versed).
155. See, e.g., J. Com., Nov. 27, 1968, at 5, col. 6 (Florida removes load-
ing, citing presence of federal reinsurance as obviating need for
the loading); Weekly Underwriter, Jan. 11, 1969, at 6, col. 1 (Alaska
ends loading, citing same considerations).
156. Of course, access to federal reinsurance did not obviate the need for
premium dollars to pay for the reinsurance protection and to support
the retained riot exposure. Elimination of the riot loading did not
mean that rates would not contain provision for the riot hazard; it
simply meant that riot losses would be recognized as part of insurers'
total experience in the traditional manner in which losses-both "nor-
mal" and "catastrophe"-were recognized. But see statement by
Hunter Van Lear, chairman of FIRAA, J. Com., Oct. 20, 1969, at 9,
col. 1.
157. Distribution of the proceeds of the loading to insurers in proportion
to their exposure to the riot hazard was, of course, only one of a num-
ber of "reasonable" bases of distribution. Another would have been
to allocate the funds so collected as far as necessary on the basis of
riot losses incurred, with any excess loading premiums distributed ac-
cording to exposures.
158. National Underwriter (F & C), Jan. 17, 1969, at 1, col. 1 (statement
by managers of three major rating boards acknowledging a supposed
ethical base for spreading riot losses across property insurance nation-
ally); Whitman & Williams, supra note 147, at 429-30, 432; J. Lewis,
supra note 135, at 394-407.
Considerations of inter-state equity loomed large in privately ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the loadings. For evidence that neither
irregular acceptance of loadings filed nationwide nor fulminations
about the resulting pattern of subsidization are anything new, consult
50 NCIC P=oc. 161-73 (1919) (dispute over mixed acceptance of
10% property insurance surcharge promulgated by the National Board
of Fire Underwriters to recognize the inchoate hazards of World War
I).
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uted when collected by each insurer for its own direct business.
Clearly, however, in the real world the loading formula gave ef-
fect to a broadly redistributive theory of funding for the riot haz-
ard. The consequent distribution of the riot loading funds was
skewed in favor of those insurers who write a larger proportion
of their voluntary business in areas with low riot potentials.'-
Perhaps more importantly, in the absence of major riot losses, the
loadings allowed a significant general increase in the premiums col-
lected by insurers which might soften the impact of nonriot losses
on risks written through the programs. Nevertheless, the loadings
were hardly a major inducement to participation in the state pro-
grams, and they added still further complications to the gaming
aspects of the risk selection process.
For such reasons, the promised near-universal -participation in
the programs did not occur. Two major insurers chose not to partic-
ipate at all in states where the programs were voluntary.160 The
National Asssociation of Independent Insurers announced that its
members would decide whether to participate on a state-by-state
basis depending upon the apparent riot exposure and the character
of the program. In sixteen jurisdictions no programs were organ-
ized;"" in another eight states, programs were allowed to die.
162
In other states, despite the hortatory efforts of the American Insur-
ance Association, the American Mutual Insurance Association, and
regulatory officials, participation remained low. 1 6 3  Eventually, a
159. Of course, if virtually all properties subject to riot hazard were written
through the FAIR program and their experience distributed among in-
surers according to premiums written in the state, the results might
be quite different. Under such circumstances an insurer with volun-
tary writings centered in counties with small populations might re-
ceive proportionally fewer loading dollars with which to meet the riot
hazard assumed. Whitman & Williams, supra note 147, at 434. Whit-
man and Williams argued for a formal accounting system to reduce
the impact of this problem but their proposals did not face up to the
difficulties of determining the distribution of insurer exposure to riot
losses. Id. at 432-34. See also Whitman, The Insurance Problems of
Small Business in Economically Poor Areas of the Twin Cities, 21
CPCU ANNALS 323, 336-37 (1968).
160. Allstate and the Continental Insurance Group. Washington Ins. News-
letter, Nov. 11, 1968, at 8.
161. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, Wyoming and the Virgin Islands.
162. Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
163. A survey in early 1969 disclosed that in the 21 states with voluntary
plans the percentage of eligible premium volume covered by the plans
ranged from 57% to 99%, and the percentage of eligible companies
participating ranged from 36% to 99%, with the average premium
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wave of state statutes, supported by portions of the industry, made
participation mandatory in all but two of the states maintaining
programs.1
6 4
3. The Limits of Public Direction and Control
The statutory conversion of the programs from voluntary to
mandatory did little to alter the ideology of the programs or the
wide dispersal of practical capacity to shape their development. 165
The statutes were viewed as technical adjustments to assure full
participation, and the programs remained a hydra-headed structure
of mixed and overlapping imperiums. On some issues, federal or
state regulators could expect to exert considerable guidance; on
others, the boards of governors and their advisory groups and sub-
committees would prove to be "islands of functional power,"'166 ef-
fectively insulated from close public direction and control, and re-
sponsive chiefly to the assumed dictates of voluntarism and the
compulsions of adjusting the impacts of the programs on partici-
pating members of the industry.
volume approximately 82%, and the average company participation
about 73%.
164. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10098 (West 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
114f(b) (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 4109(a) (1975); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-1705 (Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3202a (1971);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.72 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2111 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304 (Baldwin 1971); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1433 (West Supp. 1976); MD. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 478C(1) (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175c, § 2.4 (West
1972); MIcH CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.2920(1) (Supp. 1976); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 65A.35(1) (West Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 379.835
(Vernon Supp. 1976); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:37A-3 (Supp. 1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-27-3 (1975); N.Y. INS. LAW § 652 (McKinney Supp.
1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-173.19' (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3929.43 (A) (Page Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 735.045 (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1600.201 (a) (Purdon 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 27-33-2 (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 38.1-750(1) (1976); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 619.01 (1) (c) (West Supp. 1976).
165. See notes 183-209 and accompanying text infra.
166. The phrase is drawn from W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW
YORK CITY ch. 19 (1960). For an elaboration of the consequences of
the "public philosophy" that produces this arrangement, see T. Lowi,
supra note 19, at 85-97: "(1) the atrophy of institutions of popular
control; (2) the maintenance of old and creation of new structures of
privilege; and (3) conservatism, in several senses of the word." Id.
at 86. All were evident in the administration of the FAIR plans. See
also SELZNIcK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 240 (1969)
(warning that such "privatization of public policy" imposes excessive
social costs because it does not allow consideration of "more compre-
hensive needs and aspirations"); G. McCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1967).
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a. HUD Regulation
HUD's position at the top of the administrative charts did not
mean that it would dominate the programs. The bargain ratified
by the federal legislation by design denied HUD direct control over
most of the underwriting and pricing approaches to be employed
in the programs,1 67 and in other areas of concern left HUD's statu-
tory charter often debilitatingly vague. In addition, at least ini-
tially, the layered and dispersed administrative structures of the
programs also imposed restrictions. The problem was not so much
the formal system of consultations with state regulators and advi-
sory groups built into the federal statute; those requirements usu-
ally could be finessed or ignored. Rather, the more telling constraint
on HUD initiatives was posed by the bluntness of its regulatory
weapons for dealing with the attenuated administrative structures
of the programs.
The impressive capacity of the programs to resist direct regula-
tory efforts by HUD was demonstrated early in the history of the
programs by a running dispute precipitated by HUD efforts to se-
cure information about the operating practices and results of the
FAIR plans. Although the statute granted HUD clear authority
to require such records as it deemed necessary, 6 8 to conduct
audits, 169 and to place such terms and conditions on reinsurance
as it deemed necessary, 70 and although HUD was both explicit and
persistent in its demands for more detailed reporting, HUD's de-
mands often seemed to get lost in interstices between state regu-
lators, boards of governors, and the specialized subcommittees and
technicians who actually ran the plans.1 7 1  At times, they were
167. See, e.g., 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1090-91 (colloquy be-
tween panel member Wozencraft and Congressman Brown); Hearings
on the Operation of the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance
Program Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 46-58 (1969) [herein-
after cited as 1969 House Hearings] (discussion of FIA perceptions
of allocation of authority between FIA and state regulators).
168. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-14(a) to 14(c) (1970).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-14(d) (1970).
170. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-8(c) (1970).
171. See, e.g., Statement of George K. Bernstein, Federal Insurance Admin-
istrator, to the Civil Disorders-Insurance Problems Committee of the
NAIC, Dec. 2, 1969, in I 1970 NAT'L A. INs. COMmissoiNmRs Pnoc. 127,
129:
I regret to report that the statistics we have received are rela-
tively meaningless. They are unclassified, showing not even
the most elementary breakdown between commercial and
dwelling risk.... Without more detailed and meaningful
statistics, it is impossible for us, the Commissioners, or the
companies to determine how good or how bad the experience
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ignored or labeled irrelevant or impossible to achieve. Despite
HUD's exasperation, its enforcement options were few. The lure
of reinsurance was supposed to induce satisfactory cooperation.
When it did not, the only sanction available to HUD was the ulti-
mate one: to declare the offender not eligible for riot reinsurance.
Especially where the action demanded by HUD was to be taken by
the program rather than by an individual insurer, the threat of
such drastic sanctions rarely was likely to seem credible.
HUD's reaction to the intractability of the administrative struc-
ture took several forms. In 1969 it sought and obtained congres-
sional authorization and funding for an Office of Review and Com-
pliance to aid in monitoring FAIR plan activities.172 The new of-
fice permitted HUD to avoid many of the protocols of the formal
administrative hierarchy of state regulators, governing boards, sub-
committees and advisory boards, and to meet directly with opera-
tional personnel of the programs. 173 A second HUD initiative had
a similar focus. HUD promoted formation of an "all-industry"
FAIR Plan Advisory Board to help to unify plan procedures and
rules; the idea was increasingly attractive to an industry grown
sensitive to efficiency concerns and wary of the complexities of
operating under a variety of different state patterns. From HUD's
point of view, the Advisory Board offered the promise of reducing
the number of plan variations and the number of separate battles
that HUD would be required to fight at scattered pressure points
throughout the bureaucracy.
was and what lesson, if any, can be drawn for future opera-
tions. Apparently we must spell out for the FAIR Plans even
the basic information which is essential, not only to your re-
view and ours of their operation, but to their basic under-
standing of whether they are making or losing money.
See also id. at 130 (interim report of FAIR Plans Procedural Advisory
Committee, including discussion of work of Accounting Subcommit-
tee); FAIR PLAN PROCEDURAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, UNIFORM FAIR
PLAN PROCEDURES (May 15, 1970). But see Hearings on Housing and
Urban Development Legislation before the Subcomm. on Housing of
the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 345, 350-
53 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 House Hearings]; Letter to Na-
tional Committee on Property Insurance from FIA (Jan. 26, 1972), in
REPORTS ON FAIR PLAN OPERATIONS 1971, supra note 68 (reciting con-
tinued FIA complaints about failures of FAIR Plans to complete quar-
terly reports).
172. Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1791 (1970) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-
6a (1970)).
173. See, e.g., REPORTS ON FAIR PLAN OPERATIONS 1971, supra note 68 (lim-
ited to California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Is-
land); a series of reports on individual FAIR plans conducted in 1973
(on file with author).
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Such measures could improve HUD's monitoring of the pro-
grams and make the administrative structure appear less refractory.
They also had a related consequence. HUD reports of inspections
of state programs and communications with the advisory board
could summarize HUD findings and signal conditions and practices
deemed unsatisfactory or questionable without the need to cast the
HUD objection as a direct interdiction or command. As HUD con-
cerns widened, often ranging rather clearly beyond the narrow
limits of its statutory charter, the usefulness of mixing suggestions
and observations with direct imperatives inevitably would become
more apparent. Nevertheless, though on the large questions within
its jurisdiction HUD got its way, the system was not one in which
fine tuning from the top of the administrative hierarchy was easy.
In large measure, the HUD regulatory style, probably only partly
by choice, was to remain the regulation of admonition, cajolery, and
public hortatory preachments.
Substantively, HUD's concerns appeared to evolve as the pro-
grams matured. Initially, both the limits of its statutory commis-
sion and the press of immediate awkwardnesses in the infancy of
the programs kept HUD attentions fixed primarily on eliminating
barriers to applicant access to the programs and on issues of effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Securing the adoption of binding proce-
dures, improving the collection and reporting of program experi-
ence, and reduction of administrative expenses were at the center
of the early HUD agenda. 7 4 Gradually, as the programs stabilized
and as inspections by the Office of Review and Compliance pro-
vided details of program procedures, HUD dissatisfactions with the
efficiency, public access, and accountability displayed by the pro-
grams increasingly were translated into informal pressures for the
centralization of program underwriting, claims adjustment, and
other functions. Although HUD regulations continued the inter-
pretation that permitted the programs a variety of organizational
forms, r by 1971 HUD regularly was urging the boards of gover-
nors to convert the programs to a syndicate form of organization.179
While the HUD amalgam of prescription and counsel could be
remarkably detailed on some matters, its ventures into questions
174. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 2-24 (testimony of Acting Fed-
eral Insurance Administrator Ross); 1970 House Hearings, supra note
171, at 340-81 (testimony of Federal Insurance Administrator Bern-
stein); REPORTS oN FAIR PLAN OPERATIONS 1971, supra note 68.
175. "The Plan's placement program may take any of a variety of forms;
for example, it may involve a syndicated or direct writing pool, an
assigned risk facility, a reinsurance pool or association, or combina-
tions of the foregoing." 24 C.F.R. § 1905.4 (1976).
176. II 1971 NAT'L A. INS. Co1mnVmssioNms Paoc. 573, 576.
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of progam coverages and prices initially were much more tentative.
In 1970, HUD was bloodied in a confrontation with the NAIC over
authority to define the "urban areas" in which the programs would
operate,17 7 and on other occasions suggestions of HUD efforts to
dictate coverage requirements were met by rumblings from the
states.178 Formally, HUD regulations required only that under-
writing standards for acceptance by the programs be predicated on
objective features of individual risks179- excluding environmental
hazards, of course-and they danced carefully around the question
of whether the programs could be compelled actually to provide
coverage for the full insurable value of "acceptable" risks.' 80
177. The story is recorded in National Underwriter (F & C), July 3, 1970,
at 2, col. 1. Proposed 24 C.F.R. § 1905.21 would have defined "urban
areas" covered by the programs to include all incorporated places and
all unincorporated places with populations in excess of 2,500. 35 Fed.
Reg. 5820 (1970). The NAIC resisted, with the backing of insurer and
producer groups, so that in the final regulations the definitional prob-
lem was left to the states, subject to a prohibition against confining
them to "blighted" areas and a requirement that each plan "specify-
by name, by population size, or by class-the political subdivisions
and other areas eligible, if the entire state is not eligible." 24 C.F.R.
§ 1905.3(b) (1976).
178. Thus, the 1970 proposed regulations purported to authorize HUD to
designate any property insurance as "essential property insurance"
within the federal program. Proposed 24 C.F.R. § 1905.1(7), 35 Fed.
Reg. 5817 (1970). The proposal was attacked as inconsistent with the
limitations on HUD powers embodied in the federal statute in that
it did not limit the perils that could be designated to "fire, EC, vandal-
ism, malicious mischief, burglary, and theft." In the final rules, the
FIA required state programs to make vandalism and malicious mis-
chief available unless availability of such coverages was certified by
state regulators but backed away from the language that had
prompted the objections. 24 C.F.R. § 1905.3 (a) (1976).
179. Reasonable underwriting standards for declination of risks
must be relevant to the perils against which insurance is
sought. For example, they may include:
(1) Physical condition of the property; however, the mere
fact that a property does not satisfy all current building code
specifications would not, in itself, suffice;
(2) The property's present use, such as extended vacancy
(other than for rehabilitation purposes) or the improper stor-
age of flammable materials; or
(3) Other specific characteristics of ownership, condition,
occupancy, or maintenance that are violative of law or public
policy and that result in a substantially increased exposure
to loss.
24 C.F.R. § 1905.7 (c) (1976).
In 1975, HUD invoked this standard in attacking the practice of the
Missouri FAIR plan to deny liability where misrepresentations con-
cerning tax obligations were discovered in the original application
See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 41550 (1975).
180. Although the federal enactment gave HUD authority to prescribe pro-
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On the rating front, the statutory history unequivocally re-
serving to the states the major questions of how program coverages
were to be priced seemed to restrict HUD's role to assuring that
rates applied in the programs did not reflect environmental hazards.
The HUD position applied the statutory language literally: eligibil-
ity for riot reinsurance required that the programs neither under-
write nor rate on the basis of any hazardous condition "beyond the
control of the property owner."' 1  It thus prohibited the applica-
tion of exposure charges not only for the amorphous "social
hazards" of deteriorating areas, but also for a variety of external
exposures traditionally recognized in schedule rating. According
to HUD, the statute had declared proximity to fire traps and dyna-
mite factories irrelevant for rating purposes, and HUD moved
quickly to secure program compliance with this vision. 8 2 The HUD
interpretation was not universally shared, but the flat explicitness
grams in addition to the FAIR Plans "to make essential property in-
surance available without regard to environmental hazards," 12 U.S.C.
§ 1749bbb-9(a) (2) (1970), upon findings that such programs had be-
come necessary, HUD has never formally made such a finding nor re-
quired such programs. In fact, HUD did
not interpret that section as contemplating a guarantee of cov-
erage as such, any more than essential coverage is guaranteed
to particular properties by [the FAIR Plans] .... What
[that section] is essentially saying, in our view, is that
if the FAIR Plan approach to availability either fails or
requires substantial modification, then the Secretary has au-
thority . . . to prescribe some other approach to accomplish
the same basic purpose. We cannot say that other programs
in addition to or in place of FAIR Plans will never be neces-
sary, but to date all of our regulations dealing with essential
property insurance availability have been related to FAIR
Plans as such.
Letter to Author from George K. Bernstein, Federal Insurance Admin-
istrator (May 19, 1972).
In practice, this putative distinction between requiring that state
programs give access to the required insurance coverages and requir-
ing that they actually provide coverage has remained obscure. HUD
regulations require that state placement programs must, "for proper-
ties meeting reasonable underwriting standards ... [place insurance
up to the full insurable value of the risk," but permit the programs
to simply "assist in seeking to place the excess portion" of large risks
in excess of $1.5 million. 24 C.F.R. § 1905.4(c) (1976).
181. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-2(a) (1) (1970).
(b) No surcharge shall be made on any risk unless it is
based upon an appropriate, objective, and identifiable physi-
cal condition of the property, as disclosed by an inspection
and specified in an inspection report, and no surcharge shall
be made on the basis of environmental hazards.
24 C.F.R. § 1905.7 (1970).
182. Letter to Author from George K. Bernstein, Federal Insurance Admin-
istrator (June 26, 1972); REPoRTs ON FAIR PLAN OPERATIoNs 1971, su-
pra note 68; 1969 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 5.
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of the statutory language meant that in any confrontation with
state regulators and industry the HUD position would prevail.
Eventually, as we shall see, as HUD interest in program pricing
grew, the necessity of viewing pricing questions through the narrow
window of the environmental hazard prohibition would force upon
HUD a perspective that would significantly influence the way it
would frame its attitude toward a much broader range of issues
concerning the programs and voluntary market pricing and under-
writing practices.
b. State Regulation
State regulation of the programs, where a factor, tended to
mirror both the limitations and the preoccupations of the federal
involvement. The federal statute allowed state regulators to certify
to HUD that a particular insurer, or the entire FAIR plan, was
not functioning properly, and thus to precipitate the cutoff of fed-
eral riot reinsurance.1 8 3 However, though this power to police the
programs against shirkers might be effective in the rare case of
a clear and flagrant deviation from the federal standards, it afforded
little help to a regulator interested in the far more common problem
of trying to initiate changes in the operations of the programs or
in the standards by which individual insurer performance would
be judged. State regulators, if they chose, could try to check in-
spection reports against action reports in order to find patent under-
writing abuses, and could hear the rare appeals from decisions of
the boards of governors,l1l but they found it much more difficult to
secure adoption of better binding arrangements, higher coverage
limits, and similar alterations in program operating procedures.
The problem was that the "private" character of the programs,
even in states that provided extensive statutory underpinnings,
often meant that powers of initiative resided chiefly in the boards
of governors of the programs. In states with voluntary programs,
formal powers of initiation lay solely with the boards of govenors,
subject only to whatever suasive force the regulator could squeeze
from the federal certification provisions and his state's boilerplate
183. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-9 (a) (3) (1970).
184. In fact, despite the suggestion of the Panel that state insurance depart-
ments should be expected to monitor underwriting decisions under the
programs by comparing action reports with inspection reports on de-
clined risks, PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 93, little such activity oc-
curred, chiefly because there usually was no way to review underwrit-
ing decisions except to retrace the steps taken by the inspection
agency. State regulators, probably wisely in view of the small vol-
umes of declinations in most states, simply did not invest resources
in providing this sort of oversight.
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provisions establishing minimum standards for doing business
within the state. Moreover, legislation requiring participation in
the programs seldom went beyond authorizing the joint features
of the programs, mandating participation by insurers, and confer-
ring immunity on participants for erroneous statements they might
make in the conduct of programs.185 Even in the few states where
legislation gave state regulators the power to impose amendments,
regulatory proposals could get lost in study commissions and tech-
nical subcommittees, 186 or be openly resisted by whipsawing calls
for national uniformity on the grounds of efficiency and for de-
ference to HUD as the arbiter of what should be required of state
programs. Where state regulatory officials were willing to force
an issue, industry opposition sometimes could delay implementation
for years.'8 7 On less significant issues on which regulatory officials
185. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 379.810-.880 (Supp. 1976); INDUSTRY PROP-
ERTY INSURANCE LIAISON COMMITTEE, MODEL UNIFORMV BASIC PROPERTY
INSURANCE INSPECTION AND PLACEMENT PROGRAM4 (July 31, 1968), re-
printed in II 1968 NAT'L A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PROc. 443. A later
version of the Model Bill is reprinted in Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Business and Commerce of the Senate Comm. on the District
of Columbia, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 239-41 (1968). The industry-sup-
ported legislative approach continued the assumptions that had guided
the Urban Areas Plans, modified only to enforce full participation; it
thus accorded state regulators no more leverage than already provided
by the federal riot program. The most interesting confrontation of this
philosophy with regulatory assertions of authority occurred in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, where the battle was fought in the full glare of a
Congressional hearing. See id., especially at 241-49 (memo setting out
objections to the industry's model bill); Becker & Denenberg, supra
note 117, at 302. In Florida, a bill to permit the Commissioner to es-
tablish mandatory pools for a wide range of coverages was amended
to authorize only "sinkhole" pools. BEST'S REVIEW (P & L), July 1969,
at 5. The same basic scenario, with varying results, was played out
in a number of states.
186. Industry representation on the boards of governors tended to be di-
vided among the major insurer trade associations with added repre-
sentation for domestic stock and mutual insurers. Because the repre-
sentatives usually were executives of major insurers, the boards met
only infrequently, and various technical subcommittees were estab-
lished to act as an intermediate level of authority. This layering of
responsibility and authority not only served to impede regulatory con-
trol, it also opened the programs to the criticism that attitudes of "cor-
porate responsibility" asserted at the higher reaches of the bureauc-
racy did little good if they could not filter down to the operational
level. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), Jan. 5, 1968, at 1, col.
1 (brokers criticizing New York Urban Areas Plan on such grounds).
187. For example, despite the presence in each case of a clear statutory
authorization, decisions by two state regulators to include vandalism
and malicious mischief coverages before HUD instituted the require-
ment among those provided by the programs in their states were de-
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were unwilling to wage extended legislative or judicial campaigns,
state regulators often found themselves employing the cajolery and
jawboning that had characterized preprogram attention to avail-
ability concerns.
Moreover, in most states the location of regulatory authority
over program rates in state officials did not constitute a significant
source of regulatory leverage. Whatever the reality, the ethic of
insurer participation embodied in the "voluntary" programs implied
that the risks to be written in the programs were risks that should
be voluntarily assumed as "incident to" the normal market. Statu-
tes converting programs from voluntary to mandatory usually did
not reach the rate question, thus preserving the not-so-amiable fic-
tion that the character of the risks and the pricing scheme would
be the same in both the voluntary and the residual markets.
In practice, however, there were differences. Existing substand-
ard and excess rate filings were dusted off or new ones submitted
for approval, so that extra charges on class rated structures and
after charges on schedule rated structures could be applied by in-
spectors.'18 In order to pass federal muster, such schedules were
equally applicable to risks written in the voluntary market. Never-
theless, inspections of class rated properties almost always were lim-
ited to those seeking coverage in the programs and reinspection of
schedule rated property rarely occurred except for those properties
headed for the programs. The majority of inspected properties
were given condition charges. Consequently, properties written
through the program tended to generate more premium than if
they had been written in the voluntary nonsurcharged market. Did
the application of such charges constitute a surreptitious charge for
"environmental hazards"? State regulators seem to have been
more concerned with assuring that condition charges actually were
layed for nearly two years by court actions based on the theory that
the state program was "part of a i6int state/federal program...
geared to and dependent upon the availability of reinsurance under
the National Insurance Development Program." New Jersey Ins. Un-
derwriting Ass'n v. Clifford, 112 N.J. Super. 195, 199, 270 A.2d 723, 725
(1970) (resolved chiefly on the grounds that the statutory structure
of the New Jersey Underwriters Association disclosed that it was de-
signed to operate independently of the federal statute); District of Co-
lumbia Ins. Placement Facility v. Washington, 265 A.2d 45 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1970) (recognizing superintendent's authority to prescribe by
rule additional coverages not required by HUD, but declaring rule in-
valid for failure to comply with notice and hearing procedures of Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act).
188. For a description, see Whitman & Williams, supra note 147, at 424-
26; Whitman & Williams, FAIR Plan and Excess Rate Plan Rates in
Minnesota, 38 J. RISK & INs. 43 (1971).
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applied to specific deficiencies in the property rather than as an
automatic surcharge for all program property; in the few instances
when they formally addressed the propriety of the charges,189 the
primary concern seems to have been that the charges not be dupli-
cative. The environmental hazards question was left to HUD.
A distinctly different approach, at first tried only in New York,
called for self-rating of the residual property pool business. Rating
classifications were maintained, and extra and after charges could
be applied, but the rate level would be adjusted annually, "based on
the association's loss and expense experience."' 9 0 Put simply, the
New York Insurance Department did not credit the notion that risks
became program risks solely because of environmental hazards, in-
formational deficiencies, or anti-social insurer conduct. Unhappy
experience with the New York urban areas plan had demonstrated
to the Department that even with inspections, insurers did not want
to write a substantial portion of the risks.' 9 ' The New York solu-
189. See, e.g., Letter from George F. Reed, Pennsylvania Insurance Com-
missioner, to H. Richard Heilman, Chairman of Board of Governors of
Pennsylvania FAIR Plan (Jan. 13, 1970) (directing FAIR Plan to
put into effect simplified schedule of charges, and urging that public
statements by the FAIR plan avoid the term "surcharge" with its sug-
gestion of automatic penalties for all FAIR plan risks) (in files of Au-
thor). In Illinois, for a time, what amounted to a flat surcharge was
employed; it was eliminated under federal pressures examined in
notes 232-35 and accompanying text infra.
190. N.Y. INs. LAW § 653 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1976) made FAIR plan rates
subject to the usual property insurance rating standards, except that
yearly filings were required "based on the association's loss and ex-
pense experience, together with such other information as the superin-
tendent may require," and association filings were freed from the
usual requirement that they be predicated on five year's experience.
Filed rating plans could continue to provide standards for the applica-
tion of surcharges for risks containing unsafe or hazardous conditions.
Eventually, under the pressure of adverse experience, a form of self-
rating also was adopted in Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See also
Insurance Advocate, Jan. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 2 (Massachusetts FAIR plan
seeking 50% experience based rate hike); National Underwriter (P &
C), Mar. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 2 (Massachusetts rate increase denied on
basis of "principle that no policyholder should be surcharged without
being given an objective reason").
191. Compare FIRE INSURANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS I, supra note 38, (iden-
tifying area underwriting as "primary cause" of availability problems)
with FmE INSURANCE IN CONGESTED AREAS II, supra note 97, at 24 (rec-
ognizing that lack of information and antisocial insurer behavior are
not at heart of difficulties).
[R]ating pooled risks on their own experience is the soundest
approach, because (i) it would assure that risks placed
through the special facilities of the pool would pay a rate
commensurate with their exposure to loss, in fairness both
to pooled risks and to risks written outside the pool; (ii)
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tion was to accept the underwriting decision of the voluntary mar-
ket that a risk was different from voluntary business, and justifiably
to be priced differently for that reason.
192
A third approach, associated chiefly with the early Michigan pro-
gram, avoided both of these alternatives. Michigan regulators
shared the New York concern that the experience of the residual
risks would be substantially worse than that for voluntary market
risks. However, rather than forcing the body of residual risks to
bear these costs, as in New York, or simply ignoring them, as in
most of the other programs, Michigan chose to apply the voluntary
market pricing formulas to residual risks and to treat the unrecog-
nized costs of this approach as a subsidy to residual risks to be
funded by recoupment through the next year's premiums for all
property insurance written in the state.
93
it would assure the existence of a rate level that would
permit the pool to underwrite liberally, in order to secure the
principal social goal of making full coverage more widely
available; and (iii) it would preserve for the benefit of prop-
erties insured through the pool the proceeds of condition
charges applied to those properties after inspection.
Id. at 40.
192. To many, the New York rating arrangements appeared to signal a
willingness to consign most urban fire and extended coverage insur-
ance to a residual category, for experience rating would almost cer-
tainly increase the pressures on insurers to dump risks into the higher
rates available in the pools. The New York Department recognized
the argument, but concluded that "'dumping' cannot be totally elimi-
nated, and is a price which must be paid for assuring an adequate
fire insurance market." Id. at 42.
193. 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 262, § 2930(2): "Any deficits or profits
from the operation of the pool shall be recognized in the ratemaking
procedures and included in the rate for the types of insurance used as
the basis for determining participation in the pool, in the same manner
that expenses and premium taxes are recognized." The Michigan ap-
proach represented a consciously distinct departure from the attitude
that had shaped most other state programs; it viewed the programs
as a frank attempt to subsidize some residual insurance coverages and
sought to avoid what Kimball, Automobile Accident Compensation
Systems: Objectives and Perspectives, in R. KEETON, J. O'CONNELL
& J. McCoRD, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 10, 23 (1968), has labeled "an
unfortunate disposition to impose on insurers a duty to solve the prob-
lems of the market without providing adequate compensation." In the
Michigan program, the "quiet conscription" of insurer surpluses, ex-
pertise, and distribution systems to a public purpose was to be com-
pensated by the recoupment provision. The pool experience received
immediate recognition without the averaging and weighting dilutions
that would normally apply to increased losses; pool deficits were
treated as a tax on all property insurance coverages. See generally
National Underwriter (P & C), April 16, 1971, at 2, col. 1. The experi-
ment was short-lived. In 1971, the recoupment provision was elimi-
nated. 1971 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 74, § 1, (codified as MICH. COMP.
LAWS AN. § 500.2930 (Supp. 1976)).
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The most striking feature of these developments is how slight
was the attention given by most states to the question of unrecog-
nized costs. Except in a few states, the large questions of who was
to pay for the increased coverage remained essentially unasked.
Only in the self-rating states was the system structured to provide
continuing review of what program experience could teach.194 In
most states the choices were buried in the rhetoric of industry re-
sponsibility. The result was a promiscuous pattern of redistribu-
tion, of uncertain size and directions. 195 As hope faded that these
unrecognized costs would be small, the issue passed largely by de-
fault to HUD and the industry.196
The ethic that explained insurer participation also was felt in
the treatment accorded questions of what risks would be written
through the programs. The uneasy pretense that the reinsured riot
hazard would constitute most of the environmental hazard, though
useful to the Panel, HUD and the industry while the reinsurance
bargain was being struck, was never very credible, and it became
even less so when the HUD definition of environmental hazards
194. See, e.g., Insurance Advocate, Jan. 3, 1970, at 5, col. 1; Insurance Advo-
cate, Jan. 10, 1970, at 5, col. 1 (report of decision on New York pool's
request for 26% increase; the Department permitted a smaller increase
on the basis of unjustified expense components in the original re-
quest). Similar scripts were played out periodically in New York,
with rates both increased and decreased with pool experience.
195. Early attempts by Whitman & Williams, supra note 188, to grapple
with these questions accurately catalog the interactions between the
environmental hazard prohibitions, condition and after charges, the
civil disorder loading, and riot reinsurance premiums, but they assume
a consciousness of purpose not found in the actual developments, and
they offer only impressionistic indications of the magnitude of the re-
distributions involved.
Williams & Smith, FAIR Plan Insureds: Occupancy and Location
Characteristics and Experience, 42 J. RISK & INs. 156 (1975), reports
an attempt to determine program penetration of various occupancy
and location groups and the loss experience of such groups for two
policy years in the St. Paul-Minneapolis area. It is useful chiefly as
an indictment of the failure of the programs to routinely code the in-
formation necessary to support such inquiries. See also H. SHAPIRO,
FIRE INSURANCE AND THE INNER CITY 20 (Rand R-703-NSF 1971).
196. The FIA has repeatedly challenged industry figures purporting to
show huge losses on FAIR plan business as predicated on "statutory"
accounting methods rather than more representative "adjusted" meth-
ods. See generally REPORTS ON FAIR PLAN OPERATIONS 1971, supra
note 68; FuLL INsURANcE AvAILABILITY, supra note 15, at 28-29. Never-
theless, the FIA does not offer alternative statistics bearing directly on
these questions. See id. at 5-7. Through September 1976, the indus-
try claimed national operating losses (statutory underwriting losses
less investment returns) attributable to FAIR plans in excess of
$265,000.00. Insurance Advocate, Apr. 16, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
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was promulgated and riots diminished in importance in the under-
writers' calculus. There were several problems in addition to the
question of how to interpret the prohibition against underwriting
on the basis of environmental hazards. One concerned setting a
floor for insurability. The rubric that public policy does not permit
insurance of the uninsurable might commend itself by its ring of
common good sense, but on close examination "insurability" proved
a slippery concept to try to capture in easily-applied underwriting
guidelines. 197 In the automobile assigned risk plans, possesion of
a driver's license supplied a practical base line for eligibility; in
property insurance, "insurable interest" was almost no floor at all,
and compliance with building and housing codes, most agreed, was
far too stringent a test. In the end, though the rhetoric was larded
with suggestions that the programs were designed to provide cover-
age for properties that would be deemed insurable if mysteriously
transported to a better neighborhood, the tacit solution was to duck
the question of minimum standards; the subjective judgments of
underwriters could not be formally liberalized in their own logic,
and reliance would be placed on the appeals process and the fears
of participating insurers to indicate if the eligibility criteria being
applied were too rigorous or unduly lax.198
197. For a discussion of the difficulties, see FIRE INSURANCE IN CONGESTED
AREAS I, supra note 38, at 20 (emphasizing that the standard, however
constructed, should "embody the concept that the condition of the risk,
not the good faith of the applicant, is the determining factor").
Plans of operations for the programs tended to track the vague
guidelines provided by 24 C.F.R. § 1905.7(c) (1976). Thus, for exam-
ple, the Michigan standards were expressed in this fashion:
Reasonable underwriting standards . . . shall include, but not
be limited to the following:
(a) Physical condition of the property, such as its construc-
tion, heating, wiring, evidence of previous fires or general
deterioration;
(b) Its present use or housekeeping such as vacancy, over-
crowding, storage of rubbish or flammable materials;
(c) Violation of law or public policy which results in in-
creased exposure to loss;
(d) Substandard, unapproved, insufficient or otherwise unac-
ceptable protective devices and equipment.
MICHIGAN BASIC PROPERTY INS. Ass'N, PLAN OF OPERATION (Nov. 1,
1971).
198. Of course, most insurance departments maintained complaint divi-
sions which on occasion might intervene; more importantly, in theory
at least, the programs typically provided for appeals to regulatory offi-
cials from adverse decisions by the programs. In fact, this source of
oversight was little used. Program procedures usually called for in-
termediate appeals to specialized subcommittees of the programs, and
then to the boards of governors, and only then to the insurance de-
partments, so that only a small number of appeals ever reached regu-
latory officials. Moreover, most appeals dealt not with declinations
INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
On questions of what coverages would be provided, there was
less dispute. Federal involvement in housing policy and in efforts
to stimulate small business development always has used credit as
its basic tool, and fire and extended coverage insurance usually has
been a prerequisite to the availability of federal money and guaran-
tees; for some regulatory officials, the embarrassment that the in-
surance required for rehabilitation and redevelopment programs
was not generally available largely defined the availability prob-
lem. The federal statute required that fire and extended cover-
age be provided, and HUD by rule extended the requirement
to include vandalism and malicious mischief insurance. Demands
for these coverages were specific and well defined; more subjective
needs for the security that other insurance coverages could provide
were less easily articulated and less frequently recognized. In fact,
though the ascendancy of the antidiscrimination perspective of the
programs would help feed pressures for their expansion to include
homeowners, plate glass, bailee, and similar coverages, state regula-
but with refusals to waive underwriting rules prescribing upper limits
on program coverages or forbidding coverage of vacant buildings. The
reasons for this subject matter appear to be several: outright declina-
tions of residential and small commercial properties were relatively
few; for such properties, the differences in cost between the programs
and substandard markets might not warrant the expenses of an ap-
peal; attacks on underwriting judgment applied to particular risks
would have little chance of success. By contrast, underwriting rules
governing upper limits of coverage were chiefly the product of a desire
to spare the programs large single losses and of a preliminary decision
that property owners of large values at one location would have suffi-
cient market power to obtain insurance through their own efforts. Ap-
peals could investigate the propriety of these judgments in particular
cases, by focusing on market conditions and discernible features of
the particular risk, and such applicants were likely to have the re-
sources and know how to pursue the appeal. For an interesting exam-
ple of this sort of interplay, see In re Appeal of Buy-Rite Discount
Centers (New York Ins. Dep't, Aug. 14, 1970). There an applicant to
the FAIR program sought coverage double the $400,000 limit approved
by the program. After noting that the inspection report showed no
specific hazardous conditions, and the possible impact of a restriction
of operations on the mostly minority employees of the discount store,
the Department held:
Underwriting standards to be used by the Underwriting As-
sociation should not be the "normal" standards used in the
open market but should be standards tailored to the types of
risks which are not placeable through normal insurance chan-
nels, taking into consideration the commercial and social fac-
tors which necessitated the creation of the Underwriting As-
sociation in the first instance. In short, I find that the Under-
writing Association's decision to refuse placement of the addi-
tional contents coverage to the applicant was arbitrary and
should be overruled.
Id. at 3. There is little to indicate that the decision is a typical one.
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tors more often were involved in disputes about the geographical
restrictions and dollar limits of the programs than about the cover-
ages offered. On these questions, as well, the ultimate shape taken
by the programs usually reflected the pragmatic judgment that the
programs should be primarily urban and residual in character.'9 9
That view matched insurer attitudes, but it would produce recur-
ring conflicts with HUD.
The relation of the programs to the substandard market 200 posed
a related question for state regulatory officials. The Panel recom-
mended that FAIR plans provide for mandatory inspection of all
potentially eligible 'property before a declination or an offer of
coverage at more than standard rates, and that prospective insureds
not be permitted to waive the right to an inspection in order to
go directly into the substandard markets. 201 The Panel's reasons
turned chiefly on abuses observed in the operations of urban areas
plans; agents and brokers, lured by higher commissions available
on risks placed in substandard markets, were thought often to
have proceeded directly to substandard markets without first ex-
ploring alternatives available through the plans. 202  The Panel
recognized that implementation of its proposal would help assure
that the programs would cream the better risks insurable at pro-
gram rates and thus seriously disrupt the substandard markets, but
deemed that a necessary condition to the effectiveness of the pro-
grams.
In practice, the structure created under the federal enactment
did not guarantee any substantial incursion into existing substand-
ard markets. The federal statute's requirement that no declination
or surcharge be attached to a risk without a prior inspection was
binding only on those insurers participating in the state's programs;
more importantly, there was no express federal prohibition of the
use of waivers, and the pressures for waivers often grew intense.
Initially, the shortage of trained inspectors and administrative per-
sonnel and the lack of established procedures resulted in giant back-
logs in applications, and these delays in obtaining the requisite in-
199. By the mid-1970's, the pattern had stabilized. About two-thirds of the
programs operated state-wide. Most excluded farm and manufactur-
ing risks; two states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, offered home-
owners coverages. Seven coastal states had established beach and
windstorm programs which operated separately from FAIR plans.
200. "Substandard insurers," as that term is used here, included insurers
writing coverage at rates in excess of bureau rates under consent to
rate laws, upward rate deviations, or surplus lines laws. For an exam-
ination of the role of such insurers, see S. WEESE, NoN-ADMITTED IN-
SURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 3 (1971).
201. PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, at 91-92.
202. Id. at 56-74.
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surance coverages had immediate and stultifying effects on mort-
gage transactions. In some instances, lenders and real estate agents
with tie-in arrangements with the substandard markets aggravated
the difficulties by delaying the search for insurance coverages to the
last minute in order to use program delays as justification for by-
passing the programs. Moreover, even in the absence of such de-
lays or overreaching, some prospective insureds simply were willing
to forego possible savings in the programs in order to avoid inspec-
tions.
20 3
The most fundamental reason for waivers, however, was the ina-
bility of the state programs to provide the variety of coverages de-
manded by prospective insureds. Fire and extended coverage pro-
tection might be an adequate protective package for a homeowner,
but even with vandalism and malicious mischief coverages the pro-
grams often did little for the owner of a restaurant or mercantile
establishment unable to obtain replacement value or plate glass co-
verage through the programs and unable to place these and other
allied coverages in the substandard markets unless they were ac-
companied by the basic fire and extended coverage components.
The states differed markedly in their reactions to this question.
In Michigan, an unsuccessful attempt to prohibit by rule any re-
course to the substandard markets without prior inspection was fol-
lowed in 1971 by an absolute statutory prohibition such pre-inspec-
tion waviers. 2 04 In California, on the other hand, amendments to
the FAIR program enabling legislation made clear that substandard
markets were to be considered a part of the normal market to be
exhausted before FAIR plan provisions were called into operation,
with a vote of the agents in a geographical area to be relied upon
to determine whether FAIR plan coverages would be made avail-
able in that area.20 5 Most states occupied an uneasy position some-
where between these extremes. 20 6 Waivers usually were permitted,
but their use was expected to be restricted to appropriate situations
by the availability of binders and deemer provisions designed to
203. In addition to residents' concerns for privacy and owners' less salutary
worries that inspections might lead to reports of violations to housing
authorities, this reluctance to submit to inspections may in part have
been prompted by very real concerns that an inspection might have
prompted repairs that would necessitate rent increases.
204. MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 500.2912 (Supp. 1972).
205. "The purposes of this chapter are to do all of the following ... (c) To
encourage maximum use, in obtaining basic property insurance, of the
normal insurance market provided by admitted insurers and licensed
surplus lines brokers." CAL. INS. CODE § 10090 (West 1972).
206. Memo from J. Robert Hunter to George K. Bernstein (Oct. 26, 1971),
printed in REPORTS ON FAIR PLAN OpmAnioNs 1971, Supra note 68.
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limit the delays involved in obtaining coverage through the pro-
grams,20 7 by publicity concerning the alternatives provided by
the programs,20 8 and by enforcement of existing anti-coercion and
anti-tying prohibitions. 20 9 Whether these were adequate safe-
guards against abuses remained an open question. The answers de-
pended both on one's attitudes toward what the programs should
try to accomplish and on one's beliefs about the price consciousness
of prospective insureds.
3. Industry Hegemony and the Functional Orientation
Thus, the state programs emerged as determinedly "private"
programs, their slogans of voluntarism largely intact, with ample
evidence that the programs would not import a significant regula-
tory involvement in the definition of underwriting and pricing prac-
tices in the voluntary market. That the boards of governors of the
programs could expect to enjoy areas of substantial immunity from
207. All state programs were required by HUD rule to include either a
deemer provision or a binder provision. 24 C.F.R. § 1905.6 (1972).
Deemer provisions typically provide that if coverage has not been pro-
vided within a certain period from the date inspection was requested,
the risk will automatically be deemed insured pending the results of
the inspection if the applicant has paid the "estimated" premium that
will be required. Binder provisions permit the applicant to pay a
"provisional" premium at the time inspection is requested and to re-
ceive temporary coverage pending the results of the inspection.
208. Public education programs are required both by the federal statute
and HUD rule. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(10) (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1905.2
(d) (1976).
209. Although the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act expressly prohibits
coercion "resulting in or tending to result in unreasonable re-
straint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance," many states
have adopted supplemental statutory provisions that prohibit indi-
vidual lenders from requiring the purchase of insurance from a par-
ticular insurer, agent, or broker as a condition of a real estate loan.
See, e.g., MicHI. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2077 (1967). In addition, the
Justice Department can employ the McCarran Act exceptions for "boy-
cott, coercion, and intimidation," 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15 (1970), to obtain
consent decrees against tie-in sales of insurance by mortgage lenders.
See, e.g., United States v. Investors Diversified Serv., TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) % 67799, 69574 (D. Minn. June 30, 1954). However, the coercive
effect of the tie-in arrangement can be subtle and difficult to prove,
so that insurance regulatory officials often have tried to limit the occa-
sions for coercion by refusing to license as insurance agents those who
will be handling real estate loan transactions, sometimes with indiffer-
ent success.
Despite these efforts, many in the insurance industry believe the
practice remains widespread. For a general discussion of this subject,
consult Kimball & Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing,
61 COLUm. L. REv. 141, 155-57 (1961).
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public direction and control was reflected both in the importance
the industry attached to struggles over the compositions of the
boards and in the nature of the issues upon which their attentions
tended to center. Where the structures of public accountability
were weak, the boards were where the action would be. With the
substance of public concerns often ill-defined and unrepresented,
an orientation toward a sort of functional accountability to its con-
stituents among participating elements of industry would provide
the primary agenda of concerns out of which the boards would try
to construct the programs.
a. "Markets of Last Resort"
More often that not, this agenda was dominated by two princi-
pal themes. The first was a corollary to the prevailing rationale
for industry involvement in the programs. According to the con-
trolling vision, the FAIR plans should be structured to assure that
they would remain residual "markets of last resort," low visibility,
private measures that would so occupy the field as to leave little
room for governmental intervention. This impulse called for a deli-
cate balancing. On the one hand, where possible, the programs
should be resolutely "voluntary," with the provision of coverage
explicitly a matter of industry grace applied to residual risks prop-
erly "incident to the business" of insurers operating in the private,
voluntary market. Where the fact or illusion of voluntary action
could not be maintained, at least the programs should be kept "pri-
vate," with administration and control as much as possible in pri-
vate hands. At the same time, however, although the programs
should be prominent enough to pre-empt the threat of public alter-
natives, their scope should be strictly limited, in the sense that they
should be restricted to what was "essential" according to the cur-
rent political calculus; in no event should the programs imply any
general industry responsibility for insuring availability nor any re-
quirement that individual insurers deviate from their normal under-
writing instincts in constructing their books of primary market
business.
While the practical implications of this vision could prove hazy
along the margins, at a minimum the dictates of voluntarism re-
quired that the industry stoutly resist efforts to place "public" rep-
resentatives on the boards of governors. Such proposals seldom
involved large numbers, and the resistance was prompted less by
concerns about preserving industry majorities than by the determi-
nation to maintain the trappings of private, voluntary programs.
After all, ran the industry arguments, it was industry surpluses
and not public funds that were put at risk in the programs. More-
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over, cost concerns and the desirability of keeping the programs
in low profile necessitated that, wherever possible, the programs
should operate only in urban areas and should provide only limited
dollar amounts of a limited variety of coverages. Acquiescence in
a private, voluntary character for the programs would help to as-
sure a prominent place for those views in any consideration of pro-
posals to extend the scope of the programs. Eventually, in a few
states, public representatives were included on the boards, usually
under statutory direction, but in all the programs the industry re-
mained numerically and strategically in the dominant position.
210
b. "Incident to the Business"
A second theme with pervasive implications for the development
of the programs also surfaced in conflicts over the composition of
the boards. The maneuvering that left substantial control of the
programs in industry hands had not resolved the question of whose
hands would actually be at the controls. Moreover, the convergence
of interest that had permitted near-unanimity in the march on
Washington for riot reinsurance and that could still be mustered
for resistance to efforts to extend direct governmental supervision
of the programs would dissipate quickly under the pressures of
translating broad grants of responsibility into institutional arrange-
ments acceptable to an industry of widely divergent needs and
habits. The boards of governors would help to determine the im-
pacts of the programs on participants, usually without the guidance
of generally accepted indices of what would constitute a fair re-
sult.21 ' In this circumstance, with real interests perceived to turn
210. States with public representatives are: California, Delaware, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Ore-
gon, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington and Wis-
consin. In several states the public representatives are non-voting,
and centralization of important decision making in advisory commit-
tees, overlapping industry memberships on state boards, and the large
role of the Property Insurance Plans Service Office made public rep-
resentation even less suitable as a means of legitimating the authority
wielded by the boards of governors.
211. Two excellent presentations of the argument that committing political
questions to voluntary associations cannot be expected to eliminate the
difficulties that attend coercion are M. OLsON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIc GooDs AND THE THEORy OF GRoups (1968); and T.
LowI, supra note 19. For historical treatments making the same point
and emphasizing the claims it generates for public interventions to se-
cure stability and predictability, see R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND RE-
FORm (1962); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1968); the hyperbolic G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM
(1963). See also E. ScHATTscHNEDER, PoLITIcs, PRESSURES AND THE
TARFF 217-18 (1935) (discussing the "iron law of necessity" felt by
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on the outcome, struggles over representation were a central
feature of the organizational years of the programs, with battles
for increased representation waged between different trade asso-
ciations, direct writers versus American Agency companies, com-
panies versus producers, agents versus brokers, domestic versus
foreign insurers, and seemingly along most of many different planes
on which divergencies of interest could appear. In the end, the
result again was company dominance, with producers occasionally
receiving a token role, usually only after legislative muscles had
been flexed or regulatory support invoked.
The impacts to be adjusted could be substantial. The rating
formulas adopted in most states promised to make program experi-
ence extremely unfavorable, and in numerous other ways the pro-
grams would intrude on established patterns of doing business and
threaten dislocation of existing relationships among industry partic-
ipants. Among the issues to be confronted were questions as
fundamental as the participation formulas to be used to allocate
the formal costs of the programs among participating insurers. On
this matter, as on so many others, the federal statute had maintained
a pregnant silence. Nevertheless, from an early stage there seems
to have been general agreement that an appropriate allocation
would tie an insurer's share of the costs of the residual program
to the extent of its voluntary market writings within the state.
Of course, that concept could yield diverse interpretations. The
problem surfaced most dramatically in the early days of the pro-
grams as disputes over whether commercial and habitational prop-
erties within a state should be handled in split programs or lumped
in a single program; at stake were thought to be significant differ-
ences in the proportion of adverse financial experience that would
be allocated to each insurer. For such questions there were no in-
tuitively correct answers, and no amount of expertise and infor-
mation could be expected to reduce the intractability of what were
root questions of who was to be indulged and who denied. How-
ever useful the "incident to the business" rubric as constitutional
standard 212 or as rationale for industry involvement, it clearly was
pressure groups: "exaggerating the unanimity and determination of
their membership" and "confess[ing] to internal divisions of interest
only by accident or under compulsion").
212. In California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S.
105 (1951), the Court upheld against constitutional attacks a California
statute requiring insurer participation in an automobile assigned risk
plan:
The case in its broadest reach is one in which the state
requires in the public interest each member of a business to
assume a pro rata share of a burden which modern conditions
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inadequate as a measure of that involvement or of its allocation
to component elements of the industry. Yet the debates were con-
ducted in the rhetoric of the programs. The language of "responsi-
bility" could be made to sanction almost any result, and insurers'
arguments rarely went beyond broadly-framed attributions of rela-
tive responsibility for the availability problem. Insurers already
committed by their voluntary market writings to a large volume
of commercial risks could count them toward their quota of social
responsibility and cite the unfairness of tying their participation
in program results to such writings. The response for insurers
lightly committed to such risks was equally clear: Insurers that
had "profited from commercial writings over the years," that had
"long picked the fruits of urban, commercial writings," should be
treated as having a greater responsibility to support residual com-
mercial risks than did the other companies.
2 13
Related problems of similar difficulty concerned the role of pro-
ducers placing risks in the programs. The insurer-dominated boards
of governors often sought to set the commissions at markedly less
than rates prevailing in the voluntary market. Producers resisted,
usually without notable success. The companies could invoke two
arguments for restricted commissions, one resting on allocational
concerns, and one derived from the tenets of voluntarism: the re-
sponsibility embodied in the programs was an industry-wide re-
sponsibility, in which all the industry should share; and the lower
commissions would act as a desirable discipline on producers to in-
crease the likelihood that they would exhaust the voluntary market
before sending risks to the programs. Eventually the commission
schedules stabilized at about two-thirds of normal voluntary rates.
From the agents' viewpoint, this result could be a powerful incen-
have made incident to the business .... Here, as in the
banking field, the power of the state is broad enough to take
over the whole business, leaving no part for private enter-
prise .... The state may therefore hold its hand on condition
that local needs be serviced by the business.
Id. at 109-10.
The notion may not be entirely without constitutional content. In
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 44 L.W. 2255 (N.C. Super. Nov.
7, 1975), the court held that a statute compelling a pro rata distribu-
tion of losses from a medical malpractice pool among general liability
insurers, many of which had never written malpractice insurance, con-
stituted a violation of equal protection and substantive due process
guarantees of both federal and state constitutions.
213. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), Oct. 11, 1968, at 53, col. 2.
Eventually seven states maintained split pools in which the extent of
each insurer's participation was determined separately for commercial
risks and for habitational risks.
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tive for avoiding FAIR plans;2 14 from the regulatory standpoint,
it was a worrisome structural barrier to full utilization of the pro-
grams.
Other broad allocational questions centered on the treatment
to be accorded substandard insurers in the programs,2 15 the division
of program business among adjustors, 216 and practical problems of
matching program risks with servicing insurers experienced in
handling business of that kind. Rationalizing the impacts of the
programs was a continuing preoccupation that would drain energies
away from other concerns, influence the way issues could be per-
ceived, and ultimately force compromises with some of the apparent
policy implications of the dictates of voluntarism.
These compromises were forced chiefly by variations on the fears
classically associated with insurance pooling.217 To insurers for
whom sound underwriting and solid claims practices lay close to
the heart of a successful insurance operation, the prospect of a resid-
ual market mechanism in which control of these defensive techni-
ques would be shared with other insurers would appear only
slightly less palatable than ceding these traditional prerogatives to
governmental restrictions. In theory, of course, the loss of potential
underwriting profit and investment income on premiums allowed
to flow into the programs might be expected to discipline individual
insurers to construct a realistic division between "distress" business
and "normal" business, and thus to operate as an acceptable prac-
tical control on the possibility that other insurers would not act
"responsibly" in selecting or servicing program business; in practice,
insurers and producers schooled in competitive realities proved less
than sanguine about the power of such market-based incentives to
provide an acceptable line of demarcation between the voluntary
market and the residual market.
214. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), June 13, 1969, at 33, col. 1
(statements by president of agents' association).
215. See notes 200-09 and accompanying text supra.
216. Eventually HUD was drawn into this fray. 24 C.F.R. § 1905.10 (1976)
provides:
(a) No Plan or placement facility shall discriminate by
providing for the primary use of services or any preferential
treatment of any adjuster to the exclusion, detriment, or dis-
advantage of any other adjuster of equal or equivalent profes-
sional qualifications in any formal or informal arrangements
of any insured losses under policies or contracts of insurance
issued under the Plan.
217. See generally Haugh, Insurance Pools, in J. Long & D. Gregg, supra
note 34, at 969. Most private pooling arrangements are structured to
prevent adverse selection against the pool, often by requiring that
members retain no business of the class pooled and place all such busi-
ness in the pool. Id. at 970-71.
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Nevertheless, substantial as these concerns might be, the instinct
to refuse to trust underwriting decisions in the voluntary market
to determine an equitable allocation of risks between the programs
and the voluntary market was unlikely to result in industry
support for significant inroads into traditional voluntary market
underwriting prerogatives. The programs were efforts to avoid
such restrictions, and direct limitations in the name of inter-insurer
equity would be no more attractive than restrictions designed to
serve other ends. Again, industry leaders turned to attempts to
invest the rhetoric of individual insurer responsibility with some
informal inhibiting effect, and at times encouraged state regulators
to lend their powers of moral suasion to this cause. While these
efforts probably helped to slow the flow of risks into the programs
during the early days of large program backlogs, they offered little
prospect of long term results, and in their suggestion that an ob-
jectively determinable line of demarcation could be drawn they
were not without dangerous implications. Consequently, most in-
surer efforts to deal with these concerns centered on attempts to
adjust the structures of the programs to impose indirect disciplinary
influences on the way the troublesome questions of fairness to
participants would be resolved in the programs.
c. Normalcy Versus Control
Those issues in important measure were issues of equity born
of fears that the conduct of some participants would unfairly
burden other participants. In this setting, where uniformity of de-
cision rather than any particular level of decision could seem the
paramount value, efforts to minimize the differential impacts of the
programs on participants often appeared as a tendency to centralize
critical elements of the residual market operation better to enforce
a consistent treatment of business handled by the mechanism. The
inequities of the "luck of the draw" could be reduced by pooling
experience and expenses instead of assigning risks.218  The inequi-
218. In actual operation, the "placement facility" contemplated by the
PANEL REPORT, supra note 3, and the federal legislation soon gave way
to the use of pooling arrangements. Distribution of risks to partici-
pants had worked under automobile assigned risk plans, but in those
programs the coverages and limits typically were fixed at the mini-
mum levels established in financial responsibility statutes; under the
property insurance programs, the type of property, the value of the
property, and the amount of coverage requested might vary greatly
from one application to another. Nevertheless, initially some states
adopted a "Model Uniform Basic Property Insurance Inspection and
Placement Program" proposed by the Industry Property Insurance Li-
aison Committee. See II 1968 NAT'L A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PRoc. 449.
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ties produced by differing applications of the underwriting stand-
ards setting eligibility floors for the programs could be minimized
by instituting centralized underwriting for the programs. The in-
equities introduced by divergent claims settlement practices of par-
ticipating insurers could be curtailed by assigning these functions to
the mechanism or contracting them out to a few large participants
whose conduct could be monitored and whose substantial interests
in the experience of the programs might be expected to exert a de-
sirable restraining influence. That centralized operations might in
the long run prove less costly than a program of diffused responsi-
bilities offered reinforcement for the centripetal tendencies urging
the mechanisms toward increased centralization of functions and
dovetailed with HUD efforts to secure better monitoring and con-
trol of the programs.
Running counter to these tendencies were other impulses likely
to produce resistence to centralization of mechanism functions.
Some derived from the perceived dictates of voluntarism. Pooling
and centralization evoked fear of a residual market mechanism with
a corporeal existence distinct from voluntary market institutions,
free of competition, indistinguishable in most relevant respects from
governmental insurance programs. Other resistance tapped less
speculative instincts. Where the status quo seemed to offer the
only safe referent for what was "fair," keeping the impact of the
programs residual was likely to mean preserving "normal" market
mechanisms and established market positions. Thus, significant
support could be mustered for the idea that programs should be
It called for the placement facility to distribute an inspected risk to up
to five participating insurers selected on a rotating basis, with each in-
surer retaining a $5000 exposure, and with any excess receiving cover-
age in a reinsurance pool in which all insurers participated in the pre-
miums and losses. The plans included a complicated system of cri-
teria and limitations designed to match referred risks with insurers
by line of property insurance and by geographical area served. They
soon floundered in their own complexities and were replaced, at the
instigation of participating insurers, by pooling arrangements. In Vir-
ginia, the companies sought and obtained an order from the State Cor-
poration Commission requiring the change. Virginia State Corp.
Comm'n v. Arlington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 18595 (Virginia State
Corp. Comm'n, Oct. 24, 1968). See also J. Com., Oct. 3, 1968,
at 7, col. 3 (District of Columbia plan changed under pressure
from Insurance Company of North America); J. Com., Oct. 15,
1968, at 9, col. 1 (modification of Delaware program). The difficulties
with assignment plans and the advantages of a pooling approach
are ably presented in H 1968 NAT'L A. INs. COmmISSiONERS Pnoc. 449.
See also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the District of Columbia,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 239 (1968) (later industry proposal). By early
1969, all programs were employing pools rather than assigned risk pro-
cedures.
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structured to assure that the actual physical servicing of residual
risks would be accomplished by existing voluntary marketing and
claims adjustment institutions; that producers receive the normal
voluntary market compensation for their efforts; that producers
and insurers not be forced to handle risks of a kind they are
unaccustomed to handling; that policies be issued by individual
insurers rather than by the mechanism; that the prospective in-
sured be allowed his choice of producer and insurer; that agents
be appointed by insurers rather than by the mechanism; and so
on through a long litany of resistance to differential impacts, alter-
ations in traditional ways of doing business and creation of insti-
tutional arrangements which would appear to operate in non-
normal ways.
If the tendency toward centralization of mechanism functions
represented a search for control, these appeals to normalcy were
in many respects an opposite centrifugal tendency where the pre-
ferred values were autonomy and the preservation of the familiar
indicia of the private, voluntary insurance enterprise. The effect
of the first tendency was to emphasize the difference between
normal and residual markets; the effect of the second was to mask
it.
In the continuing struggles over how the programs should be
structured, the tension between these inclinations has been most
plain in the ongoing debates about the respective merits of joint
underwriting associations and reinsurance facilities. 219  The rein-
surance facility approach offers the prospect of a low visibility
mechanism and the maintenance of normal channels for placing re-
sidual risks, but at the cost that this very ease of access will subtly
encourage an increased flow of risks into the facility. The joint
underwriting association, on the other hand, appears to pose a more
clear-cut underwriting issue to participating insurers, but at the
cost of creating a separate mechanism engaged in far more than
219. These approaches, and their many variations, have received wide cov-
erage in the insurance trade press. An easily accessible survey of their
central features is provided by a series of articles by J. Finley Lee
and Roger Formisano: Lee & Formisano, The North Carolina Plan:
Blueprint for an Automobile Reinsurance Facility, 1973 INS. L.J. 559;
Lee & Formisano, Automobile Insurance Markets: Developments in
the Reinsurance Facility Technique, 1975 INS. L.J. 9; Lee & Formisano,
Residual Markets in Automobile Insurance: The Service Center and
the Joint Underwriting Association Approaches, 1975 INs. L.J. 92; Lee
& Formisano, Residual Markets in Automobile Insurance: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 1975 INS. L.J. 143. See also Insurance Advocate, Oct. 2,
1973, at 16, col. 1 (reporting substance of debate over relative merits
of "facility" and "joint underwriting association").
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mere bookkeeping operations, with a personality and visibility that
make identification of the mechanism with traditional insurance
marketing institutions significantly more difficult.
This testing for structure continues, fueled by often markedly
different attitudes toward the twin values of normalcy and con-
trol. However, nothing in this pattern has implied abandonment
of the central industry rationale for the programs. To the extent
the rhetoric of industry "responsibility" has had an identifiable con-
tent, the responsibility has been seen as an industry-wide respon-
sibility to be executed through the programs and as implying no
restrictions on underwriting decisions in the voluntary market.
Depopulation of the programs appears always as a desirable result,
but seldom as a program to be seriously implemented.220 According
to the controlling consciousness, the perceived compulsions to keep
residual markets residual-both as a hedge against governmental
displacement and as an effort to control competitive dislocations-
are to be felt in the industry as pangs of social conscience and en-
lightened self interest. They are routinely invoked by a set of lin-
guistic cues emphasizing the role of the industry in the programs
and a structure of beliefs about how the programs should intersect
with the voluntary market. As verbal symbols these cues could at-
tract easy consensus, but as practical guides to what the programs
do or should demand, they must be approached with caution.
Clearly, from the industry vantage, despite the very real concerns
that prompt them, their use has not meant industry endorsement
of governmental constraints on underwriting decisions made in the
voluntary market.
D. Dumping-The New Availability Problem
The ability of the industry to sustain this vision of the programs
came under challenge almost from the outset. A variety of factors
were at work that would tend to draw regulatory attention back
to questions of the legitimacy of underwriting decisions made in
the voluntary market and to encourage some regulators to hold out
the prospect of objective standards against which to measure the
validity of those decisions. Together they would suggest an alter-
native vision of the "availability problem" in which "dumping"
220. Although there was considerable discussion of "take-out credits" and
similar institutional arrangements designed to encourage depopulation
of the programs, there is little evidence that these had much impact
even in the few instances where they actually were implemented. See,
e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 6541-a (McKinney Supp. 1976) (granting double
credit against participation ratio for writing risk formerly written
through FAIR program).
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would assume the role of primary evil and the regulatory task
would become to convert the rhetoric of nondiscrimination and in-
surer responsibility into workable procedures for actually policing
the line between voluntary and involuntary markets.
Although its definition would evolve, the identification of
"dumping" as a regulatory issue had begun even before the incep-
tion of the programs. In the period immediately after the 1967 riots,
state regulatory officials had enjoyed notable successes in delaying
mass cancellations of property insurance risks. Using a blend of
private cajolery and public arm twisting, regulators in several of
the most significantly affected states managed to enforce moratoria
on cancellations pending development of the state programs.
However, the statutory authority which they could invoke was weak
or nonexistent, and these hiatal efforts did not wear well once the
programs began to operate. Many of the risks that flowed toward
the programs were properties that previously had been insured in
the voluntary market. Some left substandard or surplus lines in-
surers in attempts to qualify for lower rates through the programs;
probably most, however, were risks that had been insured at man-
ual rates, but which were cancelled or not renewed after the start
of the programs. In many states the flow of business soon swamped
FAIR plans beset by start-up confusions and the difficulties of phy-
sically inspecting each new risk. The regulatory response in
most states was to encourage the adoption of improved binding
procedures and other measures designed to smooth the entry of
risks into the programs, and to add the regulatory voice to the in-
dustry chorus abjuring "dumping" and appealing for "responsible"
underwriting decisions in the voluntary market.
221
1. The Royal Globe Decision
Despite the aggressive tones in which the warnings were some-
times couched and the essentially unchecked flow of risks to the pro-
grams, only in New York did state regulators attempt directly to
test the asserted prerogative of insurers to commit whatever risks
they chose to the residual market. In what was widely-though
probably unnecessarily-viewed as a watershed case for the entire
question of the relation of the programs to voluntary market under-
writing practices, the New York Insurance Department challenged
the Royal Globe Companies' systematic program for reducing their
voluntary market exposures. The Royal Globe Companies had been
among the most heavily committed insurers in urban areas through-
221. See, e.g., Kansas Ins. Dep't, Fire & Cas. Bull. No. 1969-1 (May 29,
1969).
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out the country. After being backed down in efforts to cull their
portfolios during the moratoria,22 2 they greeted the advent of the
New York program with a plan for cancelling and nonrenewing
some but not all of their fire insurance coverage on commerical
lines in the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant areas. The New York
Department responded with an administrative complaint charging
the companies with violation of section 40(10) of the New York
Insurance Law: "[No insurance company] shall make any distinc-
tion or discrimination between persons because of race, color, creed
or national origin, as to premiums or rates charged for insurance
policies or in any other matter whatsoever .... ,,2
Royal Globe defended against the charge before the Department
and in the press.224 The curtailment program involved less than
ten per cent of the companies' inner-city business and was designed
to bring the Royal Globe Companies to a closer approximation of
their proportionate share of urban liabilities: "[O]ur underwriting
program, like that of other companies, is to avoid the voluntary
writing of substandard risks in view of current underwriting and
for which the pool facility is now available." The clear message of
both the federal statute and the state program was that once the
pool facility became available, cancellations and dumping were
again the prerogative of insurers. The Department's charge that
"the recognition of conflagration hazards in certain core areas
smacks of racial prejudice" was labeled "patently absurd."225
After hearing, the Department held that the statute had been
violated by each of 206 policy cancellations and imposed a fine of
$100 for each cancellation.226 The decision recognized that state law
contained no prohibition against underwriting decisions predicated
on location, and explicitly found that the insurers "were motivated
by underwriting and business reasons and not by racial hostility"
in selecting the risks to be cancelled. Nevertheless, it concluded
that the selection of areas in which the cancellations were to take
place demonstrated that the race of inhabitants of the areas had
been a factor in the selection, and that the decisions therefore in-
volved a "racial distinction" in violation of the statute.
222. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), July 19, 1968, at 5, col. 3
and at 15, col. 2; National Underwriter (F & C), Sept. 13, 1968, at
50, col. 1.
223. N.Y. INs. LAw § 40 (10) (McKinney 1966). Of course, most states had
even less statutory support for challenging such terminations.
224. See, e.g., National Underwriter (F & C), July 19, 1968, at 1, col. 3
(text of statement by president of Royal Globe over CBS TV news);
Wall St. J., July 11, 1968, at 22, col. 1; National Underwriter (F & C),
Dec. 20, 1968, at 4, col. 1.
225. Id.
226. In re British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. (N.Y. Ins. Dep't April 1, 1969).
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The appellate division reversed in a memorandum decision,
apparently on the ground that the record did not disclose that the
cancellation action was "directed against any individual or group
of individuals. '22 7 The court of appeals affirmed.22 8 The majority
opinion recited the details of the New York FAIR plan, noted the
Superintendent's findings that the plan of action "was not based
on any desire to discriminate," and concluded that no discrimi-
natory effect had been shown:
In the first place, the petitioners continue to underwrite "per-
sonal line" fire insurance in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant-
which constitutes by far the greater part of their business-despite
the fact that many other insurers have refused to do so. In the
second place, their decision to cancel certain commercial insurance
policies simply requires the owners of these policies to look to the
statutory pool for insurance. This is precisely the reason that the
pool was established .... The fact that the premium rates may
be higher in the pool is not, of course, attributable to racial dis-
crimination but, rather reflects the higher degree of risk under-
taken by the members of the pool in insuring the particular prop-
erty.229
The Royal Globe decision signaled a practical end to state
regulatory efforts to influence voluntary market underwriting de-
cisions. The New York experience had accentuated the paucity of
statutory authority available to regulators, and doubtless many
shared the basic industry position, apparently confirmed in the
Royal Globe litigation, that provision of coverage through the resi-
dual programs was the most that should be demanded of insurers.
2 30
227. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 33 App. Div. 2d 1008,
307 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1970).
228. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 30 N.Y.2d 53, 281 N.E.2d
149, 330 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1972).
229. Id. at 59-60, 281 N.E.2d at 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 344. Judge Breitel,
concurring, emphasized that commercial motivations would not insu-
late underwriting decisions with racially discriminatory impacts; the
superintendent had simply failed to demonstrate a racially discrimina-
tory impact: "The reason this case is particularly troublesome and
the Superintendent has failed to sustain his determination is that it
has been fundamental and legally acceptable in the insurance industry
to classify risks on territorial bases if supported by actuarial data."
Id. at 60-61, 281 N.E.2d at 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
230. A similar occasion for broad inferences about the relation of the pro-
grams to voluntary market underwriting prerogatives to be derived
from a much narrower holding was provided by Fireman's Ins. Co.
v. Washington, 333 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1971). The city council of
the District of Columbia in 1971 passed ordinances prohibiting declina-
tions or nonrenewals "because of geographic area" and restricting au-
tomobile cancellations. Fireman's sought to have the two regulations
declared illegal and their enforcement enjoined on the grounds that
they exceeded the police powers granted to the city council by Con-
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As inefficiencies were curtailed and backlogs of applications dried
up, the "dumping problem" lost much of its urgency for state regu-
lators.231 Though pressures from producers and from company
leaders sometimes still could prompt some to rail against dumping,
these admonitions were understood by all concerned to be the
preachments of old, with little to suggest that state regulators pos-
sessed either the will or the authority to convert the rhetoric into
meaningful efforts to define and police a line of demarcation be-
tween voluntary and involuntary markets.
gress. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment
on a finding that congressional enactment of the District of Columbia
Insurance Placement Facility indicated congressional retention of po-
lice power on that subject:
The City Council's "geographic discrimination" regulation
and the Placement Act both seek to regulate the same type
of high risk coverage. The Council has determined that indi-
vidual insurers may not, with limited exception, consider mat-
ters over which the insured has no control in making the de-
termination of whether or not to insure. Prior to the regula-
tion insurers did consider such factors. This expansion of risk
is precisely what the Placement Act seeks to govern by appor-
tioning such risk among all participating carriers. Regulation
71-8 would narrow the market which Congress intended all
carriers to share.
Id. at 955. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the
challenged regulations were within the concurrent police powers of the
city council, but held:
The Placement Act deals with exactly the same problem
of red lining as does Regulation 71-8. The Act's solution is
an equitable distribution of the hazards posed by such high-
risk properties among private insurers. By eliminating envi-
ronmental hazards from the underwriting decision, Regulation
71-8 leaves the volume of such high risk properties insured
by each company to be determined not by an equitable appor-
tionment but by the vagaries of the geographic distribution
of the company's applicants. The regulation thus results in
a different distribution of risks than that intended by the
Placement Act. Since Regulation 71-8 does interfere with
Congress' solution to the red lining problem, it is preempted,
hence invalid, as to basic property insurance.
Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Washington, 483 F.2d 1323, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
231. There were exceptions. Commissioner Denenberg of Pennsylvania
took the strongest position:
The FAIR Plan has, in significant measure, lessened the kind
of discrimination it was designed to end. But its very expan-
sion has raised a question of whether it is fostering a new
kind of discrimination.
If whole areas or classes of risk are automatically con-
signed to the plan, has the plan itself become an instrument
of discrimination rather than its antidote? More and more,
policyholders, agents and brokers say: "We want access to
insurance companies like everyone else. We want the same
services, the same facilities, and the same options. We do not
want to be automatically consigned to the FAIR Plan. We
want to be treated like first-class citizens."
National Underwriter (P & C), April 9, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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2. The Annunzio Hearings and the Crime Insurance Precedent
Nevertheless, the tensions that had surfaced in the Royal Globe
litigation would not disappear. The majority opinion's casual as-
sumption that the imposition of higher rates in the programs "re-
flects the higher degree of risk undertaken by members of the pool
in insuring the particular property 232 was not universally shared,
and soon for some critics the availability problem in property in-
surance had "evolved into its functional equivalent-unpayably
high rates '233 charged by the programs.
This perspective was most forcefully presented by Representa-
tive Annunzio of Illinois. Application backlogs in the Chicago pro-
gram, coupled with wide use of condition charges, a generously
applied 100 per cent surcharge on plan business,234 and a pattern
of curtailment of voluntary market underwriting by insurers,
fueled public criticism of the program and prompted congressional
hearings 235 and introduction of legislation to require direct federal
primary insurance whenever program rate quotations exceeded
175 per cent of manual.23 6 The Illinois program was held up as
a "classic case of incest, dominated by the industry from start to
finish"; 237 the high premiums charged by the program and con-
tinued "red-lining" and "dumping" by voluntary market insurers
provided the prevailing themes for the hearings:
[I]f the underlying goal of the Federal Reinsurance Act was to
eliminate the unavailability of "essential" property insurance, the
Act as formulated has proven to be largely inadequate. The
drafters of the Act failed to appreciate that insurance "availability"
is inextricably entwined with the cost of insurance. . . . Unpayably
high rates are as much a cause of insurance unavailability as are
"redlining" and "blacklisting." 238
232. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 30 N.Y.2d at 60, 281
N.E.2d at 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
233. Comment, The Central City Insurance Crisis: Experience Under the
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, 38 U. CIn.
L. REv. 665, 673 (1971).
234. The special surcharge applied to almost all program risks in Illinois
for "hazardous conditions not otherwise charged for" was declared a
violation of federal prohibitions against environmental hazard charges,
and abandoned, but not until it had sown considerable mischief. See
generally id.; 1969 House Hearings, supra note 167.
235. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 167.
236. H.R. 13666, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 19436, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
tit. VII (1970).
237. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 349 (statement by Represen-
tative Moorhead); see also National Underwriter (F & C), Apr. 25,
1969, at 2, col. 4 (report from industry vantage).
238. Comment, supra note 233, at 678. The cited article provides an accu-
rate if uncritical reflection of the tone and content of the hearings;
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Nevertheless, the Annunzio proposal was not enacted. Congress
bolstered the investigatory powers of HUD by authorizing the Of-
fice of Review and Compliance, 23 9 and it required HUD to provide
crime insurance coverages directly at an "affordable rate" in states
in which HUD found a "critical market unavailability situation"
for crime insurance coverages, 240 but it did not alter the delivery
mechanisms nor the pricing standards applicable to the property
coverages provided through the FAIR plans.
The crime insurance legislation departed from the FAIR plan
model in two significant ways. First, it authorized direct federal
provision of crime coverages where "a critical market unavailability
situation for crime insurance exists in any State and has not been
met through appropriate State action."'24 1 Second, the standard to
be met by a state in order to forestall federal intervention was not
simply that crime coverages be "available," but that they be "avail-
able at affordable rates." 242 The substantial willingness to breach
these twin frontiers in the case of crime insurance but not for prop-
erty insurance can be laid to a single dominant perception: from
the outset there was general agreement that the crime insurance
problem was far more one of extremely high costs, even at manual
a number of its factual assertions and conclusions are entitled to less
weight.
239. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
240. Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1770 (1970) (codified primarily as 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1749bbb-10a to -10d (1970)).
241. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-10a (1970).
242. Id. "Affordable rates" are "defined" as follows:
In estimating the affordable rates for the various crime in-
surance coverages offered from time to time under this part,
the Secretary shall consult with appropriate State insurance
authorities and other knowledgeable persons and is authorized
to take into consideration the nature and degree of the risks
involved, the protective devices employed, the extent of an-
ticipated losses, the prevailing rates for similar coverages in
adjacent or comparable areas and territories, the economic im-
portance of the various individual coverages and the type of
property involved, and the relative abilities of the particular
classes and types of insureds to pay the full estimated costs
of such coverages. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to prohibit or require either the adoption of uniform national
rates or the periodic modifications of currently estimated af-
fordable rates for any particular line or subline of coverage,
class, State, territory, or risk on the basis of additional infor-
mation or actual loss experience.
12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-10c (1970). By regulation the FIA further de-
fined the term in this fashion: "'Affordable rate' means such premium
rate as the Secretary determines would permit the purchase of a spe-
cific type of insurance coverage by a reasonably prudent person in
similar circumstances with due regard to the costs and benefits in-
volved." 24 C.F.R. § 1930.1 (a) (3) (1976).
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rates, than of frictional unavailability of the sort diagnosed for the
property insurance coverages.243 The Panel had recognized that
burglary and theft as well as fire and extended coverage insurances
often were made a prerequisite to credit, and it had recommended
that they be provided through FAIR plans.24 4 That proposal got
nowhere. To include the crime coverages in undifferentiated FAIR
programs would have made their governing rationale untenable.
The unrecognized costs of the property coverages could be spread
widely across broad populations; the crime insurance base was
much smaller. The subsidy required for some crime risks would
have been too large and too apparent to allow a FAIR plan bar-
gain involving crime coverages to be struck. In 1968 the crime in-
surance problem was deferred for further study.245 The solution
proposed by the FIA was enacted in the 1970 legislation.
246
The industry displayed little reluctance to embrace the idea of
a crime insurance program with the federal government as a risk
bearer. The federal insurance was marketed through a limited
number of private insurers who contracted with HUD to act as "ser-
vicing companies," and producers found their roles and their com-
missions little changed from conditions in the voluntary market.
The chief dissents were registered by state regulatory officials.
The objections went beyond the usual resistance to federal regu-
latory initiatives: federally written crime coverages would not be
subject to state premium taxes; 247 moreover, the federal crime pro-
gram held other dangers as well. In the FAIR plans,
both the voluntary and the involuntary markets are controlled by
the same insurers. Therefore, there is no danger that the involun-
tary market will compete by attempting to write risks which are
in fact acceptable to the voluntary market.
The unfortunate aspect of the Federal crime insurance law is
that it leaves the definition of the boundary between the voluntary
and involuntary markets solely within the province of the Federal
insurer. The administrators of the Federal program, are em-
powered to determine what an "affordable rate" is, to define crime
insurance so as to include or exclude certain coverages, and to de-
cide whether insurance is being made available by private in-
243. See, e.g., Hearings on the Impact of Crime on Small Business Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); 1968 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 168 (Representative
Moorhead making point that inspection of premises of crime insurance
applicant unlikely to affect underwriting decision).
244. PANEL REPoRT, supra note 3, at 89.
245. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-15 (a) (1) (1970).
246. FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON AVAILABILITY OF CRIME
INSURANCE AND SURETY BoNDs IN URBAN AREAS (1970).
247. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-20 (1970).
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surers in any given state. Thus, the Federal insurer will enjoy a
broad power to define the very problem which it is authorized to
solve. The definition will clearly affect the boundaries of what is
left over for the voluntary market. Instead of two markets, volun-
tary and involuntary, where the boundary between them is defined
by the private insurers, we will have two markets, private and
government, where the boundary between them is defined by the
government insurer. 248
The remedy, for regulators in states in which the FIA identified
a crime insuance problem, 249 was to create a state program, but
if the federal program were to be prevented the state program
would be required to provide a subsidy. An NAIC committee ap-
proved a model bill in which the "anticipated deficits" of a state
crime pool would be assessed against participating insurers, 25 0 but
the proposal was opposed by all the major trade associations, 25 1 and
only in Michigan, California, and Wisconsin did state crime pools
provide a substitute for the federal program.
252
Implicit in the industry acceptance of the federal program was
a preference for subsidies provided through the National Insurance
Development Fund from accumulated crime insurance premiums
and riot reinsurance premiums, direct appropriations, and I-IUD
borrowing authority. Apparently, there was some feeling that with
248. National Underwriter (P & C); Mar. 12, 1971, at 28, col. 3 (Michigan
Commissioner Van Hooser). In fact, the FIA made it clear that it
would not peg federal crime rates to assure that federal provision of
coverage would be limited to less desirable risks; the FIA wanted a
mix of good and bad crime risks.
249. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. 24
C.F.R. § 1931.1(b) (1976).
250. National Underwriter (P & C), Mar. 19, 1971, at 1, col. 4. See also
I 1971 NATL A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 542-47.
251. I 1971 NAT'L A. INS. COMMISSIONERS PIOC. 542-47. See also National
Underwriter (F & C), Oct. 2, 1970, at 68, col. 1 (American Insurance
Association announces willingness to support direct federal program
with federal subsidy).
252. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANw. § 500.2901 (Supp. 1976) (adding crime cov-
erages to FAIR plan); CALI. INS. ConE §§ 10101 to 10106 (1972) (state
authorized to enter agreement to provide excess loss reimbursement
up to $500,000 for deficits in excess of a combined loss and expense
ratio of 105%); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 619.01 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976)
(authorizing additions to coverages subject to risk sharing plans, exer-
cised by the Commissioner in 1971). New Jersey established a state
program, but in 1972 it began to participate in the federal program
when federal rates were reduced. National Underwriter (P & C),
Nov. 10, 1972, at 50, col. 2. New York passed legislation establishing
a state program with a state subsidy, but it was vetoed by Governor
Rockefeller. Insurance Advocate, July 10, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
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federal dollars at risk the crime program might not prove expan-
sionist, and a willingness if necessary to abandon the crime lines
to federal governmental programs.253 In operation, the federal pro-
gram grew very slowly, despite FIA reductions in rates and expan-
sions of coverage. Program penetration remained 10w, 254 and in
time there were suggestions that the program be revamped to
eliminate the role of insurers and producers 55 or that it be ter-
minated.
25 60
3. The FIA Reaction
Although the Federal Insurance Administration opposed the
Annunzio bills, 2 57 it soon was apparent that the FIA shared the pro-
posals' attitude toward "dumping." The Federal Insurance Admin-
istrator labeled the Royal Globe decision "tragic,"258 and in a pro-
gression of public statements and reports increasingly tended to
summarize his agency's dissatisfactions with the programs as
springing from "the inequitable treatment of FAIR Plan risks in
253. Insurance Advocate, May 1, 1971, at 6, col. 1 (insurance company offi-
cer characterizing industry attitudes).
254. In the third year of operation, fewer than 25,000 policies were out-
standing nationwide. For a discussion of the constraints on use of the
federal program, see M. GREENE, GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE INsURANcE
51-58 (NAIl 1975).
255. National Underwriter (P & C), July 25, 1975, at 1, col. 2 (Representa-
tive Annunzio blaming foot-dragging by industry for low utilization).
256. National Underwriter (P & C), Jan. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (suggestion
by representative of FIA that inclusion of crime coverages in FAIR
plans or in Full Insurance Availability programs might be better ap-
proach).
257. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 171, at 350-51 (Federal Insurance
Administrator Bernstein):
[The Annunzio bill] makes a significant departure from
accepted principles of insurance ratemaking and even greater
potential departure from the operations of the property insur-
ance business as it has traditionally existed in this country.
[T]he States would thus be given the alternative of ei-
ther subsidizing these FAIR plan losses from State or other
sources, or else of submitting to a direct Federal property in-
surance program where rates exceed 175 percent of the normal
rates.
Perhaps, in time, after demonstration of the inability of
FAIR plans to solve the insurance availability problem, an ap-
proach like that of H.R. 13666 may be appropriate, but at this
point in time, when our total FAIR plan experience is less
than 2 years old, and when we have not yet exhausted all
of the authority given us under the existing act to make FAIR
plans more effective, we believe H.R. 13666 to be premature.
258. Insurance Advocate, Mar. 25, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
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relation to voluntary market risks. ' 259 Once again, "dumping" was
identified as the villain, but the theme struck by the FIA differed
markedly from those that had most influenced industry develop-
ment of the programs. Put simply, the FIA urged that residual
property markets should be kept residual, not just as a hedge
against potential governmental displacement, and not just to mini-
mize and rationalize the impacts of the programs on the industry,
but also because fairness to individual insureds demanded that the
line between the voluntary market and the involuntary market be
drawn "properly." The FIA diagnosis sounded a familiar note: "the
inequity of subjecting more than a million FAIR plan insureds to
second class treatment on the basis of subjective and undocumented
underwriting judgments, forcing these insureds to pay more
money for less coverage in the FAIR plan than for the same or
full coverage in the voluntary market.
'260
The differences between voluntary and residual markets were
real enough.261 Even with automatic surcharges eliminated, con-
dition charges meant that insureds with policies written through
the programs usually would pay higher premiums than their
counterparts in the voluntary market, even in states that did not
purport to experience rate the residual business. Moreover, the
"private" character of the programs and industry efforts to confine
them to the "essential" guaranteed complaints about the narrow
coverages, limited credit arrangements and other services available
through the programs. To insureds denied admittance to the volun-
tary market, and to the producers, insurers, and regulators who
fielded their complaints, "stigma" was a label that accurately cap-
tured the gravamen of the discontents: perceptions of second-class
treatment engendered by hostile industry attitudes toward residual
business, as mirrored in the inferior products and services offered
through the programs.
262
259. Letter from George K. Bernstein, Federal Insurance Administrator, to
Commissioners in FAIR Plan States (Jan. 28, 1972), at 4, reprinted in
REPORTS ON FAIR PLAN OPERATIONS 1971, supra note 68 [hereinafter
cited as Letter].
260. FULL INSURANcE AvAILALrry, supra note 15, at 1. From an early date
the HUD analysis was applied to automobile residual market problems
as well as the property programs within the FIA's jurisdiction. For
an explanation, see id. at 2 (the FIA "could not ignore the automobile
insurance field where, under the assigned risk plans, the same prac-
tices prevail on an even greater scale").
261. For a summary of the differentials identified by the FIA, see Letter,
supra note 259, at 6-7.
262. Significantly, the "stigma" often seems to be felt more keenly by the
industry than by those to whom it attaches. Cf. R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAmc VIcTIm 79 (1965) (dis-
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From a perspective that would view the programs as at base
instruments of public policy, with administrative tasks farmed out
to the private insurance industry, the issues posed by such com-
plaints might appear to be whether the price-coverage-service mix
provided was adequate to serve the ends which had called the pro-
grams into being. But in an environment defined in large measure
by the rhetoric of voluntarism and persistent appeals to normalcy,
with only an inchoate and inarticulate sense of public quiescence
to suggest when program performance should be deemed good
enough, the question of what kind of treatment should be accorded
risks forced to find coverage in a residual market mechanism was
not kept distinct from the question of what sorts of underwriting
decisions should be considered so antisocial as to warrant legal pro-
scription. Almost inevitably, the coverage, price, and services pro-
vided in the normal market were adopted as the referent against
which to measure the performance of residual market mechanisms;
not surprisingly, in conventional thought and rhetoric-embraced
and encouraged by the FIA-program problems came to be re-
garded as discrimination problems:
Assigned risk plans operate on the principle that there is a "volun-
tary" market and a residual or "involuntary" market, and that the
two must be separated and treated differently. It is such separate
treatment and handling-and inferior service-of the "involuntary"
market that has caused assigned risk plans to be subject to severe
criticisms. 2 63
As the quotations suggest, for the FIA the prescription that
this analysis seemed to require went well beyond bringing program
prices, coverage and services to a standard supplied by the volun-
tary market. From concerns about the equity of differential treat-
ment, depending on whether a risk is placed in the voluntary or
the residual market, it was but a short conceptual leap to the con-
clusion that the preferred course might be to address root causes
directly and to eliminate the separate treatment itself. By 1972,
the FIA had publicly announced its conclusion that the FAIR plans
were fundamentally unsound because "relegation to the FAIR Plan
is usually based on the routine and frequently arbitrary judgment
of a single underwriter":
2 64
cussing the way insurer attitudes toward automobile insurance as-
signed risks color insurer treatment of such risks); Handler & Hol-
lingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipi-
ents, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1969) (challenging on the basis of empirical
data traditional assumptions about the "stigma" felt by welfare recipi-
ents.
263. Vanderbeek & Reinmuth, The Reinsurance Facility: A New Approach
to the Residual Auto Insurance Market Problem, 22 DRAKE L. REV.
768, 769 (1973).
264. Letter, supra note 259, at 6.
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[E]ven if the specific deficiencies in FAIR Plan operations can be
rectified, we believe that the present approach to the handling of
so-called residual risks in this country will continue to be unsatis-
factory at best .... A totally different approach to the residual
market is obviously required.
In this regard, we have already proposed, as you know, that all
insurance companies licensed to do business in a particular State be
required to write every insurable applicant for coverage at the same
rate charged every other similar risk. If a particular risk possesses
characteristics that, in the judgment of an underwriter, make it po-
tentially unprofitable, the insurer could not refuse to write the ap-
plicant, but would be permitted to reinsure a portion of the risk
above a specified retention with a single facility consisting of all
insurers writing property insurance in the State. Under this ap-
proach, no insured would be relegated to different treatment than
other similarly classified risks, and any losses would be shared
equitably by all insurers on an appropriate basis. The whim of
an underwriter could no longer subject a citizen to second-class in-
surance treatment.
... To avoid an excessive use of the facility, which could
unduly burden particular insurers, the sharing ratio should not be
based solely on voluntary premium writings but also on other
objective criteria, including unutilized capacity and excessive rein-
surance with the pool. This change could be coordinated with
open-competition rating laws and with a requirement that rates be
established on an insurer's total book of business, both pool and
voluntary.
Such an approach would assure overall rate adequacy and with
an adequate statistical system would ultimately lead to less pool
utilization. To the extent that more broadly based coverages,
classes, and territories were utilized, there would not only be a re-
turn to the original concept of insurance-spreading the risk-but
there would also be an elimination of the duplication, waste, and
stigma in current assigned-risk operations.
2 65
Eventually, in late 1974, the FIA issued a full-blown brief for its
proposal, christened the "Full Insurance Availability Plan, '2 60
calling for its implementation by the states for "automobile insur-
ance coverages as well as all other lines of property-casualty cov-
erages which are not readily available at reasonable cost.
'2 67
The radical feature of the FIA proposal did not lie in the re-
quirement that each insurer accept all applicants; the underwriting
prerogative would not be withdrawn, but only shifted to allow a
later determination of whether to cede the risk to a reinsurance
facility. Instead, the radical import of the proposal lay in its propo-
265. Id. at 7-8.
266. FULL INSURANCE AvAILABILIY, supra note 15.
267. Letter from George K. Bernstein, Federal Insurance Administrator, to
James T. Lynn, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (Sept. 17, 1974), reprinted in FULL INSURANCE AV:ALABriLTY, su-
pra note 15.
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sition that all risks, whether or not ceded, should be written at
the insurer's standard rates. This conclusion was said to be war-
ranted, not because the risks ceded would not collectively produce
an unsatisfactory loss ratio, nor because a subsidy of ceded risks
by retained risks was thought socially desirable, but because of the
FIA's fundamental distrust of the ability of rating and under-
writing techniques as currently practiced to produce a "fair" line
of demarcation between voluntary and residual markets.268 The
discrimination inherent in forcing into the programs risks which did
not deserve to be there was to be relieved by obviating all distinc-
tions in the treatment of insureds resulting from insurers' views
of their desirability or lack of desirability.
Although the FIA proposal by its terms was animated by a de-
mand for more accurate underwriting decisions in the voluntary
market, it did little to document its assertion that large numbers
of risks "improperly" were being shunted into the programs. In-
stead, by defining its concerns as "discriminatory" treatment of in-
sureds and by emphasizing the undeniable truth that voluntary
market underwriting practices in large measure remain subjective
and unvalidated, the FIA was able to avoid the problems inherent
in any effort to specify a vision of appropriately objective under-
writing standards. In the FIA analysis, no attempt to police partic-
ular underwriting decisions need be made; the pressures generated
by adverse experience of risks ceded to the reinsurance facility
would reinforce heightened regulatory sensitivity to the need to
avoid subjective rating and underwriting practices to force insurers
to develop and adopt "objective and statistically supported classifi-
cations of risk. '269 Tautologically, rating and underwriting prac-
tices would become sufficiently "objective" when each insurer could
"accept any risk at a rate appropriate to its exposure. '270 In the
meantime, when reality falls somewhere between the FIA's neatly
dichotomous "subjective and undocumented underwriting judg-
ments" and "objective and statistically supported classifications of
risk," whether an insurer chooses to reinsure a risk or not is of
little moment in terms of primary FIA concerns, for "separate"
treatment of risks has been eliminated whatever the insurer's de-
cision.
Industry response to the FXA proposal was mixed. To some pro-
ducer associations, the proposal was attractive because it appeared
to promise both a guaranteed market and normalcy of operations
in the placement of risks. However, it also prescribed arrangements
268. FULL INSURANcE AVAILABILITY, supra note 15, at 5-8.
269. Id. at 12.
270. Id. at 7.
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which most insurers perceived to be in conflict with the basic in-
terests that had induced and shaped insurer participation in the pro-
grams. Thus, the proposal to charge each risk the insurer's standard
rate regardless of whether the risk would be ceded to the faculty
seemed likely to produce a scenario featuring competitive dislo-
cations and an increased vulnerability to the threat of governmental
displacement. With low-rate insurers unable to refuse to write ap-
plicants, risks could be expected to flow from the voluntary sub-
standard market and from high-rate insurers to low-rate insurers.
If the insurers' ceding limits were high, many of the new risks
would be reinsured; if ceding threshholds were set low, there might
be important implications for solvency, and low-rate insurers, for
self-protection, could be expected to raise their rates. The resulting
tendency toward uniformity of rates and rate classifications would
be consistent with the FIA emphasis on "objectivity," but it in-
volved the prospect of a loss of dynamism of competitive markets,
and threatened to throw into bold relief the question of whether
society needs numerous insurers and producers if they are to be
providing essentially the same product.2 71 In the view of the most
influential insurer groups, FAIR plans and joint underwriting as-
sociations could be made to produce acceptable results without in-
viting the pernicious consequences of the FIA proposals.
IV. RECASTING THE DEBATE: SOME CAUTIONS AND
A MODEST PRESCRIPTION
Here, at least for the moment, the debate has become stuck. The
FIA continues to inveigh against "subjective" underwriting and
rating practices and to proselytize for its full insurance availability
program,272 but with only minimal success as measured by legisla-
tive acceptance of its prescriptions in the states.273 Insurers have
271. Insurance Advocate, Oct. 27, 1973, at 16, col 1 (summarizing objections
to FIA proposals).
272. See, e.g., National Underwriter (P & C), May 21, 1976, at 9, col. 1.
273. Apparently no state has adopted the FIA proposals for property insur-
ance, but in North Carolina, which has a long history of large and
troublesome automobile assigned risk populations, a reinsurance facil-
ity for automobile liability insurance has been prescribed by statute.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-248.26, 58-248.40 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This
development has been accompanied by attempts by state regulatory
officials to require a "merit rating" classification scheme based solely
on individual driving records. For a summary account of the running
battle conducted in the press and in the courts see Flanigan & Johnson,
"Merit Rating" for Automobile Liability Insurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 425.
See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113H (West Supp. 1976);
S.C. CODE §§ 37-591.11 to 37-591.16 (Supp. 1976). Cf. National Under-
writer (P & C), Apr. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (Michigan report recommend-
ing FIA-style legislation for automobile and homeowners coverages).
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responded with proposals to adjust existing residual market mech-
anisms and with a full-blown brief arguing the necessity of untram-
meled freedom to engage in risk classification and selection, 274 but
seem not to have been able to counter the attractiveness and def-
initional potency of the FIA's anti-discrimination diagnosis. In
what is apparently a familiar pattern for such disputes,2 7 5 the de-
bate increasingly has been conducted on two planes. The first, so
far dominated by the industry perspectives, opposes conflicting pre-
dictions about the technical, short-run implications of implementing
the FIA proposal rather than some form of pool or joint under-
writing association.27 6 The second, of more concern to us here,
questions the adequacy of the FIA's "discrimination" diagnosis of
availability problems as summarization of the interests and values
involved and as guide to future moves in public policy. In this
latter debate, if only because "the metaphorical view that is offi-
cially disseminated usually enjoys a significant advantage,' 277 in-
surer efforts to construct and gain acceptance for an alternative
conception of the availability problem could be expected to en-
counter substantial difficulties. They have.
Thus, although the history recounted in this article would seem
to suggest that the once-amiable fiction that the programs are
private assumptions of responsibility for providing coverages for
residual risks "incident to" insurers' normal business has outlived
its usefulness to the industry, no alternative rationale has been
created to replace it. That is not to denigrate the continuing in-
dustry instinct to try to preserve the "private" image of residual
market mechanisms; doubtless it remains true that a "private"
character helps to insulate an enterprise from detailed public
scrutiny and that differentials perceived to be the product of the
market still are tolerated far more readily than similar differentials
in the provision of "public" services by "public" agencies.278 The
repeated assertions of industry responsibility have had important
effects of this intended variety. Indeed, in a sense they have suc-
ceeded too well. Years of insistance that availability problems
were private problems, to be handled by the industry, may have
274. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 15.
275. See, e.g., Herzog, Patterns of Controversy, 13 PUB. OPINION Q. 39
(1949) (reporting a taxonomy of "characteristic differences in the tone
and slant of answers given by those in favor of and those opposed
to the program or policy under inquiry"); R. LANE, THE REGULATION
OF BusixxssmEN 42, 75-88 (1954).
276. See note 219 and accompanying text supra.
277. M. EDELMAN, POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 72 (1971).
278. For a powerful treatment of this familiar theme, see Reich, The Law
of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
served to deflect and defer direct governmental intervention in the
underwriting process, but as availability has become an inescap-
ably "public" concern, as it has in the last decade, the identification
of the residual market mechanisms with the normal insurance in-
dustry has facilitated an analysis that fixes blame on the in-
surance industry for differential treatment of residual risks. It
also has helped to embed in the public imagination assumptions
that make it extremely difficult for insurers to reverse their tra-
ditional stance in order to argue that residual market programs
should be viewed as public efforts to deal with the normal, accept-
able fallout of voluntary market underwriting decisions. As a con-
sequence, the debate is being conducted on the FIA's ground:
availability problems remain "regulatory" problems freighted with
the range of channeling attitudes implicit in that conception; sub-
stantively, availability problems remain discrimination problems,
making existing industry practices appear especially vulnerable be-
cause matched against the FIA vision of objectivity, accuracy and
precision.
A. Limitations of the Anti-discrimination Sentiment
The rhetorical skill with which the FIA has packaged its pro-
posal has much to do with the continued hegemony of the anti-dis-
crimination sentiment as organizing conception for perceptions of
availability problems. By merging its condemnation of "sub-
jective" and "unvalidated" underwriting and rating judgments with
the "no distinctions" prescriptions of its Full Insurance Availability
proposals, the FIA suggests that an insurer underwriting or rating
decision is proper only if it "carved the [property insurance] uni-
verse at a natural joint,12 7 9 without undertaking to specify the
standards by which to determine acceptable incongruencies or
which rating and underwriting indicators should be proscribed.
The FIA's decision to treat imprecision in rating and underwriting
rather than its adverse impacts as the determinative evil has made
its prescription equally applicable in theory to all lines and clas-
sifications of insurance, and thus has allowed the FIA to avoid the
difficulties implicit in trying to assess when negative underwriting
decisions become a "problem" requiring regulatory intervention.
Perhaps most significantly, by framing its proposals as imperatives
of traditional notions of rating equity and precision, the FIA has
been able to call for internal subsidization of residual risks-
279. The phrase is drawn from Tussman & Ten Broek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CAunr. L. Rm,. 341, 346 (1949), where the bootless
character of such an inquiry is made plain.
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"temporary," of course-in the name of the ordinary regulatory
goals of effective and accurate cost-based pricing of property in-
surance coverages.
The anomalies implicit in this situation-a perceived demand for
accurate and particularized treatment of individual risks results in
a prescription that insurers ignore observed bases for differen-
tiation and write all at the same rate, and a rhetoric of anti-discrim-
ination adopted to avoid governmental interference with under-
writing prerogatives becomes the vehicle by which limitation of
underwriting freedoms is counseled-are at once a measure of the
rhetorical resources of the FIA proposal and an indication of its
analytical limitations. As argument, the FIA use of a simple slogan
decrying inaccuracy and imprecision appears to succeed as a defi-
nition of availability problems that allows the FIA "to conceal
the points of political conflict in favor of abstract principles of polit-
ical resolution 280 and that obscures the contradictions between the
principle and the expedient accommodations that must be made to
apply it. As serious guide to the interests and issues involved in
the availability problem and how public policy should regard them,
it is inadequate for those same reasons.
Thus, one warning that should be attached to the FIA's pack-
aging of the anti-discrimination sentiment is that it tends to divert
attention from the nature of the principle being asserted and there-
by encourages the disposition to consign disagreements about it to
familiar but only partially apt categories of contention. For in-
stance, there is a temptation to dismiss the current debate as simply
another dispute over how to make the trade-offs, implicit in any
classification scheme, between "equity," "efficiency," and "incen-
tives" on the one hand, and "equality," "spread," and "broad aver-
aging" on the other. Some commentators have seen in the FAIR
plans and in the FIA proposals the emergence of a shift away from
traditional industry and regulatory assumptions about how broadly
insured losses should be spread. As Professor Long views the long-
term trend, heretofore in most insurance lines
the tendency clearly has been toward progressive refinement of in-
surance rates to match anticipated losses of a particular insured for
a particular period. This refinement has been viewed as progress,
as improvement, as an approach to equity, and as commendable.
However, over the long-range future the trend may be reversed.
The public may decide, at least for certain types of insurance, that
the losses should be spread over relatively large groups without
the usual attention to actuarial finesse.281
280. Bennett, supra note 11, at 38.
281. J. LONG, supra note 108, at 110. To some observers, the advent of the
FAIR programs seemed to signal the beginnings of a movement to-
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As a description of some of the immediate effects of the property
programs and of the FIA formula, this statement clearly is accurate.
So also, from this limited perspective, are similar conclusions that
label these developments as another example of "taxation by reg-
ulation"-of an internal subsidy clothed in the rhetoric of equity.
82
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that although the
FIA's proposal imports these consequences, its argument does not.
The animating values articulated in the FIA diagnosis are pre-
cision, not spread, and correspondence between cost and price, not
purposive deviations from cost-based rates in the name of afford-
ability. Of course, at times both sides of the debate have found
it useful to attempt to frame the issues in the more familiar lan-
guage of subsidy and spread: an important part of the rhetorical
strategy of both the FIA and the industry has been to attempt to
saddle the other with the charge that its position promotes an un-
warranted subsidy of bad risks by good risks; doubtless, too, in-
surers would prefer that criticisms of current practices be under-
stood as claims that classifications cut too broadly rather than that
they are inaccurate. But while issues of how broadly classifica-
ward a "community rating" philosophy for property insurance in
which an increase in premiums paid by low risk and low expense in-
sureds would offset a decrease in the premiums to be charged high
risk and high expense properties. See, e.g., J. Com., Aug. 29,
1969, at 8, col. 1 (reporting speech by Herbert Denenberg). In
several senses the analogy was apt. Community rating in the
health insurances also was a product of fear of governmental displace-
ment of private institutions, and it too developed crescively and with-
out any clear vision of how health care coverages should be priced.
But see D. MAcINTYRE, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE AmD RATEmAK-
ING 18-49 (1962). On the other hand, at least as yet, in property insur-
ance there have not emerged the highly crystalized ethical and moral
arguments that have influenced "community rating" in the health in-
surances. See especially id. at 252-258. J. LONG, supra note 108, at
113-117, sees some evidence of a nascent sentiment of this sort in the
FAIR programs, but he draws his examples more from the Panel Re-
port's advocacy of consciously constructed public subsidies than from
the shape actually assumed by the program, and his perceptions in
many ways do not mesh well with the tone of the FIA analysis.
282. See generally Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGT.
Sc. 22 (1971); Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution,
13 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1970); Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory
Commissions, 62 Aia. ECON. Rxv. 47, 50 (1972). The line of argument,
though its details differ, draws from the same instincts that have
fueled arguments for entry restrictions in the so-called "natural
monopoly" markets as a means of avoiding cream-skimming by new
entrants that will inhibit the abilities of existing institutions to provide
needed but unprofitable services. In property insurance, with multi-
ple providers, the restrictions suggested by the FIA necessarily take
the form of an imposed uniformity and pooling of results.
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tions should be structured and whether it is appropriate to make
purposive redistributions through the insurance rate structure are
significant elements of the larger availability problem and thus
pose important regulatory issues,28 3 these are not the primary areas
of difference between the FIA and insurers. Instead, both profess
to embrace precision of cost-based pricing as a primary goal.
Where the FIA differs from the traditional view held by insurers
and many state regulatory officials is in its attitude toward how
this goal should be pursued in the face of the major conceptual
and practical barriers that stand in the way of perfect discrimina-
tion. What in the traditional view is the exercise of underwriting
judgment in the search for greater refinement and thus greater
equity is in the popular view articulated and fostered by the FIA
analysis an infection of subjectivity that prevents the achievement
of accurate cost-based pricing. For this state of affairs insurers
counsel research, judgment, and responsibility; the FIA finds its
answer in the aphorism that makes risk spreading "the original
283. See generally J. LONG, supra note 108; Pauly, The Welfare Economics
of Community Rating, 37 J. RISK & INs. 407 (1970); Long, Insurance
Subsidies and Welfare Economics, 39 J. RIsK & INs. 341 (1972). Cf.
PANEL HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 52 (Commissioner Roddis of Califor-
nia discussing difficulties and dangers of subsidy- efforts through rate
structure adjustments).
Most of the explicit work on these questions in property insurance
has been prompted by the failure of private insurance mechanisms to
provide the so-called "disaster" coverages--earthquake, flood, hurri-
cane, and windstorm-in the localized areas in which they are most
needed. See generally D. DAcY & H. KuNSnUTHEn, THE EcoNomics
OF NATURAL DIsASTEas; IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL PoLIcY 244 (1969).
Proposals usually involve a mandatory combination of coverages for
these perils in standard property insurance policies in an attempt to
provide spread across both perils and geographic areas. Professor
Anderson has provided the most easily accessible consideration of re-
cent proposals and their implications. Anderson, An Analysis of the
Federal Catastrophe Insurance Program, 27 CPCU ANNALS 213 (1974);
Anderson, Development of the Principal Elements of a Comprehensive
Catastrophe Insurance System, 28 CPCU ANNALS (1975); Anderson,
All Risks Rating Within a Catastrophe Insurance System, 43 J. RIsK
& INS. 629 (1976). See also Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive
Disaster Insurance, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 133 (1968). Most such discus-
sions assume a rough equivalence of the exposures added by "all-risk"
packaging, with hurricanes in Louisiana balancing tornadoes in Kansas
and earthquakes in California. For a time, the NAIC flirted with the
idea of recommending model implementing "all-risk" legislation, but
the proposals encountered strong insurer opposition and were never
close to adoption. See generally II 1972 NAT'L A. INS. CoMMIsSIoNERs
PROC. 511-15; I 1974 NAT'L A. INS. CoMIIsSIONERS PROC. 550-64. Cf.
Sullivan, Possible Industry Approaches to Catastrophe Coverages, 28
CPCU ANNALs 26 (1975) (surveying various industry attitudes toward
"all-risk" proposals),
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concept of insurance," 28 4 and urges that until rating inadequacies
can be corrected, greater "spread" is to be preferred to "subjective"
attempts to make distinctions among risks on bases not recognized
in the rating plans being employed.
Thus, to the extent that the current debate is characterized as
featuring disputes about appropriate degrees of spread or the
propriety of purposive deviations from efforts to make property
insurance prices proportional to expected costs, the most significant
aspect of the disagreements between the FIA and the insurers is
being missed. That area of difference continues to involve the
underwriting prerogative and whether and how it should be con-
strained. The FIA proposal continues to make the market guar-
antee an "industry" responsibility. It avoids direct interdiction
of an individual insurer's freedom to decide for itself whether to
add a particular risk to its own portfolio, but hides that decision
from insureds and the public by forcing it to occur behind the
scenes as a decision to reinsure. The FIA prescription does not
alter the FAIR plan result that makes insurers collectively assume
the unwanted risks, nor does it change the nature of the gamesman-
ship involved for insurers concerned about how the adverse ex-
perience will be allocated.285 The real lines of division between
the FIA and the insurers continue to be drawn over whether, and
when, and under what terms industry surpluses and administrative
structures should be conscripted to provide coverage to unwanted
risks. Thus, though the rhetoric is little changed, the rationale for
imposing an industry-wide obligation to assume unwanted property
insurance risks has moved a long way since the urban areas plans:
from a "voluntary" acceptance of corporate responsibility to not
withdraw from core areas in the face of urban crisis; to a prohibi-
tion of underwriting against certain property insurance coverages
on the basis of area alone; to a generalized anti-discrimination norm
indicting the imprecision of property insurance rating structures.
284. Letter, supra note 259, at 8. The FIA arguments, drawing their exam-
ples chiefly from automobile insurance, repeatedly have included at-
tacks on the industry's "passion for overclassification" and calls for
a "return to the basic insurance principle of spreading the risk." See,
e.g., Bernstein, The Bernstein Proposals in PROCEEDINGS OF THEi NAII
18TH ANNuAL WoRKsHop 199, 204 (1972).
285. See generally FULL INsuRAxCE AVAILABLI, supra note 15, at 12-15.
The FIA proposes a sharing formula designed to penalize insurers
"ceding more than their fair share" to the reinsurance facility, id. at
14, by tying participation to relative growth or reductions in retained
premiums written as compared to a five year base period. If, nonethe-
less, "abuse of the Exchange does occur, the legislation should provide
for the governing committee ... and for the State regulator to take
appropriate action." Id. at 15.
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In a sense, the rhetoric has become the reality; the "problem" has
been limited and amended by the labels used to describe it. Though
the attractions of the anti-discrimination label derive in large part
from the variety of concerns it can seem to express, as translated in
the FIA prescription its focus is narrow and one dimensional, with
a tendency to confine the debate to the question of whether in-
surers can defend the subjectivity, rules of thumb, and "judgment"
that characterize existing market practices.
Still another caution concerns the inadequacies of the anti-dis-
crimination sentiment itself. The accuracy and objectivity that
the FIA offers as the corrective for the imprecision and subjectivity
it indicts for causing availability problems cannot be expected to
function as standards against which to measure industry perform-
ance and the need for regulatory initiatives. They are sentiments,
not standards, and they share the limitations that Edelman has
termed "[t]he fundamentally insatiable character of political
goals.12 8 6  Accuracy in this context has no customary defining
ethos, and the FIA does not attempt to supply one. "Equity will
support anything, '2 87 W. Arthur Lewis has told us; so also with the
FIA's anti-discrimination sentiment. The practical consequences of
this situation are several.
One involves the difficulties of determining the circumstances
in which programs to ensure availability will be required. The
FIA's selection of rating and underwriting imprecision as the deter-
minative vice, rather than unavailability and its consequences,
makes the FIA's prescription by its own logic equally applicable
to all lines, amounts, classifications and locations of insurance with-
out regard to the nature or the magnitude of the impacts of the
negative underwriting decision. The FIA recognized this feature
of its proposal, and attempted to make it a virtue:
Although the Full Insurance Availability system could be appli-
cable both to personal lines of insurance and to small commercial
lines, we do not attempt to define or limit the lines of personal
and small commercial coverage that should be included in the man-
date. That is the responsibility of the individual States, which are
best able to evaluate their needs and the appropriate solutions.28 8
286. M. EDELMANN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 190 (1964).
287. W. LEwis, OvERHEAD COSTS 47 (1949).
288. FULL INsURANCE AvAILABILITY, supra note 15, at 9. But see id. at 74-
75:
The lines of insurance to be covered by the mandate should
include, as a minimum, those lines which are considered es-
sential on the basis of current societal and business require-
ments .... Excepted from the mandate, however, should be
those lines of insurance, such as flood insurance, where pri-
vate industry is unable to provide broad coverage at unsubsi-
dized rates without government assistance.
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Of course, any decision by a state to limit the programs would, in
terms of the anti-discrimination rationale, render the state vulner-
able to the charge that it is engaged in official redlining. The
charge is not an unfamiliar one to state regulators faced with com-
plaints about the geographical limits of existing programs, their
coverage limits, or their failure to offer homeowners and other
package coverages. Heretofore rejoinders have been able to draw
upon the patent character of the programs as limited responses to
one facet of the urban crisis; debates that focus on the pragmatic
judgments involved in defining a minimum of "essential" property
insurance coverages doubtless are ad hoc and expedient, but at
least they are likely to be in touch with the appropriate issues and
interests. The FIA rationale, by contrast, would appear to legiti-
mate and demand a limitless series of interventions.
Even more fundamentally, the FIA analysis purports to be an
indictment of imprecision in current property insurance rating and
underwriting practices, but its articulation of the anti-discrimination
sentiment provides no stopping points for evaluating rating and
underwriting practices actually employed in the voluntary mar-
ket.28 9 For reasons canvassed earlier in this article, complete par-
ticularization is an ephemeral notion impossible to achieve in prac-
tice, and its claim to status as a regulatory value is not unequivocal.
Translated into terms of the possible, the FIA anti-discrimination
sentiment becomes an ambition that rating and underwriting in-
dicators be made to demonstrate an acceptably high correlation
with the inference sought, still with no intrinsic guides to what
should be deemed acceptable congruence or to what the congruence
should relate. Thus, while the anti-discrimination sentiment must
import some idea of eliminating what Professor Tribe has called
('readily unprovable generalizations," 290 the questions that it poses
cannot really be reduced much beyond whether the inevitable de-
cision rules will be "rules of thumb" in the pejorative FIA sense, or
289. See, e.g., FULL INsURANCE AVAILABILITY, supra note 15, at 12:
The insurance industry would be required to utilize objec-
tive and statistically supported classifications of risk and to
compile credible statistical data consistent with basic princi-
ples of insurance.
Complete elimination of rate classifications is not
necessary, desirable or contemplated, ... but present abuses
cannot be adequately corrected until classifications are re-
quired to be statistically supported and the number of classes
is reduced substantially.
290. Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presump-
tions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 8, 11 (1975).
560 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 3 (1977)
corporate decision rules acceptably predicated on experience, re-
search and sound judgment.
2 91
Moreover, in any inquiry into degree of congruence, one must
consider not only the indicator but also the inference the indicator
is thought to suggest. Is the congruence to be between the rating
indicator and the "attractiveness" of the risk to an insurer? And
its "riskiness"? Or "riskiness about which the prospective insured
could do something"? If the last or even the second of these alter-
natives is thought appropriate, then the inquiry is not solely into
291. The lessons learned in the recent excursion of constitutional law into
"conclusive presumption" analysis may be relevant here. At the least,
this experience would appear to indicate the wisdom of fixing atten-
tion on the broader question of the reasonableness of the relationship
between the classification base and the inference it is supposed to sup-
port rather than solely upon the degree to which the classification in-
dicator provides particularized accuracy in individual cases. See gen-
erally Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 449 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1975); Note, The Con-
clusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection, 72
MIcH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
Admittedly, at one level the chief consequence of this choice of fo-
cus is to admit to the governing calculus considerations of administra-
tive feasibility and costs of further particularization. See, e.g., I A.
KAHN, supra note 18, ch. 7. More significantly, however, at some level
decision rules will persist because the more precise questions they
avoid simply are not answerable in the context in which they arise:
conclusions for predictive exercises inevitably are applicable only
across the populations involved and not for individual members of the
population. Thus, when Professor Long predicts that "[c]ybernetics
will make rate making a science," he is not envisioning the millenial
textbook extreme of completely particularized rate making; neverthe-
less, the demand "to be treated as an individual rather than as a statis-
tic or as a member of a group-particularly of a group the individual
did not knowingly choose to join," Tribe, supra note 290, at 10, is as
persistent-and as intractable-in insurance as elsewhere. For a high-
ly speculative suggestion of how the industry might react to such
claims, see STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 108: "The
accuracy and sense of fairness -in risk assessment could be enhanced
by providing a course of appeal for individuals-such as a personalized
rating service." Cf. AM. INS. AsS'N PRoc. 85-86 (1976) (actuary
indicating conceptual and practical difficulties of appeals program).
Of course, the law currently is wrestling with such questions in
a variety of settings. For a full development of the arguments that
swirl around the problems of "false positives" in predictive decision-
making and, by contrast, a useful sense of proportion concerning the
significance of the problems in property insurance, see Fagin, The Pol-
icy Implications of Predictive Decision-Making: "Likelihood" and
"Dangerousness" in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 24 PuB. POL'Y 491
(1976); Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 84 (1968).
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incongruence, but involves a remaking of what the insurer may
legitimately try to do; it involves a determination that an attribute
of a risk will not be considered a "morally relevant characteris-
tic.' '2 9 2 On these questions the FIA also remains silent.
B. Recasting the Debate
The point of this litany of reservations about the FIA proposal
is not that the specific recommendations it suggests are necessarily
inappropriate ways to amend the property insurance programs nor
that the expedient judgments that must be made to implement its
prescriptions will prove unmanageable in context; those seem diffi-
cult and still open issues, for which the cautionary questions raised
here have only limited significance. Instead, the primary concern is
that the FIA analysis, as an apparently authoritative statement of
the public issues posed by availability problems, will continue its
unfortunate tendency to channel and congeal the debate, thus lim-
iting the issues that will be recognized and argued, and masking the
fact that important questions associated with availability problems
are simply not addressed by the anti-discrimination sentiment.
The problem is the familiar one featured throughout this article.
Language useful to the rhetorical strategies through which political
outcomes are engineered typically provides vocabularies more likely
to impede than to aid clear understanding of the range of interests,
attitudes and institutions implicated in complex social questions.
The tensions thus imposed cannot be slipped:
Thinking clearly about goals is a tough assignment for a political
system that has been held together in great part by compromise,
ambiguity, and contradiction. And if a choice must be made, any
reasonable person would, I think, prefer the system to the clarity.
But now that we have decided to intervene in such a wide range
of human affairs, perhaps we ought to reassess that particular
tradeoff.2 9 3
At least the tradeoff should be confined to its own ambit; doubt-
less political documents may assert a claim to be understood and
judged as political documents, and on that standard the FIA anal-
ysis can hardly be faulted. On the other hand, a working agenda
292. See generally Nickel, Discrimination and Morally Relevant Character-
istics, 32 AALYsis 113 (1972). For elaboration of the influence of
similar themes on recent developments in constitutional equal protec-
tion doctrines and fair employment legislation, see Brest, Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HRv. L. REv. 1
(1976); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PnnLosopHay
& PuB. AFF. 107 (1976); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws,
38 U. Car. L. REv. 235 (1971).
293. Wilson, supra note 25, at 9.
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for public attitudes toward availability problems should aspire to
more.
A serious attempt to describe availability problems and prescribe
for them could, it seems, admit the impossibility of constructing a
single rubric able to summarize and rationalize the diverse claims
for public interventions in insurance markets to assure availability
of particular coverages, accuracy and particularization in rating, af-
fordability, spread, maintenance of competitive balance, normalcy
of operating procedures, and all of the other demands-themselves
labels that simultaneously express and mask a variety of interests,
attitudes, and perceptions-that may be associated with "availabil-
ity problems." "Equity" is probably as close to a universal solvent
for the social concerns involved here as we are likely to create, and
it is inadequate. There is not one availability problem, but many,
and a single response must include a rejection or partial frustration
of some of the demands being made. If the debate about the future
course of public measures in this area is to be a useful one, it should
confront this reality. A starting point for this process would in-
volve, at a minimum, an attempt to disaggregate the present debate
to enforce a focus on the several different claims being asserted.
This effort should also include an attempt to escape the canal-
izing influence of the institutional perspective that sees availability
problems as necessarily "regulatory," to be addressed if at all with
the traditional array of "regulatory" responses. 294 If public inter-
294. Thus, as Professor Kimball warned in 1961, "[ilf socialization of risk
is viewed as an objective of insurance regulation, it at once alters the
basic focus of the enterprise from one essentially private (albeit sub-
ject to control in the public interest) to one which is essentially pub-
lic." Kimball, supra note 1, at 513. Much of the history with which
this article has dealt concerns attempts to escape that reality. A more
mature formulation would recognize that the pressures lumped to-
gether in "availability problems" involve both claims for "socializa-
tion" of some risks, invoking one style of public intervention and cor-
responding arenas of political struggle, and more traditional claims for
regulatory interventions to attempt to proscribe specific kinds of in-
surer conduct. See generally authorities cited note 16 supra; Lowi,
Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Tech-
nocracy, 30 PUB. ADM. RmT. 314 (1970). See also K. BouLniNG, PRINcI-
PLEs OF EcoNo c PoLICY 300 (1958) (distinguishing regulatory inter-
ventions "politicizing" economic activity from interventions with "so-
cializing" effects); Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal & Economic
Freedoms-A Review of Robert L. Hale's "Freedom through Law," 54
COLUm. L. Rzv. 70 (1954) (distinguishing different "modes, forms and
purposes of legal and economic restraints"):
WIe will get along better if we do one thing at a time and
by the methods appropriate to the job at hand .... Discre-
tion, in the sense of proceeding with only the guidance of gen-
eral standards, may be useful when applied to some problems
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vention is required it can be framed as attempts to constrain, direct-
ly or indirectly, the ways in which underwriting prerogatives are
exercised, but there is another choice as well. The debate should at
least be broad enough to acknowledge that for some circumstances
the appropriate public response may be an attempt to assure cov-
erage for some of the risks rejected by the voluntary market, rather
than an effort to intervene in the underwriting process to prevent
the rejection. Cast in this fashion the debate can more easily con-
front the subsidiary questions of whether coverage guarantees
should be accomplished through public or private bureaucracies.
Although recasting the debate in these ways might identify nu-
merous issues of greater or lesser distinctness, at the least this effort
should separate inquiries concerning what sorts of rating and un-
derwriting decisions should be considered so antisocial as to war-
rant legal proscription from questions of what packages of cover-
ages, services and price should be guaranteed to what categories
of risks rejected by the voluntary market. The first set of questions
implicates concerns for accuracy and particularization and the the-
oretical and practical limitations that must qualify pursuit of those
ambitions. It also may involve demands-first felt in property
insurance as objections to the use of "area" or "environmental
hazards" as underwriting indicators-that a variety of decision bases
be proscribed directly, perhaps for reasons that have little to do
with the accuracy of the predictions use of such indicators may per-
mit. The second set of questions invokes a different social calculus.
Here the questions are whether, and to what extent, particular in-
surance coverages can claim an importance that will justify select-
ing them from among goods and services generally for special guar-
antees of availability.2 95 Hopefully, the history recounted by this
article suggests how the failure to keep these questions distinct may
of corrective justice, but dangerous when applied to problems
of distributive justice.
Id. at 80-82.
295. See generally Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequity, 13 J.L.
& EcoN. 263, 264 (1970) (discussing "specific egalitarianism"-"the
view that certain specific scarce commodities should be distributed less
unequally than the ability to pay for them," and the instincts that tend
professional economists to oppose such interventions); Posner, supra
note 282. Cf. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theo-
ries of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 901 (1976) (suggest-
ing a middle ground between the "egalitarian"' views of J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and the "libertarian" tenets stated in R.
NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AN UTOPIA (1974), and arguing that "this
principle-that basic material needs be guaranteed by government to
those who cannot meet them through their own efforts-has come to
have an entrenched status as one of the fixed moral imperatives gov-
erning our political life").
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have distorted the answer supplied for each and frustrated devel-
opment of a more explicit dialogue about how to approach these
areas of concern.
Of course, as we also have seen, powerful structures of habit
and interest are likely to resist attempts to recast the public debate
in these ways. Still, it is not clear that this effort need be without
effect in the real world. Conditions have changed since the property
insurance programs were first instituted. The attractions to the
industry of the arguments from voluntarism are less obvious now
that where they can lead is more apparent, and the programs sup-
plying medicare benefits and flood and crime coverages have pro-
vided useful additional experience with an alternative model in
which the industry role is chiefly administrative and government is
the primary risk taker. Moreover, the idea of directly imposed con-
straints on underwriting decision predicates is less unthinkable now
than a few years ago. The property programs' indirect prohibition
against considering "environmental hazards" has been joined in
other lines of insurance by legislative and regulatory restrictions
on the use of race, sex, age and a variety of other factors in under-
writing decisions. 298 The list seems destined to grow.
In sum, one of the important current tasks of insurance regu-
lation and those who study it is to develop and encourage deploy-
ment of a vocabulary for availability problems that will free the
debate from dominance by the institutional perspective and the rhe-
toric of discrimination. Probably no rigorous general formulation
can be constructed for this shifting congeries of concerns, but it
should be possible to do better than either the recurring slogan that
converts availability problems into discrimination problems or its
antithesis in blandness, the industry celebration of the inevitability
of tradeoffs between spread and perfect equity. Aggregated in the
FIA manner, the issues sometimes appear sui generis, insurance reg-
ulation's own special torment; disaggregated, the separate questions
may turn out to be not so different from issues being confronted
in other regulatory arenas and for which a community of experience
and thought may be available and worth consulting. Joining the
debate at the level of a search for "plausible policies for an imper-
fect world"2 97 is not likely to much reduce the difficulties of the
choices to be made, but at least it might increase their staying
power by improving the chances that they will be made with a
clearer advertance to the interests and attitudes that generate and
shape the many facets of property insurance availability problems.
296. See note 72 supra.
297. Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate Regulation: Plausible Policies for
an Imperfect World, in A. Phillips & 0. Williamson, supra note 57, at
108.
